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IAN WORTHINGTON AND JOHN MILES FOLEY

EPEA AND GRAMMATA

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(ORALITY AND LITERACY IN ANCIENT GREECE, VOL. 4)

EDITED BY

IAN WORTHINGTON AND JOHN MILES FOLEY

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PREFACE

This volume is a selection of papers presented at the conference 'Epea and Grammata: Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece', held at the University of Missouri-Columbia, U.S.A, in June 2000, and convened by John Miles Foley and Ian Worthington. The conference was also the fourth in what has become a biennial series, which began in July 1994 when Worthington convened 'Voice Into Text' at the University of Tasmania, Australia. E.J. Brill of The Netherlands agreed to publish selected refereed papers from that and subsequent conferences, and in 1996 *Voice Into Text, Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece* (edited by Worthington) appeared. In July 1996 Anne Mackay convened 'Signs of Orality' at the University of Natal, South Africa, and in 1999 *Signs of Orality, The Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World* (edited by Mackay) was published. Then in July 1998 Janet Watson convened 'Epos and Logos' at the University of Wellington, New Zealand; *Speaking Volumes. Orality and Literacy in the Greek and Roman World* (edited by Janet Watson) was published in 2001. Thus, the present book is Volume 4 in the Orality and Literacy series. In July 2002, Christopher Mackie will convene the fifth meeting at the University of Melbourne, Australia (with the theme 'Oral Traditions and Material Context'), and at this stage the sixth, to be convened by Margalit Finkelberg, is set for Tel Aviv in 2002.

One feature of the Orality and Literacy series is the emphasis on plenty of time for discussion, not only after each paper but also during the conference generally and on social excursions. The Missouri conference was no different – over the course of a week, two dozen papers, some precirculated, by scholars from half a dozen countries were presented at an average of five per day. Another feature has been the air of genuine friendliness exhibited by all attendees, making a perfectly relaxed and convivial atmosphere. Future meetings are likely to be no different.

Worthington and Foley gratefully acknowledge the support (both moral and, especially important, monetary) of the Departments of History, Classical Studies, English, and Art History and Archaeology, the Center for Studies in Oral Tradition, Dr. Richard Schwartz, Dean of the College of Arts and Science, Dr. Brady Deaton, Provost

of the University of Missouri-Columbia, and Dr. Richard Wallace, Chancellor of the University of Missouri-Columbia. We are also grateful to all the participants at the conference who made it such a successful and enjoyable event, and to our wives Tracy Worthington and Anne-Marie Foley, who provided intellectual and practical support. In addition, we would like to thank the contributors to this book who so quickly responded to Worthington's requests and did not abuse him too much, and also Julian Deahl and Michiel Klein Swormink at Brill.

Three notes: (1) all dates in the book are BC unless otherwise indicated. (2) Given that the contributors in this book live in North America, Australia and Europe, we have allowed both American and English spellings rather than trying to impose one spelling system. (3) Despite the inevitable criticism of inconsistency, we have allowed those authors who prefer to transliterate Greek names rather than anglicize them the luxury of doing this.

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E.A. MACKAY

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Proto-Attic amphora by the Polyphemos Painter, Eleusis Museum. Photograph copyright Deutsches Archaeologisches Institut Athen (neg. no. Eleusis 544). Detail from the neck: Odysseus and two of his men put out the eye of Polyphemos.

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Attic black-figure amphora by the Painter of the Vatican Mourner, Vatican 16581. Detail of reverse scene: Menelaos regains Helene. Photograph courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, reproduced by kind permission of the Direzione Generale, Monumenti Musei e Gallerie Pontificie, Vatican.

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Attic black-figure amphora by Group E, London B 205. Obverse: the death of Priamos. Photograph courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum.

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Attic black-figure amphora by Exekias, Boulogne-sur-mer 558. Obverse scene: Aias prepares to commit suicide. Photograph courtesy of the Chateau-Musée, Boulogne-sur-mer.

NIALL SLATER

Drawing by the author.

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PART ONE

LITERATURE, ART, AND DRAMA

CHAPTER ONE

EDITING AND TRANSLATING TRADITIONAL ORAL EPIC: THE SOUTH SLAVIC SONGS AND HOMER

JOHN MILES FOLEY

In the mid-1930s Milman Parry journeyed to the former Yugoslavia to test his hypothesis that Homer was a traditional oral poet, and that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* that have reached us bear the unmistakable signs of an oral traditional heritage. Together with Albert Lord and their native assistant Nikola Vujnović, he recorded hundreds of epic narratives from South Slavic *guslari*, or oral poets, and samples of these performances from the regions of Novi Pazar and Bijelo Polje have been transcribed, edited, and translated in the series *Serbo-Croatian Heroic Songs*. It is chiefly on this evidence—most of which remains unpublished in the Milman Parry Collection of Oral Literature at Harvard University—that Lord based his epochal book, *The Singer of Tales*, and from which the comparative field of studies in oral tradition has since taken root. To say that the South Slavic oral epic tradition was instrumental in rediscovering ancient Greek orality is thus a vast understatement; from a historical perspective the *guslar*'s performances were from the beginning a *sine qua non*.[1]

This chapter is intended as a prospectus on a long-term project, a map that charts a pathway toward its eventual goal: providing usable original-language editions and English-language translations

[1] On the history of the Oral-Formulaic Theory, see J.M. Foley, *The Theory of Oral Composition: History and Methodology* (Bloomington, 1988, repr. 1992); for bibliography, J.M. Foley, *Oral-Formulaic Theory and Research: An Introduction and Annotated Bibliography* (New York, 1988), with updates in *Oral Tradition* 1 (1986), 767–808, 3 (1988), 191–228, and 12 (1997), 366–484—also available online at the following URL: http://www.oraltradition.org. I hold bibliographical citations to a minimum herein; for relevant scholarship, see the endnotes to John Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art* (University Park, Pa., 1999). Publications of the Parry-Lord materials to date include six volumes edited and translated by M. Parry, A.B. Lord, and D.E. Bynum of the series *Serbo-Croatian Heroic Songs* 1–2, 3–4, 6, 14 (Belgrade and Cambridge, Mass., 1953). The English-language volumes are 1: *Novi Pazar: English Translations*, and 3: *The Wedding of Smailagić Meho* by Avdo Medjedović.

of South Slavic oral epic poetry. As such, it has four linked aims. First and most generally, I aspire to increase the limited number of translations of non-canonical works of verbal art. The available selection has of course long been dominated by Western works accepted as 'part of the heritage', silencing many other voices—especially the voices of oral traditions—in the process. In an era of rapidly evolving globalization, these other voices need and deserve to be heard, by both scholars and students.[2]

Second and more specifically, I want particularly to add to the available sample of editions and translations of South Slavic epic. It is a continuing irony that, since the work of Milman Parry and Albert Lord in the 1930s and for that matter well beforehand, so much has been based upon the epic tradition of the *guslari* when so little of its riches have stood open to anyone but specialists. The Oral-Formulaic Theory rests almost entirely on the initial comparison between Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* on the one hand, and the Moslem epic songs from the former Yugoslavia on the other; yet the comparatist is hobbled by the paucity of published, circulating evidence. This situation has led to polarization, with South Slavic specialists sometimes claiming more than can be fully illustrated on the basis of the present inventory of English-language exemplars while scholars from other areas not seldom profess doubt over the length, quality, and overall viability of an epic tradition they have been able only to glimpse here and there. A wider and deeper view of the tradition will help to relieve this tension.

Third, and relatedly, the present project responds to a need to bolster existing theory by a fresh emphasis on practice. That is, instead of beginning with scholarly perspectives, it will return to the performances of South Slavic epic in order to avoid the automatic, 'default' assumptions we too often make about works of verbal art we encounter only as texts. Thus, for example, translation will be construed as broadly as possible—not merely the conversion from South Slavic to English, but the transformation from performance to record, from record to transcription, from transcription to edited text, and from edited text to a suitably configured English equiva-

[2] See especially L. Haring, 'What Would a True Comparative Literature Look Like?', in J.M. Foley (ed.), *Teaching Oral Traditions* (New York, 1998), 34–45, as well as the entire collection *Teaching Oral Traditions*, which offers introductions to dozens of oral traditions, living and textualized, as well as methodological essays.

lent. At every step, we will aim not to rationalize but to problematize the translation, seeking to understand the many-leveled process as thoroughly as possible, and on its own terms.

Fourth, and potentially most significantly, this project will engage what must amount to the core challenge in any such endeavor: to *translate the implications.* Here, a great many problems present themselves. Most generally, the same questions emerge as with any work of verbal art, oral or written, performed or inscribed—in a word, the many dimensions of its idiomatic character. How does one convey even a partial sense of cultural context, historical framework, relationship to other works, and so forth? Some of these concerns can be addressed via a conventional apparatus, including an introduction and running notes to the text. But for South Slavic oral epic the implications do not end here, since any edition and translation that aspire to faithful representation must also confront the traditional poetics that informs both the composition and the reception of the given performance or text. Not only are the units of meaning—the formulaic phraseology, the typical scenes, the story-patterns—endemically different from the words, sentences, paragraphs, chapters, and books of written literature. Beyond what these units literally mean lies the further challenge of what they imply. Because 'oral traditions work like languages, only more so', they possess what I have elsewhere called *traditional referentiality*, the value-added layer of idiomatic meaning indexed or cued by their units.[3] To handle such dimensions, we must devise a new kind of presentation, one that uses the resonance of the tradition to quicken the individual performance or text.

Let me stipulate before proceeding farther that the focus of this essay and the project as a whole will be on South Slavic Moslem epic from the Milman Parry Collection.[4] That is, as noted above,

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[3] For a comparative view of ancient Greek, South Slavic, and Anglo-Saxon epic, see J.M. Foley, *Traditional Oral Epic: The Odyssey, Beowulf, and the Serbo-Croatian Return Song* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990; repr. 1993); on traditional referentiality, see J.M. Foley, *Immanent Art: From Structure to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic* (Bloomington, 1991), especially 6–8, and *The Singer of Tales in Performance* (Bloomington, 1995). This homemade proverb—'oral traditions work like languages, only more so'—is one of six such nuggets of pseudo-folk wisdom that were formulated to emphasize various aspects of traditional poetics; see further, Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art*, especially 6–7.

[4] For a sense of the immense archival holdings of the Parry Collection in South Slavic epic, see M. Kay, *The Index of the Milman Parry Collection 1933–35: Heroic Songs, Conversations, and Stories* (New York, 1995).

we will be concerned with the same subgenre of epic that served as the sole comparand for the foundation of the Oral-Formulaic Theory. This means that we will be considering a highly unified sample of traditional narrative, recorded in this case from the Stolac region of central Hercegovina chiefly in 1934–35, that consists mostly of relatively extensive songs of return or of weddings.[5] But it also means that we will not be able to treat other genres or subgenres, forms that are certainly interesting and worthwhile in their own right and which collectively give a more realistic picture of South Slavic oral traditions as a whole than could any single genre or subgenre taken on its own. Indeed, this limitation, unstated at the time, proved both a strength and a weakness of the Parry-Lord research in its initial stages: the Moslem epic provided an excellent analogue for Homeric epic in many ways, but the model that was generalized outward to hundreds of other traditions and forms was too narrow to be widely applicable.[6] Notwithstanding this constraint, I offer the translation of South Slavic Moslem epics from Stolac both as a suitable text case, hopefully generalizable (with adjustments) to other oral traditions, and as an end in itself. We need to know more about this fascinating mode of verbal art—as a window on epic traditions worldwide and as what the Anglo-Saxon poets called a 'word-hoard' in its own right.

In order to provide as full and comprehensive a view as possible of the issues involved in the edition-translation project, I will adopt below the two-step format of stating the particular problem or challenge and then offering one or more solutions or approaches. I will employ this two-part approach to consider six topics: (1) translation from performance to page, (2) conversion from an ongoing process to a static product, (3) traditional implications: resonance and meaning, (4) indexed translations: a mediaeval analogue, (5) strategies for reflecting the specialized language of South Slavic epic, and (6) cre-

[5] This is the section of the Parry Collection that Albert Lord designated as my responsibility. I am grateful to him, and now to the Curators of the Milman Parry Collection, Stephen Mitchell and Gregory Nagy, for their ready assistance in providing access to the Stolac materials and for granting permission to publish them; and also to Matthew Kay and David Elmer, who have prepared new digitalized copies of many of the recordings and transcriptions in question.

[6] See J.M. Foley, 'Oral Tradition and Its Implications,' in I. Morris and B. Powell (eds.), *A New Companion to Homer* (Leiden, 1997), especially 159–65, and Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art*, especially 39–45.

ating audience fluency. As we move through the discussion, it will become apparent that all six topics are aspects or dimensions of the same fundamental challenge: to find a way of expanding a page-bound, spatialized, textual presentation into at least a partial experience of a traditional oral performance. Although no object, no matter how carefully constructed, can ever fully simulate the process or experience from which it derives, we can move closer to the experience by becoming more aware of its identity as an event that takes place within the uniquely structured and highly resonant context of the epic tradition.[7]

From performance to page

Scholarship has established the importance of what is lost in the trajectory from the experience of a live performance—in this case by a South Slavic *guslar*—to the silent codification of a printed edition.[8] In the present state of knowledge, no one seriously contests the cost of this primary stage of translation; the only question is how to minimize its effect or compensate for at least part of the inevitable loss. One very direct method is to provide the reader an acoustic record of the performance, and in fact the new edition of Albert Lord's classic 1960 book, *The Singer of Tales*, published in 2000, includes a compact disk (CD) with the cited examples of South Slavic epic available for audio perusal. While this option can be relatively expensive and may thus present a problem for publications likely to

[7] As a double epigraph to what follows, let me cite two more of the homemade proverbs. First, 'performance is the enabling event, tradition is the enabling referent'. Second, and with special pertinence to the role of the audience, 'composition and reception are two sides of the same coin'. For more of these proverbs, see Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art*, 5–7, and 'What's in a Sign?', in E.A. Mackay (ed.), *Signs of Orality: The Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World* (Leiden, 1999), 11–13.

[8] On the history of editing folklore performances to texts, see E.C. Fine, *The Folklore Text: From Performance to Print* (Bloomington, 1994) and 'Leading Proteus Captive: Editing and Translating Oral Tradition', in J.M. Foley (ed.), *Teaching Oral Traditions* (New York, 1998), 59–71, and J.M. Foley, 'Folk Literature', in D.C. Greetham (ed.), *Scholarly Editing: A Guide to Research* (New York, 1995), 600–26. For a magisterial account of textualizing oral epic in many different traditions all over the world, see L. Honko, *Textualising the Siri Epic* (Helsinki, 1998), especially 169–217, and his edited *Textualizing of Oral Epics* (Berlin, 2000).

reach a smaller readership (and listenership), it does offer a promising alternative.

In the edition of South Slavic epic from the Stolac region, I plan two additional resources to assist the reader in recreating something of the original context, in co-creating what I have called the *performance arena*.[9] One of these strategies will consist of a description of the setting and performance assumptions in the volume's preface. Here I will concentrate on distinguishing between performance and text, on urging the reader to imagine not a geographical or temporal location but in effect a virtual space for performance that can be entered and re-entered. Arguing that the performance arena is a function of the event of epic composition and reception (and not of any one place or time), I will point toward understanding the dedicated channel of communication that each performance opens. To understand the event of epic, so goes the logic, we need to understand its working assumptions.

The second strategy focuses on the individual poet's management of the traditional event. Each performance will be introduced by a headnote sketching the singer's personal habits of performance, as compared to the repertoire of shared traditional features from the Stolac region and more widely. The individual's use of *performatives*, the 'extra' sounds that each one employs to bridge hiatus, for example, or his personal formulaic habits will bear mention here.[10] Whatever the case, the headnotes will also depend upon and selectively quote from the often enlightening conversations that Parry and Lord's native assistant Nikola Vujnović (himself an epic singer) held with all of the *guslari* whom they recorded. To place the individual's artistic achievement in the context of his region's collective tradition will help to alleviate the transition from performance to page, from the engaging presence of a real event with a real singer to the distant silence of print.

[9] For a full discussion of this term and concept, see Foley, *Singer*, 47–9.

[10] These aspects will be fully documented in appendices on Usage and on Traditional Language.

From process to product

Another general problem that arises in moving from the performance of South Slavic oral epic to a viable edition and translation is the conversion of an ongoing process to a static product. Especially for readers accustomed to responding in culturally approved ways to texts, any such presentation must engage automatic assumptions about authorship, history, and textuality that will stand in the way of basic understanding. One can point to many examples of this kind of misconstrual, none among them more longlasting than the search for the historical Homer. Faced with contradictory 'biographical' details, scholars from the ancient world through the present day have attempted to tease out a coherent life-story, a defensible set of tangible facts that would allow Homer to join the ranks of great individual, flesh-and-blood authors. The same inspiration drove the Slavicist Alois Schmaus to sift through what he could discover about the celebrated *guslar* Ćor Huso Husović, with the clear intent of piecing together a real-life profile of the great bard.[11] In these cases, and elsewhere as well, it was the unexamined assumption of a 'real' individual that stalled progress in understanding figures like Homer and Ćor Huso Husović. On the other hand, if we see such legendary singers as anthropomorphic code-names for the epic traditions they represent, then the incongruencies in their putative biographies actually become functional. Like the songs performed by their real-life descendants, these legendary figures are in effect multiforms that vary from one 'biography' to the next. Variation and process are the heart of the matter.

One solution to the problem of unexamined, automatic assumptions about a text's 'singularity' is in effect to 'make it plural'. Instead of settling for South Slavic epic as simply a collection of products or items, we can demonstrate that the songs are just as variable, just as multiform, as the anthropomorphic, legendary bards who are understood as ultimately responsible for them. The Parry Collection offers a unique opportunity to loosen up the too-textual definition of a performance by allowing consultation of multiple versions of a

[11] The scholar-researcher's frustration over not being able to frame an entirely coherent account of Ćor Huso was palpable; see A. Schmaus, 'Ćor Huso Husović,' *Prilozi proučavanju narodne poezije*, 5 (1938), especially 132–4.

song—by the same *guslar*, by different *guslari* within the same region, and by different *guslari* across different regions. Using the model of language distribution, we can describe such an inventory as idiolectal, dialectal, and pan-traditional versions of the song. In fact, by maintaining our focus on the epic tradition as first and foremost a *language*, we can avoid the process-to-product reductionism that so often characterizes the way modern Western culture deals with many species of communication. A language may take many forms, depending on the speaker, region, and so forth; nonetheless, it is always the same language, a continuing, shared resource for all of its speakers and a ready medium for individual expressive excellence. Presenting an epic performance as one version of a multiform, and at the same time providing other versions as a background, will keep the reader aware of these basic principles of composition and reception.[12]

The development of hypertext media permits us to take this ecology of variation a step further. Instead of being limited by the spatialized format of the conventional book, where one version must be epitomized and other versions consigned to secondary status in notes or an appendix, an electronic edition on a CD can present multiple performances concurrently. Within a conventional printed volume, we are limited to visually signalled cross-references and other cues. Within a hypertext 'volume', however, we can imitate the original dynamics of oral tradition by networking all available performances together, thus restoring their parallel status and collective context. Moreover, pathways to contextual information, such as the singer's background and perspective, the history of the tradition, and so forth, can be made an easily accessible part of the presentation by installing them as links on the performance 'pages'. Hand in hand with CD recensions of hypertext media will go the installation of such editions and translations at an appropriate site on the Internet. In fact, it is no accident that the Internet and hypertext hold enor-

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[12] The first two volumes of *Serbo-Croatian Heroic Songs* followed this general format, with, for example, three versions of Salih Ugljanin's *Pjesma od Bagdata* (*Song of Baghdad*). The publications of Serbian oral narratives from the Christian tradition by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić in the middle of the nineteenth century included a few alternate versions, but generally editions of South Slavic epic have epitomized the individual performance (the product) at the expense of the tradition (the process). For a comparison of the Parry-Lord and Karadžić editions and the processes behind them, see J.M. Foley, 'The Textualisation of South Slavic Oral Epic and Its Implications for Oral-Derived Epic', in L. Honko (ed.), *Textualisation of Oral Epics* (Berlin, 2000), 83–100.

mous promise for new levels of fidelity in representing oral traditions: the pathways that constitute the web closely resemble the pathways (or *oimai*) that Homer cites as the singer's compositional avenues in their structure and function. Both facilitate process and provide access; likewise, the product (or individual performance-text), so highly valued in late twentieth-century textual culture, is revealed as merely the one-time outcome of following the given pathway.[13] All of these strategies will help to expose the twin illusions of object and fixity that force impertinent methods on the reader of South Slavic oral traditional performances. They will move us back toward the reality of experience and process.

Traditional implications

In addition to performance and process, a translation of South Slavic oral epic must pay due attention to the dimension of traditional implications. The core challenge here is to ask not only *what* the poems mean but also, and more fundamentally, *how* they mean. Because the singers' own cognitive units of utterance, the 'words' of their storytelling language, constitute a specialized code, we need to be aware of their structure and their idiomatic meanings.[14]

Let us begin with structure. The *guslari* themselves define a 'word' (*reč*) in the epic language or register as nothing less than a whole line. For them the smallest unit of any expressive significance is a whole decayllabic verse long, no matter how many printed or linguistic segments textual scholars may believe that the line contains. They also describe speeches, scenes, and even whole performances as single 'words'. The disparity between this kind of language and the modern, text-bound, untraditional language to which we are accustomed is stark, and it should alert us to the presence of a different channel for composition and reception within the South Slavic epic. Furthermore, analytical research, in particular the Oral-Formulaic Theory and related methods, has shown that single 'words'

[13] For a comparison of oral tradition and the Internet as against the Alexandrian Library, see J.M. Foley, 'The Impossibility of Canon', in J.M. Foley (ed.), *Teaching Oral Traditions* (New York, 1998), 13–33.

[14] On register, performance arena, and communicative economy, see Foley, *Singer*, especially 47–56.

in this medium actually are 'larger' than the kind of word we isolate in dictionaries and lexicons; they range from repeated phrases to recurrent, typical scenes to story-patterns that provide a flexible structure for the epic as a whole. This, then, is the first step: to understand the structure of the *guslar*'s epic register.[15]

But to become aware of this expressive organization is one thing. To ask what difference it makes to our understanding of performances and texts is quite another question, one that has been only relatively recently addressed in any thoroughgoing way. Even after scholars had identified at least the outlines of these units of utterance, research was bogged down in fruitless argument over the 'limitations' of stereotyped diction and narrative structure. Now scholarship is starting to move beyond this naive view of oral traditions in general, and of South Slavic epic in particular, and to ask more interesting and incisive questions. Given that heroes are named repeatedly with the same noun-epithet formulas, what do these phrases index? How does the traditional framework of a shared typical scene interact with details used by only one singer or within only one tale? What do the largest-scale structures offer an epic performance other than a plan for sequencing the hero's adventures?[16]

Some examples of the idiomatic implications of traditional language in South Slavic epic will help us appreciate the natural resonance of this dedicated medium, as well as the challenge of representing that resonance in an edition and translation. At the uppermost level, the story-pattern that underlies the narrative shape of an epic performance contributes a great deal to its impact as verbal art. Far from merely limiting the poet's options, story-patterns provide frames of reference, 'maps' that establish horizons of expectation. Thus, if a given performance identifies itself as a Wedding Song, or the Siege of a City, or the Return of a Hero, something important happens: the listener or reader begins to expect the story to follow a familiar pathway. There may be many twists and turns, not to mention alternate destinations, along the well-worn route, and there may be char-

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[15] As a first approximation, *registers* are, as D. Hymes puts it, 'major speech styles associated with recurrent types of situations': 'Ways of Speaking', in Richard Bauman and Joel Sherzer (eds.), *Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking*[2] (Cambridge, 1989), 440. See further Foley, *Singer*, 49–53, 82–92, 110–15, 150–75.

[16] For full-length answers to these kinds of questions, see Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art*, chapter 4 (for South Slavic epic) and chapters 5–7 (for Homeric epic).

acters, situations, and events with which the listener or reader has not met before. But behind this surface of individual, sometimes unprecedented details will lie the unifying, idiomatic force of the story-pattern—setting certain aspects into relief even as it explains certain other aspects by traditional reference. Simply put, a story-pattern is a constitutive part of the communicative process.

Just as the audience comes to expect an overall sequence of events, so each event itself tends toward a traditional, idiomatic, and therefore expectable shape. When the captive hero begins to shout in prison in the South Slavic Return Song, for instance, we may be sure of a couple of things. First, his captor, the enemy Christian ban, will personally or vicariously refuse to release him. Second, the captor's wife, the banica, will then take her husband's place and succeed in negotiating a bargain that silences the prisoner's intolerable ruckus and frees him to return to his homeland. Details may change from one realization to the next—the ban may threaten the captive's immediate or longer-term demise, the banica may taunt her husband, the prisoner may gain only a conditional release—but the overall pattern of the scene varies only within limits, retaining enough of its recognizable shape to bear the burden of traditional referentiality. Its characteristic and idiomatic variability thus mirrors that of language itself. Whatever the names of the characters, the location of the jail, the specific verbal commerce between ban and banica, or the prisoner's particular promises, the ultimate meaning of this 'word' is clear: from the time the captive hero starts to shout (virtually always employing the telltale verb *[po]cmiliti*, 'to cry out'), his eventual freedom and return home are assured.[17] Traditional implication guarantees it.

In addition to story-patterns and typical scenes, simple phrases may bear idiomatic implications that cannot be accounted for by combining the literal meanings of their components.[18] For example, a *kukavica crna* ('black cuckoo') is by convention a woman already or about to be in mourning. When a South Slavic epic poet says 'But

[17] Even within the typical scene of Arming the Hero, which always forecasts an immediate journey as well as rehearses a familiar inventory of clothes and weapons, traditional form allows for—and deeply contextualizes—wide variation. The many instances of women assuming the hero's role, and therefore undergoing a modified Arming the Hero type-scene, are evidence of both the structural flexibility and the traditional implications of this multiform.

[18] On these and additional examples, see Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art*, chapter 4.

you should have seen [Character X]', he is ending one narrative increment and bridging the gap to the next, which will feature Character X. Should the *guslar* portray one person saying to another 'San usnila, pa se prepanula' ('You've dreamed a dream, so you're frightened'), he is creating a recognizable scenario in which an older male speaker berates a young woman whose report of an impending crisis he does not believe. Furthermore, and ironically, the report will prove true and many lives will be lost. Poignantly, the returning hero will unfailingly address the woman from whom he has been long separated by calling her 'truelove'; whether she proves faithful or not, this is the reverberative, emblematic term that identifies the most pivotal of all characters in the Return Song epic.[19] Such value-added meanings are part of the South Slavic epic idiom; without a sense of their contribution, the listener or reader remains unaware of the full richness of the performance in its traditional context.

All three levels of 'words' carry implied meanings that play a large part in the *guslar*'s artistry, in his meshing of traditional and individual. To put it another way, as in the homemade proverb cited above, 'oral traditions work like languages, only more so'. Of course, we should be quick to acknowledge that all verbal art depends upon idiomatic referral to a degree. But oral traditions make especially heavy and particularly frequent reference to more-than-literal signification; it is the method by which they engage the poetic tradition, which both dwarfs and enormously expands any one of its performed instances. Because of the resonant quality of the bards' specialized register, and again to put it pseudo-proverbially, we must understand that 'composition and reception are two sides of the same coin'. Both singer and audience/reader must play by the same rules. To enable readers of editions and translations to join the exchange, to converse in the same idiom, we need to devise strategies that allow them to 'hear' at least some of these traditional implications.

I plan three sets of strategies to meet this challenge. The first, already mentioned above, will include providing the reader alternate versions of a given song by the same and different *guslari*. The same

[19] A survey of the traditional morphology of the Return Song pattern in the South Slavic epic tradition (and more widely in Indo-European narrative) highlights the absolute centrality of the woman's role; everything, including the hero's reassumption of his place in society, is directly dependent upon her actions. See further Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art*, chapter 5.

initiative will also open pathways to other songs with the same or related characters, situations, and events, thus exposing some of the traditional network of referentiality on which they all depend. The second strategy will flesh out the immanent cultural context—so far removed from most Western readers' experience—in a series of head-notes and endnotes to each performance. These brief digests of information will fill out the representation of the singer, song, performance, and smaller points, concentrating chiefly on background material.

Third and perhaps most importantly, I will provide not a critical apparatus, which illuminates one text by comparison to other texts, but an *apparatus fabulosus*, or story-based apparatus. It will be the function of this companion to expand the 'words' of any given performance from inadequate, literal meanings to traditional, idiomatic meanings. Thus the *apparatus fabulosus* will open up formulaic phraseology, typical scenes, and story-patterns, explaining their non-literal signification by referral to the poetic tradition. These value-added meanings will be recovered by collating multiple instances of such 'words' in different narrative settings, and then by inquiring what more-than-literal force they contribute to the mesh of traditional and individual. Through this third strategy the reader of South Slavic oral epic will be able to move beyond 'black cuckoo' to its indexed connotation, to feel the immanent force of the Return Song as it moves inexorably toward closure—in short, to understand how 'oral traditions work like language, only more so'.

A Mediaeval English analogue

To gain some perspective on the challenge of traditional implications, let us consider an analogous process: a case in which a written text is translated *into*, rather than out of, a traditional register. I am speaking of the Anglo-Saxon narrative poem known as *Andreas*, a 1722-line retelling of the apocryphal story of Andrew and Matthew among the Mermedonians.[20] Much remains uncertain about the origin and transmission history of this hagiography, but two crucial

[20] For a full discussion of the traditional structure and implications of *Andreas*, see Foley, *Singer*, chapter 6. Quotations are taken from K. Brooks (ed.), *Andreas and the Fates of the Apostles* (Oxford, 1961); translations are my own.

points are secure: (1) the ultimate source of the mediaeval English version is the Greek *Praxeis Andreou kai Mattheia eis tên polin tôn anthrôpophagôn*, and (2) the Anglo-Saxon poet has cast his translation into the highly idiomatic language, the specialized register, of his vernacular poetry. That is, we have the prose version in *koinê* Greek, a very spare account of the events that make up Saint Andrew's journey among the cannibalistic inhabitants of Mermedonia and his eventual martyr's triumph, and we have a poetic version in Old English that stands some distance from its source. That distance is in large part a function of the idiosyncratic narrative tradition into which the foreign story has been translated.

In comparing the Anglo-Saxon *Andreas* with the Greek *Praxeis*, we notice two chief modes of correspondence. There are of course passages of nearly 'verbatim translation', where the poem follows the prose quite closely, with allowances made for simple disparities between lexical resources and the like. But there are also many sites of what I call 'indexed translation', in which the Old English poet has departed significantly and tellingly from the source. That is, in most cases such departures are not simply headstrong assertions made by a poet intent on fashioning something unprecedented, but traditionally motivated insertions, replacements, or extrapolations. Phrases and whole passages appear in the *Andreas* for which there is no basis whatsoever in the *Praxeis*, but almost without fail these are phrases and passages that recur elsewhere in the 32,000 lines of traditional poetry preserved from the Anglo-Saxon period. The structures, the 'words', are familiar features of the poetic language.

Why is this important to our understanding of the poem and what sort of analogue does it provide to our project of editing and translating South Slavic epic? To take the latter question first, the Old English analogy reveals the application of traditional rules, structures, and implications as part of the process of translation. It offers a perspective on coding that is effectively opposite to the challenge we face in trying to perceive the traditional rules, structures, and implications of South Slavic epic with a view toward reflecting them in original-language editions and in modern English. The *Andreas* poem is a tradition-based translation; our project is attempting a translation of a traditional work.

As for the former question, three examples will illustrate the impact of the Anglo-Saxon poetic idiom. First is the simple phrase *wigendra hleo* ('protector of warriors'), normally applied to a heroic leader of

men or to the spiritual equivalent in Christian theology, God the father. But our poet uses it of the martyr Andreas, certainly a very holy man but one who commands no troops and leads no *comitatus* of heroes. His spiritually heroic deeds are performed by him and him alone, with assistance from above. From the perspective of traditional referentiality, the logic of this unusual application emerges in its indexical quality, as Andrew through his faithful perseverance and suffering accomplishes a miracle, thus becoming by example a spiritual 'protector of warriors' if not an actual leader of men in earthly terms.

A second instance of traditional indexing in the Old English translation is the poet's unusual description of Andrew's first of four miserable nights in prison. Assailed by devils who seek to break his resolve, he must also endure a curious set of meteorological phenomena. Though he is incarcerated inside a jail cell, he is somehow directly exposed to the harshest of elements: snow, frost, hail, and ice are among the challenges he faces. Moreover, there is absolutely no motivation in the Greek source for any of these phenomena. A reader unacquainted with the resonance of the Anglo-Saxon poetic idiom might well wonder whether the poet had lost track of the narrative or might perhaps be indulging himself in an ill-timed lyrical outburst. The truth is simpler and more far-reaching, however. Old English poetry frequently makes use of what has been called the 'Exile theme', a typical scene that stamps the individual at its center as hopelessly divorced from family, kin group, and even society as a whole. It unmistakably brands the protagonist as undergoing the worst of all possible fates in the poetic universe. And how does the tradition key that meaning; how does it construct this 'word'? Time and again the regular—because idiomatic—strategy is to summon the imagery of winter and the sea. When snow, ice, and other unpleasant phenomena descend upon Andrew, he is not merely being exposed to the elements; rather, he is being certified or 'slotted' as an Anglo-Saxon exile, one of many such figures. That is how desperate his situation is, and that is how evocative an instrument the traditional register can prove in Old English poetry.

A third and final example of the implications of the poetic register in which the story of Andreas is cast is furnished by the poet's interruption of his own narrative, a unique event in Anglo-Saxon poetry. Here is a modern English prose rendering of the poet's intervention (1478–91):

> Lo, for a while now I have told in 'words,' in poem-songs, the story of the holy man, what he accomplished, his unsecret fate. It is greatly beyond my ability to say what he endured in life, longlasting learning, all from the beginning; a wiser man on earth than I count myself must find that in his heart, so that he makes known from the origin all the hardships that Andrew courageously suffered, his grim battles. Nevertheless, we must further tell in little pieces a share of song-words; that is related from olden times, how he endured a great many torments, severe combats, in that heathen city.

This unprecedented entry of the poet into his poem has no motivation whatsoever in the *Praxeis* source, but seems to be stimulated by the singer's misgivings about his ability to finish the tale. Although he does go on to complete the narrative, he is here admitting a supposed lack of knowledge about the apocryphal story and calling upon someone better acquainted with the tale of the saint's life (*ægleawra*, literally, 'wiser in the law', 1483b) to assume the burden.

Most significantly for our present purposes, the poet's interruption—a complete departure from the *Andreas* translation and a wholly unparalleled kind of commentary in the surviving poetry—is formulated within the Anglo-Saxon poetic idiom. That is, the untraditional excursus is composed in the highly traditional register of Old English formulaic phraseology. So fluent is the poet in this specialized 'way of speaking' that he never leaves his chosen medium, even when the subject is by definition far outside its usual range, even when he is treating an event unrelated to the story, something that must be happening for the first time. We may compare the traditional pronouncements of the Presocratic philosophers in ancient Greece, some of whom used Homer's own hexametric medium to criticize his portrayal of the gods, for example. Or we might cite the evidence of an oral epic poet in contemporary Serbia who composed four traditional-seeming lines, adapted as necessary, to describe the singular and likewise unprecedented event of having his photograph taken.[21] In all of these cases the epic register—which 'works like language, only more so'—has provided a ready instrument for handling a subject quite outside its customary focus.

In this example from the Anglo-Saxon poetic corpus, then, we can glimpse a translator attempting to make the *Praxeis* tale 'work' in a new medium. In remaking the narrative within his own tradi-

[21] See further Foley, *Singer*, 205–6.

tional context, he is providing an 'indexed translation', a new framing that depends heavily on the resources of his poetic idiom. Such is the strength and pliability of traditional languages, and such is the challenge as we try to echo their resources in our own translations.

Reflecting the 'way of speaking'

Like any such specialized code, the South Slavic epic register presents particular challenges as we try to reflect its structure and texture in an English translation. The idiosyncratic shape and narrow focus of this medium stem from the particularity of its assigned function within the overall ecology of discourse in South Slavic. That is, it regularly serves one purpose only—the making and remaking of epic. This means that it is never used for everyday communication or for composition within other traditional genres, and that it merits comparison in function and specificity on that score with idiomatic languages like the Homeric Greek and the Anglo-Saxon poetic registers.[22] Each of these specialized 'ways of speaking' has in effect relinquished the broad spectrum of expressivity typical of everyday, unmarked varieties of language in order to do a single job well and expeditiously. This is another way in which 'oral traditions work like language, only more so' by setting the performance arena and optimizing communicative economy.

As for actual linguistic features, the idiom of the *guslari* consists of not one but a mixture of dialects. In a manner completely atypical of everyday speech or of the written medium employed in the composition of a novel, for instance, the epic register includes forms from different dialect regions alongside one another in the same performance or even the same line. This concatenation is absolutely typical and even expectable, however, since the epic language operates not according to the rules of geographical language distribution, but according to the rule of *metri causa*, 'for the sake of meter'. For instance, if the three-syllable ijekavski form of the word for 'milk',

[22] Except for rare moments like the singer's description of having his photograph taken, which remains within the performance arena of epic. We also occasionally find phrases from the epic used as 'poetic shorthand' or metonymic allusion within other genres. On comparison of registers, see Foley, *Traditional Oral Epic*, chapters 3–7 and *Singer*, chapter 3.

mlijeko, fits the decasyllabic prosody better than the corresponding two-syllable ekavski form *mleko*, then it will be preferred—no matter what the individual poet's home dialect may be. For cognate reasons, the South Slavic epic language is also rife with archaisms, both lexical and grammatical, and especially with Turkicisms, an inheritance from the days of the Ottoman Empire. Once established, such forms tend to persist in the phraseology, since their displacement by normalizing or updating would render many phrases or 'words' unmetrical. Such changes would undermine the singer's and tradition's special—and specially evocative—'words'.[23]

Other trademark dimensions of the South Slavic epic register include the decasyllabic meter (*deseterac*) in which most of the extant narrative is composed, a characteristic word-order that follows certain rules and varies strikingly from normal prose word-order, sound-patterning of various sorts, parataxis or adding style, and frequent but unnecessary enjambement. For example, word-order is determined by localization rules that sequence the parts of a line according to their syllabic length and grammatical type. Thus shorter items tend to precede longer ones, no matter what the 'normal' word-order might be, while proclitics and enclitics are regularly found only at certain junctures in the verse. These rules govern *every line* of South Slavic epic, and constitute its prosody at the most fundamental level; they make the phraseology traditional. Other regularities, like acoustic patterns, appear only in some situations and are thus not part of the most basic metric. Once engaged, however, such occasional sound-linkages may well increase the stability of a phrase or line over time and from one singer or region to another, fossilizing the phraseology by strengthening its internal cohesion. All of these rules, regularities, and tendencies make the epic register a highly recognizable, reverberative medium that immediately circumscribes the performance arena, alerting listeners and readers to a narrow but powerful channel for communication. Crucially, these features thus play a role in both composition and reception.

Nonetheless, we cannot directly transfer these cueing features to modern English; to try to do so would result in an unreadable trans-

[23] Again, Homeric Greek offers a parallel, depending as it does on two major dialects, Ionic and Aeolic, and exhibiting archaic alongside contemporary vocabulary and grammar. See further Foley, *Singer*, chapter 3.

lation marooned unidiomatically between the South Slavic original and contemporary English. What we can manage is a rendering that preserves what can be transferred from one language to the other and at least reflects some of those linguistic strategies that defy direct transferral. Thus, for example, as a policy I take great care to translate the formulaic phraseology consistently. If a noun-epithet designation for a hero or a verb phrase for riding a horse is employed time and again, indicating its status as a traditional byte of expression, it seems essential to use the same English translation each time. As an additional mechanism for familiarizing the reader with the idiom, many phrases will be indexed in a digest of Traditional Language. With these aids the reader can begin to sense the indexicality—if not all of the original resonance—of the phrase in question. If enough instances occur in enough different narrative contexts, the resonance will begin to emerge. It is also quite possible to imitate the paratactic or adding style of the South Slavic line by choosing diction and punctuation appropriately; again, the result will necessarily be one step removed from the original, but it will also be one step ahead of renderings that fail to acknowledge these key aspects of poetic structure. Such accommodations, together with the *apparatus fabulosus* mentioned above, will provide a more realistic representation of the singer's language and therefore of his and his tradition's epic poetry.

Naturally, there are some aspects of that language that translate poorly or not at all, and the translator must be forthright in assessing which of them can be brought over into English and which cannot. Thus I make no effort to imitate the decasyllabic line and internal metrical organization, which are enabled by (and based on) South Slavic's complex inflectional system and numerous permitted prosodic adjustments, for which modern English has no parallel. Likewise, I do not try to echo the multidialectal texture of the *guslar*'s way of speaking, a nonsensical (because irrelevant) expressive strategy in the target idiom. Some archaisms can be used to advantage as the opportunity presents itself, particularly to underline the indexical quality of a recurrent phrase, but this must be done sparingly to maintain readability. The watchword in selecting which features can be transferred or reflected and which cannot is practicality: the resources of the two languages are different, and the translator must be able to strike a reasonable balance between the goal of a 'faithful' version and the heterogeneity of linguistic vehicles.

Conclusion: creating audience fluency

In this final section I will offer some wider perspectives on the edition and translation project as a whole and review a few of the key concepts developed above, closing with a brief illustration of some of the methods espoused in this essay. All of the initiatives discussed in this article point in one fashion or another toward the same goal: creating a fluency on the part of the readership, a fluency that mirrors, if only partially, that which is shared between the singer and his original constituency.[24]

Beginning with large-scale concerns, let me re-emphasize the importance of including multiple performances of both particular songs and particular subgenres within the anthology of epic narratives from Stolac. Only in this way can readers appreciate what I have called the 'traditional morphology' of subgenres, songs, and 'words' within songs; only in this way can they learn how, at every level, variation within limits is the lifeblood of oral epic tradition.[25] There can be no substitute for gaining a sense of multiformity, of how and to what extent performances can vary, because only against this background can both the resonance of the poetic tradition and an individual's artistry be assessed. To answer this need I plan, as indicated above, to concentrate on the Return Song, the best represented subgenre of epic in the Stolac region, and on three or four singers whose performances collectively give a fair sense of the traditional morphology within which they all compose. These *guslari* are Halil Bajgorić, Mujo Kukuruzović, Ibro Băsič, and, if space considerations permit, Salko Morić. Headnotes to each song and more general introductory information will place these singers in their environment in Hercegovina in the 1930s. By presenting their songs together, essentially by offering a perspective through the tectonic and expressive unit of *story-pattern*, I hope to simulate some of the competence of a

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[24] Let me emphasize here that I mean to include the rhetorical audience as well as the real-life group of people who actually attend any given performance. On audience, see further Foley, *Immanent Art*, chapter 2 and, with special reference to oral-derived texts, Foley, *Singer*, 60–98.

[25] On *traditional morphology*, see Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art*, especially 204–8. This concept is applicable at all three levels examined in this chapter: phraseology, typical scenes, and story-pattern.

native audience, filling in the gaps of indeterminacy in any one performance by implicit and explicit reference to the others.[26]

In addition to the map provided by story-pattern, we will consider the perspective from the *theme* or *typical scene*. As with any of the 'words' that constitute the compositional (and receptional) lexicon of South Slavic epic, the idea is to encourage reading across the tradition as well as within the given performance. Labels in the right hand margin will alert the reader to the onset of themes, which will also be discussed in the *apparatus fabulosus* and indexed in a glossary devoted to traditional units. In this way multiple instances of the same theme will be quickly and easily available to the reader. Additionally, the electronic version of the project will feature links that lead directly to these other instances, thus reducing the 'distance' between multiple occurrences to a minimum. By proceeding through the individual text (scrolling down the screen) and, where applicable and desirable, across the tradition (from link to link), a reader should be able to have the best of both worlds: an awareness of both the traditional context and the contribution of the individual *guslar* in various different performances.[27] Good candidates for this kind of treatment are the typical scenes of Shouting in Prison and Caparisoning the Horse, the latter of which is labeled in the example below.

At the microlevel of phraseology, the translation will follow the principles laid out above: consistent rendering of repeated phrases, an attempt to reflect those structural and expressive features of the South Slavic original that can be transferred to modern English, and a commitment to making the traditional implications of the diction as evident as possible. Thus the selection of performances becomes

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[26] One example of the importance of creating a 'thick corpus' (Honko, *Textualising the Siri Epic*, especially 512–13, 595–604) of materials is the context that a comparative background provides for the *Odyssey*, the single version of the Return Song that survives from ancient Greece. Without the comparative evidence of other Return Songs, Penelope's ambiguous actions may seem puzzling or contradictory; once the idiomatic nature of the story-pattern is brought into play, however, her indeterminacy can be recognized as heroic and fundamental to both Odysseus' success and the viability of the story as a whole. See further Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art*, chapter 5.

[27] It should be noted that 'readings' of the electronic representation, itself a tool that fosters the pluralizing and 'retraditionalizing' of the epic performances involved, can vary. This variability reflects the original multiformity behind the composition and reception of the performances; see further Foley, 'Impossibility of Canon'.

a crucial factor in the overall configuration of the volume, since it is these songs, and these alone, that will collectively provide multiple examples and opportunities for glossing phraseology and demonstrating idiomatic function. In the 'paper version' of the anthology, cross-reference among instances will be accomplished in two ways: through labels in the right hand margin and through the deeper resources of the *apparatus fabulosus.* In the electronic version of the anthology, instances can be networked via links that once again reduce the false, artificial distance that texts impose between one performance and another.

Reading via either of these media will amount to an ongoing tutorial as the story-pattern map takes on more detail and better definition with each performance, as the typical scenes are fleshed out by variation within limits, and as the phraseology begins to define itself as a medium rife with traditional referentiality. As these various kinds of signs occur and recur, and as the *apparatus fabulosus* and Traditional Language section enrich the process, constellations of meaning will emerge that are never explicit but always implicit. If thoughtfully configured and fully glossed, such an anthology of South Slavic poetry should, to an extent, both re-create the performance arena and make available at least some experience of the communicative economy of the original performance. In short, with this translation we are aiming at what amounts to a manuscript-less facsimile, a place where traditional context and individual performance meet, an instrument for the partial re-creation of an experience. If the anthology fulfills its purpose, we will to some degree become that rarest of partners for the *guslar*: a good and receptive because fluent audience.

APPENDIX

An Example (Draft)
The Wedding of Mustajbey's Son Bećirbey
Halil Bajgorić (Parry no. 6699), Lines 1–52
with partial annotation

Headnote

This performance by Halil Bajgorić, a *guslar* from the village of Dabrica in the Stolac region of central Hercegovina, is a classic example of a 'Wedding Song' in the Moslem tradition of South Slavic epic [include a cross-reference to other Wedding Songs here]. It tells the story of how Mustajbey, duplicitous leader of the loosely confederated beys and pashas who rules over the borderland or Lika, seeks to marry his only son Bećirbey to the fair Zlata, only daughter of the champion of Kanidža. What stands in the way, quite expectably, is an irruption of the Turkish-Christian enmity so typical of the reign of Sulejman the Magnificent (ruled 1520–1566), during which period most of the Moslem epic narratives are set: in this case the Christian ban Baturić contests the marriage and provokes what always seems to accompany a grand wedding in South Slavic epic—namely, an equally grand battle. Marriage and battle are linked traditionally via the storytelling idiom, and culturally by the ritual bride-stealing motif that survives today in rural villages (sometimes using a Mercedes Benz rather than horses, however). The free-agent hero Djerdjelez Alija travels to Mustajbey's territory in order to serve him and is appointed the nominal leader of troops assembled from far and near, though the young Bećirbey himself and the trickster figure Tale of Orašac also play important roles in the dénouement. The epic singer Bajgorić employs his own idiolectal versions of traditional phraseology and narrative patterns shared among *guslari* from this region, with particular attention to the typical scenes of Arming the Hero and Catalogue of Heroes (as represented in letters of invitation and subsequent arrivals), and features a rich portrayal of Tale's inimitable, comic antics [include an except from the conversation with the singer Bajgorić here].

Oj! Djerdjelez Alija arose early, *Hero arises*
Ej! Alija, the tsar's hero,
Near Visoko above Sarajevo,
Before dawn and the white day— *Initiatory*
Even two full hours before dawn, *markers* (4–7)
When day breaks and the sun rises
And the morning star shows its face.
When the young man got up,
He kindled a fire in the hearth *Heroic coffee*
And on the fire he put his coffeepot; (9–15)
After Alija brewed the coffee,
He poured himself one, then two cups—
One, then two, he felt no spark,
Three, then four, the spark seized him,
Seven, then eight, and then he had enough.
For a bachelor there is no maidservant, *Proverb*
And indeed Alija had no one at all,
Just himself and his bay horse.
The young man jumped up to his light feet *Heroic errand*
And hurried down the white tower.
Into the warm stable he ran, *Caparisoning the*
To his long-maned bay horse. *horse* (21–43)
He brought the horse out of the manger,
Led it out and tied it underneath the eave.
He pressed the curry-comb to the horse's back
And began to brush the golden one.
After he groomed his fine steed,
He collected water in a sponge
And spread the horse's coat with a goatskin pouch.
Then he hitched up a blanket and threw on the war saddle,
And under the saddle four girths
And a fifth of silken thread,
Hooking them all up in a single bond
And tightening the saddle so it wouldn't slip.
Then he warmed the animal up with a cold snaffle-bit,
Fastening the bit with a button below its jaw;
He threw the golden chain behind the horse's ears
And the two reins over its two shoulders,
Fitting the riding bit into its jaw.
All by itself the horse began to prance about,
Back and forth throughout the courtyard,
Without a whip and without a rider.
How proudly the bay horse bore his head!—
Like a careless young shepherdess up on a mountain, *Simile* (44–49)
Clothed in her hood and her motley jacket,
Just eighteen years of age
And her mother's first-born;

Her mother would put up a snack for her,
So her daughter wouldn't go hungry.
Now here was Djerdjelez Alija at his white tower. *Position change*
He approached his clothes and the dressing-tree; *Arming the hero*
He cast off his poor garments and donned new ones. (51–99)

CHAPTER TWO

RITUAL SPEECH IN EARLY GREEK SONG

John F. García

Although the religious setting of early Greek song is often acknowledged,[1] students of Greek religion have not, on the whole, engaged the *formal* properties of Homeric versification, whereas Homerists ignore the religious import of these properties. Parry and Lord took a crucial step in the right direction by introducing the all-important factor of oral performance into the study of the textual artifacts we call Homer. If we think of their achievement as fundamentally ethnographic—and I believe that this is correct—then we already have a point of departure for further ethnographic observation, as this essay aims to demonstrate.

Parry and Lord concentrated their ethnographic work on the singer (whether Greek or Yugoslav) and his techniques. Their major triumph was to show the imprint, in the textual artifacts left by oral performance (our *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, for example), of the very conditions under which the original sung texts were produced.[2] Time and

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[1] See for example P.E. Easterling, 'Greek Poetry and Greek Religion', in P.E. Easterling and J.V. Muir (eds.), *Greek Religion and Society* (Cambridge, 1985), 34–49. W.R. Connor, '"Sacred" and "Secular": ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια and the Classical Athenian Concept of the State', *Ancient Society* 19 (1988), 161–88, is important for its discussion of pervasive religiosity. In a sense, the present essay picks up where another leaves off; K.J. Dover, 'Song-language in Preliterate Cultures', in his *Greek and the Greeks: Collected Papers* 1*: Language, Poetry, Drama* (Oxford, 1987), 1–15, closes with the question, 'what were the attitudes of the poet and his audience, at different periods and in different places, to intelligibility?' (13).

[2] For an intellectual history and bibliographical guide to the work of Parry and Lord, see J.M. Foley, *The Theory of Oral Composition: History and Methodology* (Bloomington, 1988, rep. 1992), especially 19–56. In this chapter, the abbreviation *MHV* = M. Parry, *The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry*, ed. A. Parry (Oxford, 1971). A good orientation in performance studies generally is R. Bauman (ed.), *Folklore, Cultural Performances, and Popular Entertainments: A Communications-centered Handbook* (New York, 1992). Note that I do not take 'text', as many oralists do, to suggest writing; I therefore do not avoid it in talking about Homeric performance. I use 'textual artifact' to suggest the document that comes down to us. See further M. Silverstein and G. Urban, 'The Natural History of Discourse', in M. Silverstein and G. Urban (eds.), *Natural Histories of Discourse* (Chicago, 1996), 1–17.

again they pointed out how the removal of text from context, of which traditional philology had been guilty, could distort the act of interpretation. Nevertheless, this ethnographic insight tended to remain fixed on a narrow view of context that consisted of the singer; his tradition, training, and technique; and the skill he showed on his feet.[3] Important as their advance was, our task remains to extend Parry and Lord's methods into broader domains of social experience.[4] Just as they detected the traces of oral performance in Homer's printed lines, we can build on their methods to attempt to discern the imprint of other forms of social behavior in those lines.

I attempt here to recover one such aspect of the pragmatics of Homeric performance in its ceremonial setting, the factor of ritual speech.[5] The term 'ritual speech', rather than, say, 'poetic speech' will help us bear in mind the peculiar contexts of situation of early Greek song-performance, which, like other genres of speech—and not only the 'artful' ones—conditioned meaning and interpretation.[6] My argument will proceed in the following stages. I first identify an

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[3] For a similar view, see J.M. Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art* (University Park, Pa., 1999), 14–18. Some examples of recent works that promote a broader view of performance context in the study of Homer are R.P. Martin, *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad* (Ithaca, 1989), R. Seaford, *Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-State* (Oxford, 1994), J.M. Foley, *The Singer of Tales in Performance* (Bloomington, 1995); see also the essays in B. Heiden (ed.), *The Iliad and its Contexts, Arethusa* 30.2 (1997). A glimpse of the views of archaeologists and social historians (with rich bibliographies) can be gained from the section headed 'Homer's Worlds', in I. Morris and B. Powell (eds.), *A New Companion to Homer* (Leiden, 1997), 509–713. On ancient views about Homer's audience, see S. Nannini, *Omero e il suo Pubblico nel Pensiero dei Commentatori Antichi* (Roma, 1986).

[4] Cf. R. Bauman, 'Introduction', in A. Paredes and R. Bauman, *Toward New Perspectives in Folklore* (Austin, 1972), xi, where he promotes a view of 'performance as an organizing principle that comprehends within a single conceptual framework artistic act, expressive form, and esthetic response, and that does so *in terms of locally defined, culture-specific categories and contexts*' (my italics). See also J.E. Limón and M.J. Young, 'Frontiers, Settlements, and Development in Folklore Studies, 1972–1985', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 15 (1986), 437–60, who warn about the unreliability of studies of 'artful speech' that forgo deep ethnographic description.

[5] S.C. Levinson, *Pragmatics* (Cambridge, 1983), especially 1–32. Naming a precise festival occasion on which pre-Pisistratean epic performances occurred remains impossible; for orientation, G.S. Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge, 1962), 274–81; further, R. Seaford, *Reciprocity and Ritual*, 144–54, with his bibliography at 150, n. 26.

[6] Other communicative aspects of the overall performance, such as music and dance, admit of partial description on the strength of vase figuration, internal evidence, and external testimonia. On genres of speech, see M.M. Bakhtin, 'Speech genres', in C. Emerson and M. Holquist (eds.), *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, trans. V.W. McGee (Austin, 1986), 60–102.

analytical prejudice that Parry inherited from his predecessors in the study of Homeric formulae, which led him to minimize, in his account of Homeric diction, the role that social forces played in shaping it (I). Next I salvage from Aristotle the beginnings of a corrective to Parry's omission. I suggest, however, that Aristotle's 'theory of poetic discourse' was compromised in other ways instructive to us. Namely, though sensitive to the rhetorical force of 'poetic discourse', he promoted a secularized model of performance that persistently ignored its ritual dimension (II). It is therefore illuminating to compare his account of 'poetic speech' with accounts of 'ritual speech' available from linguistic anthropology, to see whether it is possible to add back what Aristotle (and his intellectual successors) took away (III and IV). I close by discussing some Homeric evidence for metapragmatics; that is, attitudes expressed or implied about ritual speech itself (V).

I. *Parry, Homeric diction, and 'Kretschmer's law'*

It is first important to recall the stated aim with which Parry and Lord carried out their original fieldwork in Yugoslavia and what we have gained from it. Neither was a professional anthropologist; rather, they were setting out to discover why Homer composed in a traditional form of speech. The sequence of events is instructive. In his Sorbonne *thèse* of 1928, Parry had demonstrated the traditional nature of Homeric diction. Then, as a consequence of this research, he set out on his famous field expeditions in order to investigate the hypothesis, in what he thought was a closely analogous setting, that the motivation of this traditional nature, its cause and *raison d'être*, was the set of conditions under which it was composed. He indeed found comparative backing for this hypothesis. Under the pressure of *viva voce* performance, the Yugoslav singers, being mostly unlettered and only rarely having recourse to written versions, had developed a traditional song diction characterized by efficiency, scope of coverage, and artfulness. In important ways, this diction answered to Homer's *Kunstsprache*, as described by the German predecessors whom Parry reliably acknowledged: Ellendt, Düntzer, and especially Witte and Meister.[7]

[7] In addition to Foley, *Theory of Oral Composition*, 1–18, see A. Parry, 'Introduction', *MHV*, ix–lxii, J. Latacz, 'Tradition und Neuerung in der Homerforschung: Zur

But to his credit, Parry consistently avoided adopting the term *Kunstsprache*, with its overtones of European high culture combined with clever artifice, preferring instead the cumbersome but accurate 'traditional poetic language of oral poetry' (*MHV*, 329, etc.) or some abbreviation of that. A traditional, rather than artificial, form of language is not a self-contained, *ad hoc* invention, but has taken its shape from singers' responses, over generations, to performance pressures. With this astute realization, Parry laid aside the formulation of his predecessors, that 'the language of Homer is the language of the Homeric verse' (*MHV*, 328), by which they had meant that the constraints of the hexameter *per se* led to the use of formulas. Parry replied that the hexameter does not generate formulaic diction *sponte sua* (witness later, literate epic hexameters), but argued instead that it is the conditions of performance, the singer's need to generate hexameters on his feet and in dialogue with tradition, that motivated the formula.[8] Composition-in-performance would become, in the work of Albert Lord and Parry's many champions, the leading motivation for the character of Homeric diction.[9] Returning to the *Harvard Studies* article of 1932, we find Parry thus motivating many specific features of that diction other than the formula: archaism, non-Ionic forms ('the foreign element'), and artificial formations.[10] He then pronounced what may be called the Eight Principles of Homeric Diction (*MHV*, 340–2), of which only the first two will concern us here:

Geschichte der Oral poetry-Theory', in J. Latacz (ed.), *Homer: Tradition und Neuerung* (Darmstadt, 1979), 25–44, J.P. Holoka, 'Homer, Oral Poetry Theory, and Comparative Literature: Major Trends and Controversies in Twentieth-century Criticism', in J. Latacz (ed.), *Zweihundert Jahre Homerforschung: Rückblick und Ausblick* (Stuttgart, 1992), 456–81.

[8] To 'motivate' something is to provide conditions that give rise to it. Contrast O. Schumann (ed.), *Lateinisches Hexameter-Lexikon: Dichterisches Formelgut von Ennius bis zum Archipoeta* (Munich, 1979–83 [+ supplement, 1989]), in which 'formula' really refers to the literate poets' habits of collocation of recurrent words and phrases by metrical shape. The properties of flexibility and productiveness shown by a developing formula system were described during the 1960s and 1970s by Russo, Hainsworth, Hoekstra, Nagler, Sacks, and others: see J.A. Russo, 'The Formula', in Morris and Powell (eds.), *A New Companion to Homer*, 238–60.

[9] J.M. Foley, among others, has attempted to move beyond composition-in-performance as dominant motivating factor by endeavoring to work out the aesthetic principles underlying traditional epic discourse. See his *Immanent Art: From Structure to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic* (Bloomington, In., 1991) and other works cited in these notes, each with comprehensive bibliography.

[10] For the 'Homeric gloss' (Aristotle's γλῶττα), see also *MHV*, 240–50.

1. The spoken dialect of the author of an oral poem is shown by his poetic language, which will tend to be the same as his spoken language wherever he has no metrical reason to use an older or foreign word or form or construction.
2. On the other hand an oral poet, composing in a diction which follows his own language where it can, may be using phrases and passages which are neither his own work nor that of other poets of the same dialect, whether of his own or of an earlier time, but borrowings from the poetry of another dialect.

The difficulty with the second principle is perhaps easiest to express: there is no evidence that *any* verse was composed in archaic Greece 'in another dialect'; that is, in diction that conforms to all the distinguishing traits of a given local dialect. Instead, there is always a high degree of non-conformity with the dialect local to the author in question—every poetic dialect is composite. The poet, then, does not 'borrow from the poetry of another dialect'.

Parry's first principle is equally faulty, but it takes a little more work to show it, and I can only do so summarily.[11] The principle expressed may conveniently be called 'Kretschmer's Law' after the German linguist Paul Kretschmer, who is the first, to my knowledge, to have argued it, though he was addressing the problem of verse inscriptions. He himself called it a 'rule' (*Regel*):

> For the earlier period we can distill out of this material the following rule: the epigrammatic poet uses his own dialect as a basis, but uses epic dialect forms if they are more convenient for his meter; in other words, if they are not metrically equivalent to those of his own dialect; and on some occasions he borrows individual expressions and turns of phrase from epic.[12]

That last clause, however, the added qualification to his rule, was not sufficient. In 1923 C.D. Buck demonstrated that the main principle of 'Kretschmer's Law' was itself flawed; Buck's work has been more recently confirmed by K. Mickey.[13] The use of 'epic' forms

[11] I pass over the obvious (and trivial) objection that literary history knows of poets, such as Bacchylides, Simonides, and Pindar, who composed in a 'dialect', sometimes called 'Doric', that was not that of their native lands (Simonides and Bacchylides: Ceos [local Ionic]; Pindar: Boeotia [local Aeolic]).

[12] P. Kretschmer, 'Sprache', in A. Gercke and E. Norden (eds.), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* I[3] (Leipzig, 1927), 545 (inner pagination)—my translation. This view was first published in the second edition of 1912 (*non vidi*), and repeated in *Glotta* 6 (1915), 275–6.

[13] C.D. Buck, 'A question of dialect mixture in the Greek epigram', in *Antidoron: Festschrift J. Wackernagel zur Vollendung des 70. Lebensjahres* (Göttingen, 1923), 132–6.

even where local forms would have fit was too widespread to be reckoned an exception. In other words, though meter plays a role in the arrangement and patterning of poetic diction, it cannot be said to motivate the diction *per se*. The importance of the metrical inscriptions for this argument is, obviously, that we can rely on the accuracy of the linguistic forms in which they were recorded, and there is no reason to assume that the principles observed by Buck and Mickey would differ appreciably in the case of Homer. The various stages through which the text of Homer passed will undoubtedly have 'purified' the imputed Ionic basis considerably and correspondingly regularized, at least in part and where metrically feasible, any traits that violated known 'dialectal' phenomena.[14] In any case, since Parry had built his theory of oral composition on the foundation of the metrically generated formula, as described by his German predecessors (though extending this by the factor of performance), the motivation that he offered for the character of formulaic diction, that is for its generating principle, is likewise weakened by the repeal of 'Kretschmer's Law'.

But this motivation is only a part of the theory of oral composition, which as a whole is not weakened. That is, the theory surely does tell us much about *why* Homeric diction is used the way it is. Therein lies its explanatory power, superior to that of accounts that had preceded it. It only does not (taken by itself) tell us how the diction so used came to look (or rather sound) quite the way it does in the first place. To begin with, it does not explain why the compulsion to use local forms of speech was not felt *throughout*. The application of 'Kretschmer's Law' should have raised this question—if the compulsion to preserve the hexameter (or other meter) overpowered

His argument was extended by K. Mickey in 'Studies in the Greek dialects and the language of Greek verse inscriptions' (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1981; for a summary of her findings, see 'Dialect Consciousness and Literary Language: An Example from Ancient Greek', *Transactions of the Philological Society* 1981, 35–66).

[14] Thus, terms like 'hyper-Ionicism' or 'hyper-Doricism' are misleading in that they assume a 'correct' mixture of dialect forms *per* 'Kretschmer's Law'. But a ritual speech model, we shall see, *predicts* the presence of such forms and accounts for non-dialectal forms such as ὁρόω (on which see Dover, 'Song-speech', 13). This is not to deny the intervention of scribes; a famous case of 'hyper-Laconisms' clearly introduced at a late stage is found in the text of Alcman: see C. Calame (ed.), *Alcman* (Rome, 1983), xxiv–xxviii. On some specific consequences of literate transmission of the *Iliad* (and Homer generally), see R. Janko, 'The *Iliad* and its Editors: Dictation and Redaction', *Class.Ant.* 9 (1990), 326–34.

the compulsion to use the local form, why was this tolerated? After all, Homeric, lyric, or elegiac diction *could* have looked different. It is not difficult to imagine metrical practice that allows for the almost unlimited use of 'local' forms; the line could be based on alliteration, for example, or an isosyllabic count, each attested elsewhere among Indo-European linguistic groups. But this is not what we have. Complex meters and diction, despite their remoteness from conversational usage, are used and tolerated in the songs, and, most important, the causal relationship between the two is not simple. It is our job here to ask the questions that Parry did not. If the metrical constraints that a singer experiences in performance do not alone motivate such things as archaisms and loan words, then what else does? In other words, though the pressure to generate hexameters in performance explains how he shapes his raw material, and the hexameter gives him a model by which to structure his utterance in time, what can explain that raw material itself?

II. *Aristotle and the rhetoric of poetic speech*

For Greek intellectuals of the fifth and fourth centuries, the answers were to be supplied by theories of rhetoric, a discipline that already moves us beyond the isolated analysis of textual artifacts and towards the effect of words on an audience. Aristotle's discussion of the rhetoric of poetic diction will serve as a first approach to a new view of text in context that moves beyond Parry and Lord's restricted view of performance context. It will be useful first to sketch briefly the background from which Aristotle's theoretical contribution emerged.

The ability of language to refer to itself, its reflexivity, represents an inexhaustible source of evidence on linguistic practice and ideology.[15] In Homer, Antenor's remarks about Odysseus and Menelaos (*Iliad* 3.203–24) are a memorable example, but most impressive is the early use of metapragmatic terms such as *morphê epeôn*, 'shapeliness of speech', an expression that Alkinoos uses to describe Odysseus'

[15] See J.A. Lucy, 'Reflexive Language and the Human Disciplines', in J.A. Lucy (ed.), *Reflexive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics* (Cambridge, 1993), 9–32. See also the important paper by M. Silverstein, 'Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description', in K. Basso and H. Selby (eds.), *Meaning in Anthropology* (Albuquerque, 1976), 11–55.

autobiographical narrative (*Odyssey* 11.367), in the same breath that he compares him to an *aoidos*, 'singer'.[16] Hesiod's encounter with the Muses (*Theogony* 22–35) has much the same rhetorical function; so does Pindar's tableau (*Pythian* 1.1–16) on the lulling power of song—both excellent illustrations too of the poet's prerogative of speeding the fortune of his song with reflexive speech. On reflection, we could fill the history in even more, pausing at the *sphrêgis* ('seal') of Theognis (19–23), 'performative futures' in hymn and epinician, and, bringing in the prose authors—the *logos* of the Pre-Socratics, the historians' prologues, the self-reference of the tragic chorus, and so on.

Early speculation on rhetoric begins (almost) with speculation on the power of poetic speech. Gorgias' pronouncements on the magical power of *logos* and *poesis* in his *Defense of Helen*[17] are of course partly a defense of his own playful way with words (on display in that very speech, a further example of reflexivity), and partly too, certainly, a sincere attempt to comprehend his success.[18] That he *was* successful, or at least that people listened, is proved to us by Plato's attack on him, clearly meant to cripple. But we learn simultaneously that Gorgias' ways were as unsettling to some elites as was magical practice itself.[19] Other sophists of the period are known to have elaborated on the same points.[20] And for his part, Isocrates plaintively regrets in the *Euagoras* (8–9) that he cannot make full use of the *kosmoi*, 'adornments', of the poets, such as 'unfamiliar words, neologisms, and metaphors', for these would clearly enhance the force of his performance.

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[16] For language ideology in Homer, the best recent work is Martin, *The Language of Heroes*. A useful collection of texts for the archaic period is G. Lanata (ed.), *Poetica Pre-Platonica: Testimonianze e Frammenti* (Florence, 1963). D. Collins, 'Hesiod and the Divine Voices of the Muses', *Arethusa* 32 (1999), 241–62, discusses linguistic ideology in Homer as well as Hesiod, and provides further bibliography.

[17] H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1951–2), 82 B 11.

[18] C. Segal, 'Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos', *HSCP* 66 (1962), 99–155, J. de Romilly, *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), especially 3–22. Cf., more generally, P. Laín Entralgo, *The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity*, ed. and trans. L.J. Rather and J.M. Sharp (New Haven, 1970).

[19] See C. Faraone, *Ancient Greek Love Magic* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), especially 1–40, who justly cautions against exaggerating the weight of opinion pronounced by 'minority voices' (3) saved through medieval transmission.

[20] Apart from Gorgias, Thrasymachus is explicitly mentioned by Plato (*Phaedrus* 267c–d) as working 'magic' with words. On Antiphon, to whom [Plutarch] *Moralia* 833c–d attributes curative powers of speech, see Laín Entralgo, *Therapy of the Word*, 97–8.

We can therefore be sure that in the two generations spanning the turn of the fifth to fourth centuries, the talismanic and amoral virtue of words was recognized at all levels of intellectual discourse. But the most systematic surviving exposition of this *dunamis* ('force')—being at the same time an attempt to understand and contain it—is the one that Aristotle distributed between his *Poetics* (19–22) and *Rhetoric* (Book 3). In the context of fourth-century reactions to Gorgias, Aristotle's 'theory' of poetic *lexis* is in one sense a rearguard attempt to keep the powers conjured by the sophists safely at bay. In any case, the two treatises do have this in common: they set out, each in its way, to reduce the major modes of public, oral discourse in democratic Athens to the purview, and oversight, of dialectic.[21] In making this attempt, the philosopher declares his willingness to struggle for control of the power of words in public arenas.

Admittedly, the implications of such a view could be traced only through a large-scale study of Aristotle's apprehension of Greek religion, magic, and popular beliefs, an enterprise that has not been ventured, as far as I can tell. For the time being, however, we can be guided by Massenzio's somewhat less ambitious study of Aristotle's tactical refusal to engage ritual in the *Poetics* (or rather his relegation of ritual to a place in the murky prehistory of drama).[22] He finds that Aristotle omits from his analysis of tragic form any mention of tragedy's sacred dimension, its connection to Dionysos and his festival; at the same time, by abstracting tragedy from its festival setting, Aristotle deprives it of its ritual force. This desacralization could be achieved only at great cost, and Aristotle seems aware of this in his attempt to channel, and thus contain, the god's enigmatic and unpredictable power through a poet disciplined by procedure, the demands of the plot, the elements of good drama. Massenzio notes the irony that in so doing, Aristotle ends by telling us much indeed about the power of divine presence in tragic *poesis*.[23] Massenzio's argument can even be extended beyond his immediate purview. He

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[21] A judicious statement is C. Lord, 'The Intention of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*', *Hermes* 109 (1981), 326–39, for whom, '[t]he ultimate aim of the "Rhetoric" is . . . not so much to transform the practice of rhetoric as to transform the theoretical or conceptual understanding of rhetoric by political men' (338).

[22] M. Massenzio, 'La Poesia come Fine: La Desacralizzazione della Tragedia: Considerazioni sulla "Poetica" di Aristotele', *Religione e Civiltà* 1 (1972), 285–318.

[23] Massenzio, 'La Poesia come Fine', 316.

stopped at Chapter 18 of the *Poetics*, but I propose to pick up the trail in the very next chapter, where Aristotle's analysis of *lexis* begins.[24] In an early passage, we read this about *lexis* (1450b 13–20):

> By *lexis* I mean verbal representation (*hermeneia*), something that has the same power in metrical as well as spoken utterance. Of the other sources of pleasure, music is the greatest; whereas visual display, though it makes a stronger impression [lit. is more influential to the *psychê*] is not subject to technique [or 'art', *technê*] and is least the province of a poetics; for the power of tragedy exists even without the festival [lit. competition, *agôn*] and the acting; and the craft of staging props is more dominant in the production of visual display than is the poets' craft.

This remarkable passage illustrates Massenzio's point that Aristotle abstracts tragedy from the ritual setting of its performance, locating a peculiar power (*dunamis*) in words on their own, regardless of whether they were metrically patterned or publicly (ritually) performed. This takes us well beyond Parry's position already, by looking past the role of meter and compositional technique in conditioning performed utterance to the *effect* of the words themselves. In a series of mutually corresponding passages in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, we find elaboration, an explicit analysis of the *dunamis* of poetic and persuasive speech. Our brief review will bring out two main considerations. First, unlike Parry, Aristotle ignores the role played by meter in his aetiology of poetic speech; for him, the aetiology is essentially rhetorical. Secondly, however (picking up Massenzio), as with tragedy in general, so too with poetic speech in particular: Aristotle overtly eschews mention of the ritual settings in which such speech is used and redirects the vocabulary of magic that Gorgias had favored in describing the power of words (*dunamis*, for example).

In his theory of poetic speech, Aristotle draws a distinction between metrical-mimetic *lexis* and 'prevailing usage' (*ta kuria*).[25] He tells us

[24] These chapters on 'linguistics' have long proven a bit of an embarrassment to critics. For example, G. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 567, declines to treat them in his massive commentary, saying simply that 'they have very little—astonishingly little—connection with any other part of Aristotle's theory of poetry'. Among studies, see G. Morpurgo-Tagliabue, *Linguistica e Stilistica di Aristotele* (Rome, 1967). D.K.W. Modrak, *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning* (Cambridge, 2001) appeared too late to be considered for this chapter.

[25] I use the unwieldy term 'metrical-mimetic *lexis*' to capture Aristotle's minimal criteria for poetry.

that the difference rests on two main grammatical categories, morphology and lexicon. A list of the precise features that he has in mind may be assembled by comparing the relevant passages from the two treatises listed together (*Poetics* 1457b1–3; cf. 58a22–3, and *Rhetoric* 1405b35–1406b19):

- non-standard compound words (διπλᾶ ὀνόματα, *Poetics* 1459a8–9, *Rhetoric* 1405b5–1406a6),
- regionalisms/archaisms (γλῶττα, *Poetics* 1458a22, *Rhetoric* 1406a6–10)
- metaphor (μεταφορά, *Poetics* 1458a2, *Rhetoric* 1406b5–19),
- artificial coinages, nonce words (πεποιημένον [ὄνομα], *Poetics* 1457b33–5, *Rhetoric* 1404b26–33),
- ornamental epithet (κόσμος? [*Rhetoric* 1408a11–16], ἐπίθετον, *Rhetoric* 1406a10–32),
- apocopated, or artificially contracted, forms (ἀφῃρημένον [ὄνομα] *Poetics* 1458a1–5),
- diectatic, or artificially distracted, forms, i.e. with unetymological syllable[s] (ἐπεκτεταμένον [ὄνομα], ἐπέκτασις *Poetics* 1458a1–4), and
- heteroclite forms; that is, with altered inflection (ἐψηλλαγμένον [ὄνομα] *Poetics* 1458a5–7)

The treatises complement each other in further ways; for example, Aristotle argues (between them) that poetic speech must be comprehensible without being dull (*Poetics* 1458a18–21), whereas oratory must be adorned only as appropriate, without indulgence in poeticisms that compromise clarity (*Rhetoric* 1404b1–5). Moreover, too many poeticisms cast a chill over oratory (*Rhetoric* 1405b35–1406b19). For an explanation, we may consult the following passage from the *Poetics* (1458a21–6):

> [Diction] that employs out-of-the-ordinary terms is stately and departs from common speech (*to idiôtikon*). Now, by 'out-of-the-ordinary' I mean loan-words, metaphor, [metrical] lengthening and everything that deviates from prevailing usage (*to kurion*). But if someone composes this sort of thing exclusively, the result will be either cryptic or outlandish (*babarismos*). Thus, if [one composes] from metaphors [only], it will be cryptic; if from loan-words, outlandish.

Here, the standard against which Aristotle assesses 'out-of-the-ordinary' diction (*to xenikon*), namely 'prevailing usage' (*to kurion*), is virtually equated with *to idiôtikon*. The latter term is usually taken to mean 'private' as opposed to public, 'what pertains to the individual citizen' as opposed to the state, but it comes to mean 'civilian', 'pertaining to the *average* individual', etc. In the present context, however, the term is unlikely to refer to 'individual' (as opposed to the

collectivity), because the point is not that metrical-mimetic *lexis* deviates from that of the individual (in favor of that of the collectivity); rather, Aristotle has in mind the individual or group not performing in a state-sponsored event, such as a tragic festival; hence, a spectator rather than a performer.

It is very important for our purposes that Aristotle is interested here in the functional distinction between kinds of speech. But it is equally important to notice in this terminology of relative authority that Aristotle associates the dominant mode of discourse, *to kurion*, with the non-poetic, that is, speech *not* characterized by 'regionalism, metaphor, and lengthened forms'. And so, although he is trying to describe the power or potential of metrical-mimetic *lexis* (its *dunamis*), he is at pains to limit its authority. Again, one aim of the treatises seems to be to harness or contain the magical power of metrical speech.

Too much poetry, he continues, makes speech enigmatic or nonsensical. At best, as this next passage from the *Rhetoric* shows, poeticisms of the kind enumerated above add adornment but not substance to an argument; they are to be used for effect, though used sparingly, since clarity, that trait most prized in a philosophically sound rhetoric, is an inherent property of prevailing usage as against poetic speech (1404b5–12):

> Received usage (*ta kuria*) of the parts of speech makes for clarity, while the word-types mentioned in the *Poetics* [make diction] not flat but ornate. For departing from the ordinary brings on a stately appearance [in diction]. You see, people react towards out-of-towners and locals the same way as they do towards diction—and this is why discourse needs to be made out-of-the-ordinary: they are in awe of what is non-local, and the awe-inspiring is pleasant. Accordingly, in metrical works many effects are brought about like this and they fit well there (since the people and things treated in the story are more remote [from daily experience]); whereas in plain discourses this is less true (since what is treated is less [remote]).

Yet if poeticisms are for 'mere' effect, *effect* does entail rhetoric, and hence a context of performance. The subordination of word power to the power of reason in the *Rhetoric* all but masks Aristotle's acknowledgment of the pragmatic force that conditions speech in particular situations. Crucially (at least for the present study), this force is sought out in Aristotle's account of metrical-mimetic *lexis*, which justifies its use under strict limits; *dunamis* is at once its cause, or motivation, and its effect, or rhetorical virtue.

Still, if Aristotle desacralizes poetic performance (and it will be clear by now that I am interested in broadening this observation to include the genres other than tragedy that he discusses), it follows that his account of metrical-mimetic *lexis* is correspondingly incomplete. It will be necessary for us to take up his interest in the pragmatics of 'poetry' without abstracting it from ritual. Parry and Aristotle have now put us in a better position to understand not only how ritual speech is used but how it came to look the way it does.

III. *From poetic speech to ritual speech*

Our task now will be to show that correspondences between our 'master list' of Aristotle's features of metrical-mimetic *lexis*, on the one hand, and a similar inventory abstracted from recent ethnographic descriptions of ritual speech, on the other, are not coincidental. In clearing the decks for his philosophical revision of public ritual (the 'desacralization' described above), Aristotle inhibited later scholars from understanding the ritual pragmatics of this *lexis*;[26] and these aspects have left traces in textual artifacts of early Greek song that we can still undertake to recover through ethnographic comparison and a study of metapragmatic reference. The linguistic consequences of the approach I am advocating can be summed up in the term 'ritual speech', which I will henceforth use, not dogmatically, I hope, but illustratively.[27]

First, a caution. The temptation to identify the mere use of formalized speech in Homer as constituting a *de facto* ritual act seems to be encouraged by common statements such as this: 'Formality is an obvious aspect of all rituals: both observers and actors identify acts as ritual in part by their formality. Rituals tend to be stylized,

[26] Some idea of Aristotle's influence on later linguistic thought can be gathered from H. Arens, *Aristotle's Theory of Language and its Tradition: Texts from 500 to 1750* (Amsterdam, 1984).

[27] J. Du Bois, 'Ritual Language', in W. Bright (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Linguistics* 3 (New York, 1992), 335, defines the term thus: 'Ritual language is language distinctively characteristic of ritual—a special linguistic variety used in prescribed consecrated forms of behavior, governed by belief in mystical powers. It is distinguished from ordinary speech in both form and socio-cultural function, as well as by the attitudes and evaluative criteria directed toward it by culture members.' I prefer to use the term 'ritual speech' rather than 'ritual language', which I reserve for separate, non-native languages used principally for ritual occasions.

repetitive, stereotyped, often but not always decorous'.[28] And indeed several observers have noticed that such traits are exhibited by the formulaic behavior of Homeric (and other archaic) verse.[29] This would seem at first to offer *prima facie* evidence of a ritual function of early Greek song performance, but I would warn that such a *conclusion* would be hasty, since it is yet to receive strong theoretical grounding. Parry's researches, as we have seen, effectively developed a way to trace in the textual artifact some external features of its 'original' performance as text-in-context, and one methodological aim of this chapter is in fact to extend Parry's findings beyond the singer's technique of composition into the domain of ritual context. But I doubt that this can be done by identifying formulae with ritual *because* they conform to Rappaport's 'stylized, repetitive, stereotyped' behavior, since by no defensible definition is *all* such behavior 'ritual'.[30] Bakker, in fact, demonstrates that language-use in Homer shares important properties with language-use in contexts with no claim to 'ritual' status (again, on a narrow definition), and in particular he emphasizes similarities in phrasal texture between the two.[31] It follows from this that the formulaic texture of early Greek song is not *by itself* indicative of ritual. Note that it does not follow that formulae cannot be an index of ritual function, only that the nature of the indexical relationship is yet to be properly theorized.

I spoke above about ethnographic comparison and metapragmatic reference as two important components in a theory of ritual speech, and it is to these that I now turn. There are two main justifications for the use of these tools. First, ethnographic comparison, though imperfect and sometimes hazardous, is an indispensable resource for

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[28] R.A. Rappaport, 'The Obvious Aspects of Ritual', in his *Ecology, Meaning, and Religion* (Richmond, Ca., 1979), 173–221.

[29] E.A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 77 and *The Muse Learns to Write* (New Haven, 1986), 58. Note that Bakker refers to the use of name-epithet combinations not as ritualistic but as *rituals* (or 'mini-rituals'): *Poetry in Speech*, 162–5 and 'Noun-epithet Formulas, Milman Parry, and the Grammar of Poetry', in J.P. Crielaard (ed.), *Homeric Questions: Essays in Philology, Ancient History and Archaeology* (Amsterdam, 1995), 97–122.

[30] J. Goody, 'Religion and Ritual: The Definitional Problem', *British Journal of Sociology* 12 (1961), 142–64 and 'Against "Ritual": Loosely Structured Thoughts on a Loosely Defined Topic', in S.F. Moore and B.G. Meyerhoff (eds.), *Secular Ritual* (Assen, 1977), 25–35.

[31] Bakker, *Poetry in Speech*, especially 35–53. For the 'formulaic' texture of natural spoken language, see A. Pawley, 'On Speech Formulas and Linguistic Competence', *Kansas Working Papers on Linguistics* 11 (1986), 57–87.

the study of any society to which we have no *direct* ethnographic access. Second, and by corollary, lacking direct ethnolinguistic observation, we may look to statements by practitioners *about* their language use, either in the form of explicit statements (for example, 'we only say "thou" when we pray') or indirect (for example, 'you know, when I was your age', which prepares a child for wisdom to be heeded). In Homer, one form that this representation takes is the poet's display of his relation to the unseen, the past, and the divine. But in archaic Greece, as universally, crucial backing for the pragmatics of ritual discourse will have come from representations held within the community about that relationship, and about the community's own, *vis-à-vis* the divine. These thoughts should be borne in mind throughout the following discussion.

The field of linguistic anthropology, which has seen over a century of rapid development, offers us the most powerful body of data and theory for approaching the formal and pragmatic problems of Homeric diction. A striking illustration of common cause between this field and Aristotle's old project is found in the work of students of ritual speech-use in traditional religious settings. Surveying numerous field studies of these linguistic phenomena, John Du Bois distilled a catalogue of widely attested properties.[32] Correspondences between this list and the one that we derived from Aristotle's discussion of compositional *lexis* are not coincidental. The table is designed to illustrate these as well as parallels from other Greek sources.

Du Bois	Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, *Poetics*)	Other sources
1. special register	'poetic' *lexis*	lang. of gods/men
2. archaic elements	γλῶτται	–
3. borrowed elements	"	–
4. euphemism and metaphor	metaphor	Parry 1933[33]

[32] J. Du Bois, 'Self-evidence and Ritual Speech', in W. Chafe and J. Nichols (eds.), *Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology* (Norwood, 1986), 313–36, and 'Ritual Language'. In what follows, I merge two slightly different lists of linguistic traits that appear in these two publications.

[33] *MHV*, 365–75. The *kenningar*, or riddling circumlocutions, belong here: C. Watkins, 'ἀνόστεος ὃν πόδα τένδει', in his *Selected Writings* (Innsbruck, 1994), 588–92; in general, E. Marold, *Kenningkunst: Ein Beitrag zu einer Poetik der Skaldendichtung* (Berlin, 1983).

5. meaning opaqueness	dithyrambists, 'chilling'	Plut. *Delph. Orac.*
6. parallelism	–	Aristoph. *Frogs* 1151 ff.
7. marked delivery	*Rhet.* 1403b 18 ff. (*hypokrisis*)	[see 10 below]
8. Gestalt knowledge	–	Lord 1951, 1960[34]
9. words permanent, repeatable	–	e.g. *kleos aphthiton*
10. personal volition disclaimer	–	Pl., *Ap.* 22; *Ion* 533
11. mediated speech	–	Hes. *Th.* 1–103, etc.
12. shifter avoidance	–	[discussed below]
13. ancestral model	–	–
14. –	ornamental epithet	
15. –	apocopated forms	
16. –	diectatic forms	
17. –	heteroclite forms	

Du Bois intended his list to be an analytic digest; he made no claim that *all* of these variables would be present in any one example of ritual speech. Nor is the list meant to substitute for study in the field: each society makes its own use of the feature in question. I find adequate parallels to six of the thirteen points listed here in Aristotle's discussions of *lexis* alone. In the case of Item 6, Aristophanes' brief description of parallelism in the *Frogs*, placed in the mouth of Euripides and directed at Aeschylus, is good evidence that this was perceived as a noteworthy feature of an idiom specialized for ritual performance, though parallelism was never as highly developed in Greece than elsewhere.[35] For Items 8–12, we must search farther afield, but again there is adequate evidence that we can cite. This set of omissions from Aristotle's list may in fact be a direct reflection of his neglect of ritual function, in that the evidence for them (attested elsewhere in the society) lies beyond linguistic form, to be found instead in the representations cherished by practitioners of what they are doing and why. To record these representations as fact would be to endorse them, which Aristotle is not prepared to do. And a

[34] A.B. Lord, 'Homer and Huso II: Narrative Inconsistencies in Homer and Oral Poetry', *TAPA* 69 (1938), 439–45, and 'Composition by Theme in Homer and Southslavic Epos', *TAPA* 82 (1951), 71–80.

[35] The pioneering work on parallelism was R. Lowth, *Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews*, trans. G. Gregory (London, 1787); for a modern study, see J.J. Fox, *To Speak in Pairs: Essays on the Ritual Languages of Eastern Indonesia* (Cambridge, 1988).

second look shows that indeed Aristotle was concerned mainly with formal features at the level of morphology and the lexical item—information that could be derived from textual artifacts alone, without regard for their origins or contests of performance. This is also the case with the four last traits, which I could perhaps have ranged under Du Bois' Items 1, 2, and 3. Possibly average listeners would have considered them archaic or borrowed elements; categories such as 'apocopated forms' or 'diectatic forms' would surely serve only a technical descriptive purpose like Aristotle's.

The comparisons of Du Bois' list with Aristotle's are not meant to be probative but suggestive. They suggest what is missing from Aristotle's influential account of metrical-mimetic *lexis*, which strips away its ritual motivation, providing instead a rhetorical motivation. That served his philosophical purposes but has inhibited modern scholars from understanding the factor of ritual in archaic Greek song performance.[36] Of course, the continuity in magic, 'folk religion', and state cults of the use of ritual speech (often metrically patterned) shows that it was *only* scholars that Aristotle inhibited. The sorcerer, herbalist, or hymnist chose the speech that worked for her, or him, and carried on the trade, untroubled by categories such as 'poetry'.

But we can now begin by reconsidering this category. Students of Greek cultural history have only recently begun to appreciate that there was apparently no such thing as secular poetry in early Greece for the simple reason that there was very little that was secular at all, in our sense. This is another way of saying that religion was not the differentiated compartment of social life that it is, for the most part, in modern industrial societies.[37] And what we know of early Greek poetry was performed within public gatherings, whether festivals, ceremonies, or the highly ritualized gatherings of the *symposion* or *thiasos*.[38] 'Poetic' speech, then, being adapted for speech-events

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[36] A fuller study of Aristotle's theory of poetic speech will show that he was not acting in isolation but was helped along by many factors. These included (1) the increasing ease with which early Greek song could be seen as a corpus of textual artifacts, (2) the growing tendency to look to the ancient wisdom of literary classics (e.g. Thucydides 3.104, Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1353–77) and the reverence with which philosophical schools treated *ipsissima verba* of their leaders, and (3) his own rivalry with other schools.

[37] T. Asad, 'The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category', in his *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore, 1993), 1–54. See also Connor, '"Sacred" and "Secular"'.

[38] B. Gentili, *Poetry and its Public: From Homer to the Fifth Century*, trans. A.T. Cole (Baltimore, 1988), 3–104 and *passim*, R. Kannicht, 'Thalia', in his *Paradeigmata:*

that belonged to such ceremonial sequences, was ritual speech. Festivals, cult ceremonies, consultations of sorcerers or seers, and so on show that even within a society in which the influence of the unseen was pervasive, there were still occasions characterized by a special *focus* of cultic attention and energy.[39] What was called for at such moments were ways of speaking through which the alternative realities of religious activity could be represented, created, and sustained.[40] It will help us refine the application of this view to the Greek material if we consider some controversies in anthropological linguistics relating to ritual speech, its meaning and use.

IV. *What gives ritual speech its authority?*

We need a theory of early Greek ritual speech that accounts for the form it takes in terms of the circumstances of performance (performer, spatial and temporal situation, sanctioning audience, etc.), which condition that form and the meaning that emerges through it. We have seen that the account offered by Parry (components of which he inherited from previous scholars) depended heavily on language history and meter. We can supplement this by appealing first to Aristotle's theory of metrical-mimetic *lexis* for the beginnings of a rhetorical account. But this is incomplete, too, as we have seen, owing to Aristotle's goal of abstracting poetic performance from its ritual setting, of 'desacralizing' it (as Massenzio puts it). To my knowledge, it has not been asked what it might mean for our apprehension of *poetic* diction that it was, in Aristotle's theory and Gorgias' practice, removable, transferable to oratory. This is the problem of

Aufsätze zur griechischen Poesie, L. Käppel and E.A. Schmidt (eds.) (Heidelberg, 1996), 68–99.

39 Cf. J.T. Irvine, 'Formality and Informality in Communicative Events', *American Anthropologist* 81 (1979), 779, J.Z. Smith, 'The Bare Facts of Ritual', in his *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago, 1982), 55.

40 M.A.K. Halliday, *Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning* (Baltimore, 1978), 164–82, has identified this as a prime function of 'anti-languages', such as underworld jargons. These, however, are differentiated by social class as opposed to ritual occasion. A useful summary statement of the general problems of specialized speech varieties can be found in A. Agha, 'Register', *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 9 (2000), 216–19. For the expression 'way(s) of speaking', see Dell Hymes, 'Ways of Speaking', in R. Bauman and J. Sherzer (eds.), *Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking*² (Cambridge, 1989), 433–51.

what Urban has called 'transduction', the removal of a mode of discourse from one setting to another.[41] Granted that 'poetic speech', when it is removed to oratory, assumes a *rhetorical* force such as the one ascribed to it by Aristotle, the crucial question would still remain unresolved: do the features of speech transferred from poetry to oratory retain their *original* force in transduction; if not, what do they lose (or take on)?

One clear consequence of this exercise in abstraction was that rhetoric in poetics became, after Aristotle, *unidirectional*, its force being exercised exclusively by speaker on hearer. Scholars still often see the poet *choosing* diction for the *effect* that *he* wished to produce on a *receptive* audience. Even this, including a receptive audience as it does, is an advance over pure formalism, as we saw. But it leaves out the crucial dimensions of intention and action on the audience's part; it deprives the latter of *its* authority within the cultural dialogue, and it imputes to the poet an implausible usurpation of power to dictate cultural meaning unilaterally, even at communal gatherings. Among hellenists, the usual justification or cause given for this relation is divine authority. The poet, as 'master of truth', is endowed with authority by virtue of privileged access to the Muse, Apollo, or Memory.[42] What this overlooks, however, is the creative role of the society in which the singer lives and works. Our theory of ritual speech (which the present work merely sketches) must challenge such unidirectionality and advance beyond a 'sender—code—receiver' model of discourse, restoring a more detailed picture that sees the performance event as multi-dimensional, dialogic, 'emergent'.[43] In simplest terms, this means that attempts to account for the authority behind ritual speech that consider only the power of the 'specialist' are incomplete.

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[41] G. Urban, 'Entextualization, Replication, and Power', in M. Silverstein and G. Urban (eds.), *Natural Histories of Discourse* (Chicago, 1996), 21–44.

[42] M. Detienne, *Les Maîtres de Verité en Grèce Archaïque* (Paris, 1967); cf. H. Maehler, *Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum bis zur Zeit Pindars* (Göttingen, 1963). J.A. Notopoulos, 'Mnemosyne in Oral Literature', *TAPA* 69 (1938), 465–93, had claimed that the goddess Mnemosyne personified memory as an all-important facet of the singer's art.

[43] D. Tedlock and B. Mannheim, 'Introduction', in D. Tedlock and B. Mannheim (eds.), *The Dialogic Emergence of Culture* (Urbana, 1995) and C.L. Briggs and R. Bauman, 'Genre, Intertextuality, and Social Power', *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 2 (1992), 131–72.

A new theory of ritual speech might begin with the problem of meaning itself. It is sometimes said that traits of ritual speech, such as those enumerated by Aristotle and Du Bois, amount to *constraints* on 'ordinary' speech and that this will inevitably have some effect on the ability of ritual discourse to transmit meaning. Take, for example, the trait of invariance in the content of the utterance. This is relevant to Homerists because of the problem of plausible meaning in formulaic speech that was first posed by Parry when he suggested that name-epithet combinations were formed and deployed for their metrical shape rather than meaning.[44] This question, whether invariance in ritual utterances diminishes the informative, propositional content of verbal messages, has occupied anthropologists too.[45] It is sometimes argued that repetitive chanting or the like is unable to tell listeners facts about the world, though it can have other aims, such as charm-like or other incantatory effects, for example. An example from everyday English is 'good-bye', which indexes a situation, rather than 'means' anything (rarely, if ever, its source phrase, 'God be with you'); the varieties of this phenomenon in ritual speech range from meaningless vocables to prayers in ritual languages (such as Sumerian or Latin) to formulae. In ritual settings, such phenomena can assume a significance that they may not have out of context.[46] As Rappaport observed, 'that which is stated in the invariant canon is thereby represented as certain because invariance implies certainty.' The unquestionable truth that this source of certainty offers is, for Rappaport, to be identified with the sacred, and hence with 'truthfulness, reliability, correctness, naturalness, and legitimacy.'[47]

Considerations such as these led Maurice Bloch to propose that 'formalized language, the language of traditional authority, is *impoverished* language', which, depleted of propositional content, transfers

[44] For a valuable, if somewhat dated, review of the literature, see J.P. Holoka, 'Homeric Originality: A Survey', *Classical World* 66 (1973), 257–93; more recent work summarized in Russo, 'The Formula', 238–60.

[45] A.F.C. Wallace, *Religion: An Anthropological View* (New York, 1966), 233–42, and W.T. Wheelock, 'The Problem of Ritual Language: From Information to Situation', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 50 (1982), 49–71.

[46] Cf. on glossolalia Paul, 1 *Corinthians* 14.20; cf. 13.1, with H. Güntert, *Von der Sprache der Götter und Geister: Bedeutungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur homerischen und eddischen Göttersprache* (Halle, 1921), 23–31.

[47] Rappaport, 'Obvious Aspects of Ritual', 209 and 211, respectively; cf. Du Bois, 'Self-evidence and Ritual Speech', 326–7 ('parallelism').

all meaning to the domain of illocution.[48] Because ritual speech constrains expression, as against less-marked forms of speech, and simultaneously constrains the range of admissible response, thereby compelling acceptance of its code, communication in this idiom, in Bloch's strong formulation, amounts to coercion. In my opinion, he is right to emphasize the dimension of power in the use of ritual speech but surely over-generalizes from the particular rites that he adduces as support for his argument, circumcision ceremonies conducted by powerful elders among the Merina people of Madagascar. Bloch's analysis of speech-usage in this context is dominated by an idealized scenario in which a villager is bound by the situation to accept the code and adopt it to respond to the elder(s). The profile of power here is bound to seem unidirectional, as we saw in Aristotle's analysis of speech-use in democratic institutions, public oratory and state theater. But this is fatally incomplete.

To my knowledge, the most successful rejoinders to Bloch's model of ritual speech were made by Pascal Boyer, in his *Tradition as truth and communication.*[49] Boyer insisted that anthropologists needed to proceed, in their descriptions of ritual speech, not with vague generalities about 'tradition' and the use of formalized speech as a vehicle for its propagation, but by studying the representations that people make about the value and content of the ritual discourses in which they partake; he further shifts the emphasis from power to truth, as so represented. It is the dimension of social participation that is crucial. Boyer comments, 'I would claim that "reduced propositional potential" on its own, is not sufficient for the utterances to be held true. Semantic vacuity and parallelism are indices of truth only if the listeners have some assumptions about the reasons why discourse is thus distorted.' Again, '[m]ost formalised discourse should . . . be

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[48] M. Bloch, *Ritual, History, and Power: Selected Papers in Anthropology* (London, 1989), 25, S.J. Tambiah, *Culture, Thought, and Social Action* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 17–166. 'Illocution' is a term that Bloch expressly borrows from J.L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words*[2] (Cambridge, Mass., 1975). It indicates an act that a speaker accomplishes by making a statement, usually in the first person and with a verb conventionally recognized as entailing its own performance (for example, 'I *promise*', 'I hereby *pronounce*').

[49] P. Boyer, *Tradition as Truth and Communication: A Cognitive Description of Traditional Discourse* (Cambridge, 1990), especially 61–93, J.T. Irvine, 'Formality and Informality in Communicative Events', 773–90, J.H. McDowell, 'The Semiotic Constitution of Kamsá Ritual Language', *Language in Society* 12 (1983), 23–46.

construed as not only a quotation but, more strongly, as the consequence of the reality described. Instead of being a quotation of, e.g. "the words of the ancestors" [as Bloch held it was for the Merina], formalised utterances in ritual contexts would be interpreted as triggered *by* ancestors.' Finally, 'So the persuasiveness of ritualised speech must depend, not only on the properties of the utterances, but also on the listeners' representations about the utterances and the domain of reality which is talked about.'[50]

This, then, is one methodological means of replacing the unidirectional intent that Aristotle ascribed to *lexis*. It is unlikely that ritual speech looks the way it does because, as Aristotle said, poets want to gratify an audience's desire to admire the unfamiliar; rather, it looks like that because the audience shared—perhaps even generated—representations of that kind of language-use as caused by, reflective of, or productive of some unseen reality. The precise representations vary strongly from one society to another, and because we lack ethnographic access to early Greece, we must have recourse to the testimonia and textual artifacts themselves if we want to come to know it at all. Unlike earlier attempts to describe the job of poet in the archaic period, then, ours will ask what it is about his job that gives shape to what I am calling ritual speech in early Greek song.

V. *Homer on ritual speech*

The Muses, as eyewitnesses to the events to be described (in contrast to mortals, who rely on hearsay alone: *Iliad* 2.485–6), are summoned to speak at the opening of large performance segments, as it were to dictate a tale or catalogue through the singer, and the authority for these songs is thereby explicitly attributed to them. Nevertheless, there is no statement that links the singer's diction itself to them as explicitly. Here I want to argue that a contemporary aetiology of ritual speech is vestigially present in Homer; that we can derive metapragmatic commentary from his words by observing his citation of the language of the gods and his cession of authority for his discourse to the Muse.

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[50] Boyer, *Tradition as Truth and Communication*; the quotations are on 90, 89, 86, respectively.

What does it mean that Homer can cite the language of the gods? When, according to Hesiod, Zeus had driven the Titans from heaven, and Earth bore her youngest offspring, Typhoeus, by coupling with Tartaros, there are said to spring forth from the monster's shoulders a hundred serpentine heads (*Theogony* 829–35):

> In all the dreadful heads were voices
> giving forth an uncanny cry of every kind, sometimes
> speaking as if for the gods' understanding, sometimes
> the raging voice of a prideful, bellowing bull,
> sometimes of a lion fearless at heart,
> sometimes like a litter of puppies, amazing things to hear,
> and sometimes a hissing—and below, the mountains rumbled.

The motif of a separate language spoken by the gods is attested in various Indo-European societies, consistently linked to the 'hermetic' aspect of the poet's craft.[51] But Hesiod mentions it here among an array of inhuman utterances that resemble various animal voices. For Aristotle the voices of animals would mark the limits beyond which rational engagement with language could not proceed: '. . . no name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol. Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name' (*De Interpretatione*, 16a26).[52] And for Hesiod, the language of gods is beyond the comprehension of mortals in the same way as the yelp of a puppy or the lowing of a bull: *thaumat' akousai*, 'amazing things to hear'.

Homer himself is able to cite several divine terms, pairing them sometimes with a mortal equivalent: the hundred-hander, Briareus/Aigaion (*Iliad* 1.401–4); a mound, tomb of Murine/Bateia hill (*Iliad* 2.811–14); a bird, *chalkis*/*kumindis* (*Iliad* 14.289–91); the river, Xanthos/Skamandros (*Iliad* 20.74–5); the drug, *môlu*/? (*Odyssey* 10.302–6); and the reefs, *Planktai*/? (*Odyssey* 12.59–61). To these may be joined the name of the divine analogues of blood *ichôr*/[*haima*] (*Iliad* 5.339–40), and life-giving substances *nektar* and *ambrosiê*.[53] At a narrative level,

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[51] Güntert, *Von der Sprache der Götter und Geister*, F. Bader, *La Langue des Dieux, ou L'Hermétisme des Poètes Indo-Européens* (Pisa, 1989), J. Leavitt, 'The Language of the Gods: Craft and Inspiration in Central Himalayan Ritual Discourse', in J. Leavitt (ed.), *Poetry and Prophecy: The Anthropology of Inspiration* (Ann Arbor, 1997), 129–68.

[52] Translation: J.L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione* (Oxford, 1963); cf. *Poetics* 1456b23–5.

[53] Güntert, *Von der Sprache der Götter und Geister*, 116–30, surveys post-Homeric citations of divine language, while A. Suter, 'Language of Gods and Language of Men:

these distinctions body forth most plainly the gulf between godly and human modes of life and activity, but as metalanguage the citations are also scattered throughout the poems as periodic reassertions of the singer's access to divine sources of knowledge. As such, they make good his claim, enunciated in proems and invocations, to cede authority for his song to the goddess.

Du Bois' inclusion of 'shifter avoidance' in his catalogue is especially important to us in this regard. The term 'shifter' was coined by Otto Jespersen to label a class of words that give 'grave difficulty' to children learning to speak because they lack stable meaning, their reference shifting according to situation.[54] Examples are 'here', 'yesterday', and the first and second person pronouns. Shifter pronouns in Homer—and here I mean Homer-as-narrator—are rare, but all the more salient as a result.[55] Du Bois' model accounts for shifter avoidance by pointing out that as a celebrant cedes authority for his utterance to an unseen source, his speech takes on traits that are represented as the consequence of this movement along an implied gradient, the end point of which is often spirit possession, or utter surrender of personal identity to outside authority.[56] It is significant that Homer's use of first-person shifters in primary narrative occurs precisely at moments when he is announcing, or reminding us of, his transfer of authority to the Muse.[57] The invocations are examples, but so is the internal reference (*Iliad* 12.176–8), 'It is toilsome for me to tell it all like a god, how all around the stone wall there

The Case of Paris/Alexandros', *Lexis* 7–8 (1991), 13–25, makes a good case for seeing the same distinction in certain Homeric name pairs.

[54] O. Jespersen, *Language: Its Nature, Development, and Origin* (London, 1922), 123–4.

[55] The basic work is I.J.F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad* (Amsterdam, 1987); see also S.D. Richardson, *The Homeric Narrator* (Nashville, 1990). On temporal shifters, see P. Steinrück, 'Wie entsteht bei Homer der epische Schein? (Eine Alternative)', *Poetica* 31 (1999), 324–3, on second-person references, R.P. Martin, *The Language of Heroes*, 231–9.

[56] Du Bois, 'Self-evidence and Ritual Speech', 326–32; cf. the corroborative findings of W. Chafe, 'Seneca Speaking Styles and the Location of Authority', in J.H. Hill and J.T. Irvine (eds.), *Responsibility and Evidence in Oral Discourse* (Cambridge, 1993), 72–87.

[57] Cf. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers*, 42: 'The [primary narrator-focalizer] reflects on, and thereby explicitly reveals, his own activity as narrator and focalizer only when addressing the Muses.' The passage that I cite, which is not directed at the Muses, constitutes an exception, but de Jong's point is supported in that Homer explicitly despairs of telling his tale 'like a god'.

raged an awesome fire', where the narrator intrudes his personality only to abandon it; the accurate telling is the work of an Eyewitness.[58]

The nearest that Homer comes to the mumbo-jumbo of the possessed, or to Hesiod's bestial voices, is citing the language of the gods, which consists, as far as we can tell, of no more than a small lexical inventory. Yet when the gods themselves speak, they rarely use these words (the frequent *Xanthos* is alone used by singer, gods, and heroes). He does not quote them speaking either their language or that of men: they speak, as everyone within the ritual frame of performance must, the ritual speech of song, which is suspended midway between gods and men as if mediating the two planes. He cites their language to probe this distance: the language of the gods is to ritual speech as this is to the language of men. This proportion is only implied but will have been felt as the singer intoned, by the authority of the Muse, sounds unavailable to men and whose sense he alone could provide them. The language of gods in Homer is likely to be a trace, albeit faint, of an original, indigenous representation of the value and source of the specific ways of speaking associated with the singer's craft. Combined with his rare but charged use of shifters at moments when his first-hand authority is acknowledged to be remote, it gives us a valuable glimpse of what Homer could have testified if Aristotle and Parry, investigating the sources of his language, had put the question to him.[59]

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[58] The first-person pronoun in focused performance is already problematic without such a cession of authority: G. Urban, 'The "I" of Discourse', in B. Lee and G. Urban (eds.), *Semiotics, Self, and Society*, (Berlin, 1989), 27–51.

[59] For improvements in this essay, I am indebted to many conference participants; to Ian Worthington and the volume's anonymous reader; and also to Richard P. Martin, who saw a formative version.

CHAPTER THREE

THE EVOCATION OF EMOTIONAL RESPONSE IN EARLY GREEK POETRY AND PAINTING

E.A. Mackay

In earlier comparative analyses of narrative techniques in the early Greek epic tradition and in the Athenian black-figure vase-painting tradition of the sixth century BC, it has been shown that the two traditional systems work in parallel, but separately.[1] This chapter examines a phenomenon in painting that is essentially parallel to a similar phenomenon in traditional epic, which can also, however, work in concert with it. In Homeric epic, emotional response is generated at key points in the narrative by a momentary sharp focus on what Jasper Griffin termed 'significant objects'.[2] These can alternatively be described as indexical elements that refer to an event or item from outside the immediate narrative context, with the effect of juxtaposing it with that context so as to engage and direct the emotional response of the viewer.[3] These references work, in a performance context, by slowing down the narrative, allowing the listeners

[1] E.A. Mackay, 'Narrative Tradition in Early Greek Oral Poetry and Vase-Painting', *Oral Tradition* 10 (1995), 282–303, 'Time and Timelessness in the Traditions of Early Greek Oral Poetry and Archaic Vase-Painting', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Voice Into Text, Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece* (Leiden, 1996), 43–58, E.A. Mackay, S. Masters, and D. Harrison, 'Ring Composition in Archaic Vase-Painting', in E.A. Mackay (ed.), *Signs of Orality*. The *Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World* (Leiden, 1999), 115–42. The following abbreviations are used: *ABV* = J.D. Beazley, *Attic Black-figure Vase-Painters* (Oxford, 1956, repr. New York, 1978), *ARV*² = J.D. Beazley, *Attic Red-figure Vase-Painters*² (Oxford, 1963), *Para* = J.D. Beazley, *Paralipomena* (Oxford, 1971), *Add.*² = T.H. Carpenter *et al., Beazley Addenda*² (Oxford, 1989), and *LIMC* = *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Graecae* 1–8 and indexes (Zürich, Munich, Düsseldorf 1981–99). The financial support of the National Research Foundation, South Africa, and the University of Natal Research Fund is gratefully acknowledged.

[2] J. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death* (Oxford, 1980), 1–49.

[3] This definition owes much to J.M. Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art* (University Park PA, 1999), who in his discussion of the overarching oral-poetic phenomena that he denotes as *semata* observes, for instance, that 'the part stands for the whole, *pars pro toto.* [. . .] with the phrase indexing a character, object, or event in its extrasituational, extratextual wholeness' (20).

time to dwell upon the immediate moment in the narrative and to consider its implications. The focus on an object, which often includes a history of the object,[4] serves in most cases to contrast the 'here and now' of the narrative context with a 'then' or 'there' of a different context. Often, too, one can discern a causal connection between the 'now' and the 'then'. It would be otiose to re-present Griffin's detailed observations; one or two examples will serve to bring his 'context' into the present discussion.

When Andromache hears the news of Hektor's death in *Iliad* 22 and casts off the headdress that was given to her by Aphrodite on her wedding day, it is (in Griffin's words) 'a vivid symbol of her loss'.[5] The causal element consists in the fact that without the joyous wedding, she would not now be a grieving widow. The list of previous owners of Agamemnon's staff in *Iliad* 2 invites comparison of that illustrious assemblage with the present owner, to the latter's disparagement, just before he launches into his ill-conceived speech suggesting the abandoning of the siege. Here too there is a causal aspect, in that Zeus, the source of Agamemnon's position of leadership, has just led him astray, and he now 'leans on the symbol of kingship which has already been undermined.'[6] Old Argos in *Odyssey* 17 is a powerful emotional symbol of the meaning of Odysseus' long sojourn away from Ithaka,[7] a sad contrast to his earlier days as a hunting dog. He wags his tail just before Odysseus enters his house in a ragged disguise that similarly contrasts with *his* pre-war self. The dog recognises his master and dies; Penelope will soon recognise her husband, and will not die. We feel a sentimental pity for the neglected old dog, mixed with a recognition that the pace of the homecoming is quickening. Achilleus' lyre in *Iliad* 9, which the hero won in the spoils from his sack of Eëtion's city, evokes for us the contrast between Achilleus the fighting man and Achilleus on strike as a man of leisure. Again there is a causal reference: were Achilleus not such a renowned and successful sacker of cities, he would not now be sulking in his tent. When Hekabe selects the loveliest robe to offer

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[4] E. Minchin, 'Describing and Narrating in Homer's *Iliad*', in E.A. Mackay (ed.), *Signs of Orality. The Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World* (Leiden, 1999), 49–64.

[5] Griffin, *Life and Death*, 2.

[6] Griffin, *Life and Death*, 10.

[7] Griffin, *Life and Death*, 12.

to Athene in *Iliad* 6.289–95, Athene's rejection of the request associated with the gift seems somehow justified by our knowledge that the Sidonian gown had been imported to Troy by Paris when he journeyed back from Sparta with Helene.

To summarise, then, the poetic phenomenon of the significant object involves a sudden sharpening of the descriptive focus which, while appropriate to the situation, is not a necessary component of it, and which draws into the immediate or primary narrative context a resonant awareness of a secondary context that will enhance the affective potential of the first. Consideration of this recognised verbal phenomenon leads one to reconsider a visual phenomenon in Attic black-figure art that has in the past been categorised as the 'synoptic' scene—misleadingly, in my opinion.

In the Attic black-figure vase-painting tradition of the sixth century BC, the viewer's reception is not temporally constrained in the same way as is reception of traditional epic in performance. Viewers can take as much time as they wish to examine and respond to a scene. Nevertheless, they need to be encouraged to engage with the scene and to discover its emotional substructure. In order to accomplish this, the painter must incorporate features that will arrest the eye in its superficial perception of a scene, and that will then direct attention to the painter's particular interpretative construction. Within the black-figure tradition, techniques were developed for accomplishing this, and the more able painters predictably exploited these more effectively and more consistently.[8] The intention of this chapter is to show that the pictorial devices are similar to the poetic in their form and in the way they work in realising the affective potential of the scene. These visual elements can also therefore be categorised as significant objects, in that they too constitute 'indexical elements that refer to an event or item from outside the immediate narrative context, with the effect of juxtaposing it with that context so as to engage and direct the emotional response of the viewer' (quoting from p. 55 above).

As will be demonstrated, in the painting tradition these elements can work in two different modes: they can refer *conceptually* to a story

[8] That is, able in drawing, and able in interpretation: the two seem for the most part to go together, although there are exceptions (such as the Swing Painter and the Princeton Painter, to some extent).

context, in which case they work together with the *verbal* narrative tradition, in some cases without recognisable reference to the visual tradition; and they can refer *visually* to other paintings and in that way evoke additional contexts through purely *visual* stimuli that emerge solely from the pictorial tradition. The latter type of visual elements cannot, of course, be totally divorced from an engagement with the story at the conceptual level: the distinction between the two categories will therefore be based on the primary mode of the element.

The example most often cited is the proto-Attic name vase of the Polyphemos Painter, painted about 650 (see Figure 1).[9] On the neck is represented the blinding of Polyphemos, with the giant sitting on the right as Odysseus and his men drive the stake into his eye. In *Odyssey* 9.370–4, Polyphemos is described after he has drunk deeply of Odysseus' potent potion as slumping over and lying on his back with his head turned to the side, all but comatose and vomiting wine and lumps of human flesh in his stupor. This vase-scene clearly does not represent the Homeric description with any exactitude. In defiance of the story's internal logic, the Cyclops is sitting up, evidently awake, and indeed still holding the fateful wine-cup in his hand. In an attempt to determine an alternative logic for this scene and others like it, it has been proposed that the artists set out to conflate into a single picture several different events within a story, events that take place not simultaneously but in necessary sequence over a period of time; for this apparent technique of narrative painting, Snodgrass coined the term 'synoptic method'.[10]

It would appear, however, that what we have here is not so much a conflation of two or more different *potential* scenes, as rather one single, highly dramatic, moment, the blinding of Polyphemos, with the inclusion of a significant object, the cup, as a conduit for evoking an earlier context in the narrative sequence: the effect is pictured, the cause is evoked, and so we are led to appreciate in the moment of Odysseus' application of force the preceding application of foresight and ingenuity that has empowered the weak against the strong. The cup can then be seen as a shorthand way of account-

[9] Eleusis Museum.

[10] A.M. Snodgrass, *Narrative and Allusion in Archaic Greek Art* (London, 1982). See also his more recent discussion of 'synoptic' scenes in *Homer and the Artists. Text and Picture in Early Greek Art* (Cambridge, 1998), 57–66.

ing fully for Odysseus' success.[11] In this scene, the reference of the cup as a significant element, so far as can be judged, is entirely to a verbal narrative context, since there is neither evidence for nor, given the early date, likelihood of a pre-existing series of scenes that could have served as the object of the reference.

In some cases, and this is one of them, it is a fine line that is being drawn between an element that indexes an earlier event in the story and a conflation of the earlier and later events. One may say the effect is the same. Here, however, the main concern is to tease out the *process* by which the meaning is constructed, and, as will be seen, in some scenes it makes a difference whether we receive a certain combination of elements as conflation or indexical reference. Here, the seated Polyphemos and the cup do bring to the foreground the concept of *xenia* (hospitality) and stress the key reversal: the *xenos*-host who has maltreated his *xenoi*-guests has now been properly treated as a *xenos*-host by his *xenoi*-guests, who are thus enabled to maltreat him.

Another example is not unique, but recurrent in a comparatively large number of black-figure scenes from the second half of the sixth century: the representations of Menelaos' recovery of Helene. Here the primary reference develops in terms of the visual tradition, although it also necessarily relates to the epic tradition if only through its subject-matter. On the reverse of the name-vase of the Painter of the Vatican Mourner (see Figure 2),[12] there is a fairly typical example, where one sees Menelaos with sword in hand, taking Helene by the wrist; she has drawn her himation over her head. While these scenes overtly represent Menelaos' recovery of Helene after the fall of Troy, as was evidently described in the *Iliupersis*, the himation over the head (which is not a normal way for a woman to be represented in black-figure) and the holding by the wrist can both be taken as signalling the marriage procedure. These elements recur: the veiling himation, for instance, on the dignified woman, usually taken to be Ariadne, who often faces Dionysos, and on the woman standing beside the man driving the chariot in wedding-chariot scenes.

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[11] Incidentally, Polyphemos' position, seated rather than supine, may to some extent be functional; folded up like this, he can be represented as far more gigantic and dangerous than if he were stretched out along the ground-line.

[12] Vatican 16581 (350: *ABV* 140.1, 686, *Para.* 58, *Add.*^{2} 38).

To anyone familiar with the celebratory procedure,[13] these elements would evoke a recollection of the wedding, long before, of Helene and Menelaos, and at the same time they also appropriately mark her as the quintessential permanent bride—apt, considering consider how many husbands she had.

This is a juxtaposition of the two events in one image—rather like a palimpsest: the original marriage and the remarriage or recovery. In its working, the effect, in concept as well as theme, is very close to that of Andromache's headdress in Homer, in that it evokes the superimposition of two similar images with distinct meanings. There are many scenes on this pattern and they all include the himation motif, even sometimes in the absence of the wrist-grip: the himation motif clearly became part of the painters' repertoire of significant elements after the middle of the sixth century. There will be further discussion of Helene below; for the moment, it is sufficient to register that the recovery scenes are a recurrent theme, and that the himation-element is a constant factor, along with the armed warrior, Menelaos.[14]

Some Athenian black-figure painters represented another narrative situation from the fall of Troy: the killing of Priamos on his altar. From the summary of the *Iliupersis* we learn that in the sack of the city Neoptolemos killed Priamos, who had fled to the altar of Zeus Herkeios.[15] In the *Little Iliad* it was evidently recounted how Neoptolemos killed Andromache's baby son Astyanax: he 'seized him

[13] For an account of which see J.H. Oakley and R.H. Sinos, *The Wedding in Ancient Athens* (Madison, 1993).

[14] It must be noted that the use of significatory objects to evoke a broader narrative context is by no means limited to Athenian black-figure painting. For instance, from about 470 onwards, well into the second half of the fifth century, some Athenian red-figure painters represented Menelaos in eager pursuit of Helene, dropping or even casting away his sword as he runs (cf. *LIMC* 4, Helene 260–77). This refers both to the preceding painting tradition of Menelaos' threatening Helene with drawn sword in hand, and, as it would seem, to the continuing literary tradition, where the narrative motif of the dropped sword may have appeared as early as Ibykos' *Ilioupersis* (on which see *LIMC* 4, p. 500). John Boardman has suggested to me that the representation of the falling weapon is probably intended to convey the change of mind on Menelaos' part, and he compared Medeia dropping her (poisoned) jug on recognising the identity of Theseus (for instance, on the Apulian bell krater, Adolphsek, Schloss Fasanerie 179, *LIMC* 1, Aigeus 23).

[15] Photius' abridgement of Proclus' summary: H.G. Evelyn-White, *Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 521.

Figure 1. Proto-Attic amphora by the Polyphemos Painter, Eleusis Museum. Photograph copyright Deutsches Archaeologisches Institut Athen (neg. no. Eleusis 544). Detail from the neck: Odysseus and two of his men put out the eye of Polyphemos.

Figure 2. Attic black-figure amphora by the Painter of the Vatican Mourner, Vatican 16581. Detail of reverse scene: Menelaos regains Helene. Photograph courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, reproduced by kind permission of the Direzione Generale, Monumenti Musei e Gallerie Pontificie, Vatican.



Figure 3. Attic black-figure amphora by Group E, London B 205. Obverse: the death of Priamos. Photograph courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum.

Figure 4. Attic black-figure amphora by Exekias, Boulogne-sur-mer 558. Obverse scene: Aias prepares to commit suicide. Photograph courtesy of the Chateau-Musée, Boulogne-sur-mer.

by the foot and hurled him from the tower.'[16] In a scene on an amphora in the British Museum (see Figure 3),[17] Priamos falls back helplessly on the altar before the assault of Neoptolemos, who has his right hand raised in the gesture of a warrior attacking with a spear; instead, however, he is clutching a young boy by the foot. This, like the scene of Polyphemos' blinding discussed above, can be labelled 'synoptic', but to read this as a representation that conflates two events makes poor Priamos' death ludicrous—he is not stabbed by an enemy, but apparently bludgeoned to death with his grandson as the blunt instrument. It seems to make more sense to read the inclusion of the child as a significant object, evoking the horror of the murder of the grandson in the impious butchering of the old king. Here is a man who kills innocent children; here is the man who killed Priamos in the face of the gods. This seems to be the visual equivalent of affective description—it is easy to imagine a poet's commenting 'with this same murderous hand that had slain young Astyanax', and one can think of Priamos himself in *Iliad* 24.504–6:

> I am even more pitiable:
> I have gone further than any other man upon the earth,
> touching my lips to the hand of the man who killed my children.

In epic narrative, time has to be spent on such an item to allow the double exposure the opportunity to develop fully; in vase-painting an eye-catching, even startling, visual stimulus serves to hold the attention and focus the mind of the viewer.

Here again, we know of no already-established image-tradition to which this significant element could refer, no scenes which give central focus to Neoptolemos hurling Astyanax to his death, and so it seems likely that it referred once again primarily to the verbal, not the visual, tradition.

Lydos painted another version of Priamos' death on the altar about the same time as the scene just discussed—it is impossible to say which was earlier.[18] In the centre is essentially the same composition

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[16] Scholiast, Lycophron, *Alexander* 1268: Evelyn-White, *Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica*, 519.

[17] London 1842.3–14.3 (B205) attributed to Group E (*ABV* 136.55, *Add.*^{2} 37).

[18] Berlin 1685 (*ABV* 109.24, 685, *Add.*^{2} 30): *LIMC* II, Astyanax I 9 (photograph); J. Boardman *Athenian Black Figure Vases* (London, Thames & Hudson 1974) fig. 67 (drawing).

as in the previous picture, including the child clutched by the foot (held this time like a sword rather than a spear). Further to the left, however, stand a man and a woman, signalled by the woman's himation over her head and the man's armour as Menelaos' recovery of Helene. Is this a synoptic overview of the main events in the Sack of Troy? It *can* certainly be read that way, in that the recovery of Helene, as has been mentioned above, was at about this time becoming a well-established, separate, narrative scene in the black-figure tradition. However here, just as in the previous scene, the child held by the foot cannot be taken as a literal sub-scene, for then again its intersection with the death of Priamos acquires a comic potential. If indeed the child is to be seen as a significant element, then for the left section of the scene, rather than proposing a whole complicated new way of analysing Greek pictures (and only for some few of them), it seems to be more consistent to view the Helene and Menelaos part of the picture as an item rather than a scenelet, a complex element of the same kind as the child, working in the same way to bring to the forefront additional contexts in order to heighten the potential emotional content of the picture. Here, given the more or less contemporary series of scenes devoted to Menelaos' recovery of his wife, it seems likely that the reference of this part of the scene may have been both to the visual and to the verbal traditions. The effect of this conjunction of elements is that one is led to construct a poignant chiasmus, to consider the relative reactions of Greeks and of Trojans to the end of the war: Menelaos recovers his wife in a joyous re-enactment of a wedding, while the Trojan king is mercilessly butchered and his grandson exterminated by the Greek victors.[19]

[19] Again, red-figure painters continue to develop the use of these traditional motifs; for instance, on one side of a cup by the Brygos Painter (Louvre G 152: *ARV*^{2} 369.1, 1649, *Para.* 365, *Add.*^{2} 224), Neoptolemos threateningly approaches Priamos (who sits on the altar reaching pleading hands towards his aggressor), with the helpless body of a child hanging from his right hand, outstretched behind him. On a kalpis hydria by the Kleophrades Painter (Naples 2422: *ARV*^{2} 189.74, 1632, *Para.* 341, *Add.*^{2} 189), Priamos sits again on the altar, but this time his hands are raised to his head in mourning over the bleeding body of a child sprawled across his lap, while Neoptolemos prepares to butcher him, his right hand raised for the death-stroke. His hand and the weapon it must be presumed to have held are conveniently cut off by the picture-frame, which could suggest that the painter did not want to break with the earlier 'child-wielding' tradition too obviously. My thanks again are due to John Boardman for reminding me of this continuation into red-figure.

Both the painting and the poetic traditions manifest a further, more sophisticated, means of evoking emotion in a traditional narrative context, one that involves the manipulation by poet or painter of well-established traditional elements for a specific effect in a specific context. The success of this technique is dependent on the receiver's competence within the tradition, for it requires of one a natural response to the standard traditional items, and following on that a recognition of the changes or substitutions. Here once again, a comparison of examples from the visual and the verbal traditions will clarify the cumulative process by which meaning is constructed within each tradition, for while the mode of expression naturally differs, the effect is the same. A series of passages from the *Iliad* involving helmets, hair, and dust will exemplify how this manipulation works in the poetic traditional context, which will in turn lead to a better understanding of the parallel phenomenon in the painting tradition.

First, a standard part of the arming formula-system (*Iliad* 3.336–7):

κρατὶ δ' ἐπ' ἰφθίμῳ κυνέην εὔτυκτον ἔθηκεν
ἵππουριν <u>δεινὸν δὲ λόφος καθύπερθεν ἔνευεν</u>·

On his mighty head he set the well-made helmet
topped with a horse-tail; <u>and the dread crest tossed on high</u>.

This occurs three more times in the *Iliad*: 11.42 (Agamemnon), 15.481 (Teukros), and 16.138 (Patroklos). The image of the crest is well-established from this and from other passages (such as Hektor's helmet at the end of Book 6) as something that belongs aloft, on top of someone's living head, and the horsehair crest is of course in itself a heightened image, a more impressive version of the hair of a human head.

Next there is the phrase ἐν κονίῃσι ('in the dust') which occurs *only* in death contexts such as *Iliad* 4.543–4:

πολλοὶ γὰρ Τρώων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν ἤματι κείνῳ
πρηνέες <u>ἐν κονίῃσι</u> παρ' ἀλλήλοισι τέταντο.

For many of the Trojans and many of the Achaians on that day
face down <u>in the dust</u>, side by side, measured their lengths.

and *Iliad* 13.203–5 (the killing of Imbrios):

κεφαλὴν δ' ἀπαλῆς ἀπὸ δειρῆς
κόψεν Ὀιλιάδης κεχολωμένος Ἀμφιμάχοιο,
ἧκε δέ μιν σφαιρηδὸν ἑλιξάμενος δι' ὁμίλου·
Ἕκτορι δὲ προπάροιθε ποδῶν πέσεν <u>ἐν κονίῃσι</u>.

and the son of Oïleus, enraged
on Amphimachos' account, sliced his head from his tender neck,
and hurled it rolling like a ball through the thick of battle;
and it landed at the feet of Hektor, in the dust.

The dust is where dead bodies come to rest. It serves no other purpose in the *Iliad*, and so amounts to one of the significant elements associated with death on the battlefield, even when the poet is describing the death of a horse (Pedasos: *Iliad* 16.469). The poet of the *Iliad* on a couple of occasions describes the helmet with its tossing crest falling into the dust—a powerful image of the disparagement and indignity of death. When Meges is fighting Dolops at *Iliad* 15.535–8:

Τοῦ δὲ Μέγης κόρυθος χαλκήρεος ἱπποδασείης
κύμβαχον ἀκρότατον νύξ' ἔγχει ὀξυόεντι,
ῥῆξε δ' ἀφ' ἵππειον λόφον αὐτοῦ· πᾶς δὲ χαμᾶζε
κάππεσεν ἐν κονίῃσι νέον φοίνικι φανεινός.

Meges sliced at the crown of the bronze helmet
bristling with horse-hair with his sharpened spear,
and shore away the horse-tail crest; and down to the ground
fell the whole thing, crimson in the dust with the gloss of newness.

The helmet-crest, a moment before fresh and clean, is now drabbled in the dirt like a dead body. It is a presage, for its owner will soon join it.

This image is then emphasised in the narrative of Patroklos' death (*Iliad* 16.793–800):

τοῦ δ' ἀπὸ μὲν κρατὸς κυνέην βάλε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων·
ἡ δὲ κυλινδομένη καναχὴν ἔχε ποσσὶν ὑφ' ἵππων
αὐλῶπις τρυφάλεια, μιάνθησαν δὲ ἔθειραι
αἵματι καὶ κονίῃσι· πάρος γε μὲν οὐ θέμις ἦεν
ἱππόκομον πήληκα μιαίνεσθαι κονίῃσιν,
ἀλλ' ἀνδρὸς θείοιο κάρη χαρίεν τε μέτωπον
ῥύετ' Ἀχιλλῆος·

Phoibos Apollo knocked the helmet from his head;
it clanged as it rolled under the hooves of the horses
with its empty eyes and multiple crest-clips, and the crest-hair
was befouled with blood and dust. In time before it was unthinkable
that the horse-haired helm should be dirtied in the dust,
but it guarded the handsome head and face of a godlike man,
Achilleus;

In this example the emotions are engaged all the more through awareness of the normal reference to the crest as nodding terrify-

ingly atop a living head, when we are invited to visualise it now brought into the muck of death. How much more keenly still do we then respond later to the description when Achilleus has killed Hektor and is dragging his body behind his chariot (*Iliad* 22.401–4):

> τοῦ δ' ἦν ἑλκομένοιο <u>κονί</u>σαλος. ἀμφὶ δὲ χαῖται
> κυάνεαι πίτναντο, κάρη δ' ἅπαν <u>ἐν κονίῃσι</u>
> κεῖτο πάρος χαρίεν· τότε δὲ Ζεὺς δυσμενέεσσι
> δῶκεν ἀεικίσσασθαι ἑῇ ἐν πατρίδι γαίῃ.

> Where he was dragged there arose a cloud of <u>dust</u>, and around him
> his dark hair was falling, and his whole head, that before
> was so handsome, was lying <u>in the dust</u>. And then Zeus gave him
> to his enemies to dishonour in the land of his fathers.

Not now the horse-hair of the helmet crest but the actual hair of Hektor is dirtied—a strengthening visual image of the indignity of his death, and one which depends for its full effect on the contrasts implied by the bringing together of traditional usages: the hair, like a helmet crest, that is usually held high and kept clean, now soiled in the dust where dead bodies 'belong' and where a helmet crest can also be sullied. It is an odd reversal of metaphor, where the object of the comparison becomes its subject.

This is just one example of the technique in traditional epic: the meaning of these small, phrase-size references is fully constructed only against the fabric of traditional usage. Of course, the entire texture of the poem is contrapuntal, with every part, smaller and larger, effective because of and in opposition to the tradition as a whole.

In vase-painting a similar effect can be achieved by parallel means, and indeed in painting this kind of substitutional manipulation is in one way easier, because there is no formal constraint such as the metrical requirement in poetry. In fact, as has been shown before,[20] the whole development and expansion of the black-figure tradition is to a large extent a matter of experimental substitution of one formulaic motif for another. However, when one moves beyond the merely constructional level of building and conflating scenes, to seek the emotionally evocative substitutions that can be regarded as parallel to the kind of Homeric effect just described, it is a rare occurrence, for it calls for a high level of sophistication in the painter, even though it is readily perceived by the tradition-experienced viewer.

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[20] See above, n. 1.

In this respect one might think of some of the more effective instances of modern advertising: ingeniously devised, and immediately effective in their reception.

An excellent example is the suicide of Aias, on an amphora in Boulogne attributed to Exekias (see Figure 4).[21] In this deceptively simple scene the significant elements work in several ways at once. The story is well known: after Achilleus' death, his glorious armour, destined for the best remaining Greek warrior at Troy, was claimed by both Odysseus and Aias. When Agamemnon awarded it to Odysseus (favouring brains over brawn for perhaps the first time in western history), Aias' plans for murderous revenge to reinstate his honour were thwarted, and, ultimately shamed, he committed suicide. The suicide was depicted in Greek art from quite early on, typically in a scene where the deed has been done and it is the impaled corpse that is pictured.[22] Corinthian vase-painters represented the story similarly, but for some reason the theme does not occur in Athenian painting until Exekias painted his version (around 535 on conventional dating). This scene is unique in Athenian black-figure painting in terms of its theme, and it is unique more generally in archaic Greek art, in that Exekias chose to depict the preparation for the deed rather than its aftermath. He has therefore had to devise a whole new composition for his subject.

Aias' huge, naked, crouching figure, planting the dire sword in a little mound of earth, totally dominates the scene (if Aias stood up, he would would be too tall to be contained in the scene-space). Behind him is a drooping palm tree,[23] and before him, on our right, his armour is piled against the side of the scene. It is not possible, given the whole story lying behind the scene, that these arms could fail to remind the viewer of Achilleus' fateful bequest, even though logically we know that this is without doubt Aias' own equipment, since he did not receive that of Achilleus. In this respect, then, the armour serves as a significant object, indexing the verbal narrative

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[21] Boulogne 558 (*ABV* 145.18, *Para.* 60, *Add.*^{2} 40).

[22] As for instance in a little scene on a shield-band from the early sixth century Olympia B 5007: *LIMC* 1, Aias 1 127, p. 331.

[23] For the debate on whether this should be regarded as an example of pathetic fallacy, see J.M. Hurwit, 'Palm Trees and the Pathetic Fallacy in Archaic Greek Poetry and Art', *CJ* 77 (1982), 193–9, J.D. Madden, 'The Palms do not Weep: A Reply to Professor Hurwit', *CJ* 78 (1983), 193–9, J.M. Hurwit, 'Professor Hurwit Replies', *CJ* 78 (1983), 200–1.

tradition (for there is no earlier visual tradition in black-figure to which it could refer);[24] the story was recounted in the *Aithiopis*[25] and in the *Little Iliad*.[26]

In this scene, however, there is an additional reference encoded in the same object, and this refers solely to the vase-painting tradition: it is in this regard that the relevance of the Iliadic dust-sequence becomes apparent. In the huge majority of black-figure scenes, the main action is situated squarely in the middle of the picture space, and is more or less symmetrically framed at the sides by bystanders who look on.[27] A figure standing on the right margin of a conventional scene occupies the position here filled by the pile of armour, and his head is more or less where the helmet's head is positioned.

In reference solely to the visual tradition, therefore, one has an additional layer of interpretative information on the basis of which to construct a far more emotionally complex meaning for the scene. Aias' arms look on, and in a kind of double exposure or palimpsest at the same time we perceive Achilleus' arms watching the havoc they have caused. Further, Aias is alone at his end—only a pile of armour with empty, eyeless sockets watches where normally a fellow human should stand. On the other side the tree serves a similar, though less visually reminiscent, function.[28] In 'normal' black-figure scene composition, where the action is framed between onlookers, very often one is male, the other female; is it too fanciful to see in this substitution Exekias' subtle reflection of this gender differentiation?

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[24] That is, there are no earlier black-figure scenes that represent the awarding of Achilleus' arms, and there is no black-figure tradition whereby Achilleus' armour when depicted on the hero is significantly different from that of Aias. Both heroes are regularly shown equipped with the so-called 'Boiotian' shield-type that is seen here, with its cut-outs to either side.

[25] Scholiast on Pindar, *Isthmean* 3.53: 'The author of the *Aithiopis* says that Aias killed himself about dawn', and Proclus: 'Lastly a dispute arises between Odysseus and Aias over the arms of Achilleus' (Evelyn-White, *Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns and Homerica*, 509).

[26] Proclus: 'Next comes the *Little Iliad* in four books by Lesches of Mitylene: its contents are as follows. The adjudging of the arms of Achilleus takes place, and Odysseus, by the contriving of Athene, gains them. Aias then becomes mad and destroys the herd of the Achaians and kills himself' (Evelyn-White, *Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns and Homerica*, 509).

[27] See Mackay, Harrison, and Masters, 'Ring Composition', 115–42.

[28] On a more obvious narrative level, as is borne out particularly by later vase painting, the palm tree suggests the sea-shore where Aias killed himself; in other contexts it carries a reference to Delos (in scenes, for instance, with Apollo and Artemis).

The palm tree is often used in subsequent Greek literature as a metaphor for a beautiful young woman; the pile of armour of course has strongly masculine connotations. In any case, this substitution of inanimate objects fully complements Exekias' decision to represent his Aias as the sole figure in the scene, in total contrast to and manipulation of the tradition which creates an expectation that the scene space will be fully occupied by a number of human figures. This is one of the emptiest of all black-figure scenes, and the spindly tree and mocking armour-pile are vital ingredients in the reception of the scene and reconstruction of its full emotional implications within the black-figure and narrative traditions.[29]

In conclusion, then, once again the vase-painting tradition can be seen to work in the same way as the early Greek epic tradition in the process of the construction of meaning, specifically in regard to the substructure of emotional response. Both traditions regularly incorporate significant elements in the form of significatory objects that direct our responses by means of a contrast between the current narrative context and another, causally or thematically related, one. Both use on occasion a process of substitution of one traditional element for another and hence develop new and powerful signs that work on more than one level or mode of reception. The vase-painting tradition, however, has an additional lamination available to it in the art of meaning-construction, because it can refer conceptually outside of its own tradition and in this way can draw into its pictured 'here and now' a contrastive and suggestive context from the epic tradition. In this respect, the vase-painting tradition is not self-contained, and, while not necessarily directly reliant on the poetic tradition, it draws upon the broader range of epic in the evocation of emotion within the visual traditional system.

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[29] There are, of course, other examples that could be adduced; for instance, the many scenes representing Herakles standing beside Athene in her chariot draw upon two standard scene formulations. First, the wedding journey, where bride and groom stand side by side in their chariot with the man in the foreground holding the reins while his wife stands beside him (further back in the picture-field). Then, the version of a warrior's departure in which the warrior stands beside (that is, further back in the field from) his charioteer who holds the reins. Herakles occupies the position alternatively of bride and of warrior, and Athene of bride-groom and of charioteer. In the reception of such scenes while the second, martial, potential is naturally dominant, one senses a certain appropriateness, intriguing in its gender reversal, in the notion of a relationship where the female deity takes precedence over the male mortal protégé.

While this chapter has been for the most part an application of a well-recognised poetic traditional phenomenon to painting, it is presented also in the hope that an examination of this aspect of the process of visual reception may provide a sharpened focus of the analytical lens through which the verbal palimpsest is examined.

CHAPTER FOUR

SPEECH ACTS IN THE EVERYDAY WORLD AND IN HOMER: THE REBUKE AS A CASE STUDY

ELIZABETH MINCHIN

The relatively new discipline of discourse analysis studies the ways in which people use language to communicate: it investigates how speakers (and writers) construct messages for their audiences and how listeners (and readers) work on them to find their sense. For the sociolinguist, discourse analysis is concerned mainly with the structure of social interaction as manifested in conversation; but for the psycholinguist, it is primarily concerned with the processing of language.[1] For the Homerist whose interests lie in the spoken exchanges of the heroes of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, discourse analysis can be useful in both ways. On the one hand, a close study of the speeches that the poet attributes to his heroes can help us 'read' the intentions of each actor and trace their developing relationships. On the other, a study of individual units of discourse, as mind-based rather than textual phenomena, may throw light on the activity of 'singing' by revealing something of the role that memory plays in the comprehension and the generation of a number of identifiable speech units. It is this latter function that I shall explore in this chapter.

My reasons for making such a claim for the potential of discourse analysis *vis-à-vis* Homer emerge from three general observations about the poems. First, a substantial portion of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is represented as actual discourse, the spoken words of one or another of its principal characters.[2] Second, in the world that Homer describes, all actors share a strong sense of propriety with regard to spoken

[1] For discussion, see G. Brown and G. Yule, *Discourse Analysis* (Cambridge, 1983), viii–ix.

[2] Proportions of direct speech and indirect speech in the epics: Jasper Griffin, 'Homeric Words and Speakers', *JHS* 106 (1986), 37—of the *Iliad*, 45% is rendered as direct speech; of the *Odyssey*, 67%. Speeches in the two poems together amount to nearly 55% of the whole.

interaction. This is a world in which each hero speaks in the knowledge that he will not be interrupted, or obliged to give up the floor, until he has completed the expression of his thought.[3] We never find the hesitant or fragmented discourse that is typical of normal conversation in the real world. Nor do we find brief interjections and comments from other participants that are so much a part of everyday talk. Rather, every hero speaks out fluently and coherently. Thus, in traditional epic, we are able to see complete and uninterrupted speech events, as conceived by the poet for each of his actors. Third, it is clear, possibly even to the casual observer, that many of the utterances made in the course of each epic bear a structural resemblance to others that appear to be serving the same purpose. Just as there are 'typical' *scenes* in Homer, in which the same sequence of micro-events is narrated at different points of the epic, so there are, as I shall demonstrate, recurrent *speech types*.

Despite these observable similarities of structure, there have been few attempts at establishing a typology of the spoken discourse of the Homeric epics. Fenik, in his discussion of typical scenes in the *Iliad*, has identified in passing the structural patterns that underpin a number of speeches in Homer.[4] Lohmann, by contrast, devotes his whole work to the speeches of the *Iliad*; but, rather than examining the structures common to individual speech acts, his principal concern has been to find evidence for a pattern that does not recognize distinctions of genre. This is the pattern that he calls ring composition and which, he claims, shapes so many Homeric speeches.[5] Although Lohmann's demonstrations have contributed in peripheral

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[3] I make this observation despite Agamemnon's peevish remarks at *Iliad* 19.78–82. Note that not even Thersites, whom the Achaians so despise (*Iliad* 2.222–3), is interrupted when he abuses his leader (*Iliad* 2.225–42).

[4] See B. Fenik, *Typical Battle Scenes in the Iliad*: *Studies in the Narrative Techniques of Homeric Battle Descriptions* (Wiesbaden, 1968). Fenik identifies a pattern for 'rebukes' (see below); he discusses in more general terms at a number of points 'speeches of triumph' and 'threats and taunts'.

[5] D. Lohmann, *Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias* (Berlin, 1970). The concept of ring composition began with W. van Otterlo, *De Ringcompositie als Opbouwprincipe in de epische Gedichten van Homerus* (Amsterdam, 1948). When the same element appears at the beginning and at the end of a unit of discourse, this repetition is identified as a ring; when a number of elements within that unit are handled individually in a certain sequence (A, B, C. and so on) and then rehandled in the reverse order (. . . C, B, A), the outcome is a number of concentric rings. We refer to the pattern so created as 'ring composition'. For further discussion, see below.

ways to our understanding of the structure and composition of the poems, they have not succeeded in illuminating how the poet conceived of, and composed, the variety of speeches he includes in his epic tales. More promising, however, is Martin's study of the language of Homer's heroes.[6] Following the linguistic philosophers, J.L. Austin and John Searle, Martin reads the speeches of the heroes as behaviour.[7] He works from the premise that the poet, in attributing speech to his heroes, draws on a number of speech genres familiar to his audience, such as commands, boasts, and rebukes. Martin considers the speech events that we observe in Homer to be akin to speech acts as defined by Searle.[8] In his analysis of speakers and speeches in the *Iliad*, Martin points out what Homer's representations of speech acts can tell us about the intentions of his speakers in each case, and he shows us how the poet individualizes his heroes through the speech genres that he attributes to each one.

Martin's study, however, is founded on an unexamined notion: that the speeches of the *Iliad* are mimetic. He claims that they are 'without question stylized poetic versions of reality', and that the 'rhetorical repertoire of the heroes must be rooted in the actual range of speaking strategies available to any Greek speaker.'[9] We should

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[6] R. Martin, *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the* Iliad (Ithaca and London, 1989), proposes to 'look at the very notion of speech within the poems to discover the parameters of this very basic sort of performance' (10). He suggests (47) that the 'performances' embedded in the poem can tell us about 'the parameters of Homer's own performance'.

[7] For discussion, see Martin, *Language of Heroes*, chap. 1. Here, he examines Homeric speech and distinguishes *mûthos* (authoritative speech) from *epos* (which designates any utterance). He focuses on those speech events that might be considered *mûthoi*. On the 'inextricable bond between words and deeds' see also D. Roochink, 'Homeric Speech Acts: Word and Deed in the Epics', *CJ* 85 (1989), 290–1. Like Martin, Roochink makes the point that the Homeric poems conceived of language in a way that makes them 'similar', or receptive, to the speech act theories of Austin or of Searle.

[8] See, for example, J. Searle, *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts* (Cambridge, 1979). Speech act theory starts from the assumption that the minimal unit of human communication is not the sentence but the performance of certain kinds of acts, such as describing, explaining, apologizing, and thanking. Some speech acts may be expressed quite economically, in a few words (for example, 'I congratulate you'); others may require a sequence of sentences to achieve their illocutionary function—that is, to fulfill the intention of the speaker. For a useful discussion, written for the Homeric scholar, of Searle's taxonomy of speech acts, see M. Clark, 'Chryses' Supplication: Speech Act and Mythological Allusion', *CA* 17 (1998), 9–10.

[9] Martin, *Language of Heroes*, 45; see also 225.

not accept Martin's assertions without pause. Can we be sure that the speech acts realized by Homer in his epics were indeed 'versions of reality'? Is it possible today to demonstrate that they were mimetic, despite our lack of access to native speakers from Homer's own time? Also, to reveal my particular interest in this discussion, what light might this demonstration, if it can be achieved, throw on a singer's memory for and composition of spoken discourse in the oral epic tradition?

In the following discussion I shall examine a limited set of speeches from the Homeric epics that I recognize as belonging to the same genre on the basis of the introductory language of the narrator and the intention that we read into the speaker's words. These are the speeches that we might classify as rebukes. I shall compare the Homeric data with samples of everyday rebukes from our own world. This comparison will allow us to evaluate Martin's claim and open the way to a discussion of the role of memory in the composition of the speech acts that we identify both in Homeric discourse and in our own everyday talk. I shall argue, with Martin, that the rebukes of the Homeric heroes, as well as many other of their speech acts, are stylized and complete versions of everyday talk and explain, in cognitive terms, why rebukes are expressed in so similar a fashion in both contexts. Finally, I shall show how this knowledge can contribute to our understanding of oral traditional composition.

I. *Homer's rebukes*

Homer's characters are remarkably free with their rebukes. Their reproofs may be addressed to an audience of one, or more than one, and the speaker may censure an action, or want of action, on the part of another (for example, the sharp rebuke that Andromache envisages for Astyanax at *Iliad* 22.498, or the rebuke that Apollo administers to his fellow gods at *Iliad* 24.33–54). The speaker may be ironic, as is Apollo when he rebukes Aineias at *Iliad* 17.327–32. He can express his rebuke humorously, as does Diomedes in his response to Nestor, who has woken him from sleep (*Iliad* 10.164–7), or mildly, as does Odysseus to his peers (*Iliad* 2.190–7). Or, he may be both misguided in his judgement and abrupt in his manner, as is Agamemnon (*Iliad* 4.338–48, 370–400). A rebuke will often serve

the purpose of a challenge, or a rallying cry, when the speaker condemns, for example, a lack of fighting spirit (such as at *Iliad* 15.502–13). It may metamorphose into a threat when the speaker decides that a rebuke alone will not gain the desired result, as at *Iliad* 2.225–42. But the rebuke, in all its variety, remains recognizable as a rebuke. What, then, are its signs?

The first common, but not unfailing, signal of a rebuke in the Homeric context is the presence of a characteristic word or phrase, by way of introduction. So, for example, a rebuke may be introduced by the verb νεικέω ('upbraid'), or ὁμοκλέω ('chide'), or by a descriptive phrase such as ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν ('fiercely'), or μέγ' ὀχθήσας ('greatly vexed'), or αἰσχροῖς or χολωτοῖσιν, or κερτομίοισι ἐπέεσσι ('with shaming, or angry, or taunting words'), or χαλεπῷ μύθῳ ('speaking angrily'). But, as Martin observes, it is not necessary that this speech-type is sign-posted, because the context will provide many of the cues we need for interpretation.[10] So also will the recognizable structure and the language of the reproof itself. This is the point to which I now turn.

When Fenik states that no two rebukes in the *Iliad* are exactly alike, he is referring, I believe, to their surface features,[11] for he subsequently identifies a 'familiar structure' that underlies the Homeric rebuke: (1) criticism, (2) description of the bad situation, and (3) call to action.[12] My own study of the rebukes of the *Iliad* leads me to propose a different typology, of four elements:

(1) address/emotional reaction/words of reproach;[13]
(2) an account of the problem (in which the speaker alludes to the undesirable behaviour at issue);[14]

[10] Martin, *Language of Heroes*, 68. For examples of rebukes that are not sign-posted, see that addressed by Dream to Agamemnon at *Iliad* 2.23–34, the rebuke that Nestor addresses to the Achaians at *Iliad* 2.337–68, and the rebuke of Athene to Diomedes at *Iliad* 5.800–13. For comment on formulas which introduce speech acts, see I.F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad* (Amsterdam, 1987), 200–8.

[11] Fenik, *Typical Battle Scenes*, 176. See further below.

[12] Fenik, *Typical Battle Scenes*, 206.

[13] Sometimes the person addressed is named, sometimes not. Naming the individual singles out the addressee and commands his attention. For further discussion of naming, see below.

[14] This element is situation-specific. It may be couched as a statement, a rhetorical question, or a negative command ('don't . . .'). This last form, anticipating element (4), conveys the urgency of the rebuke.

(3) a generalization about appropriate action/or a view of the undesirable action from a broader perspective; and
(4) a proposal for amends.

Not all Homeric rebukes, as we shall see, will manifest each of these elements, but most of them do. Let us consider a number of examples that illustrate the 'full' rebuke.[15]

At *Iliad* 1.254–84, Nestor upbraids Agamemnon and Achilleus, who have quarrelled over Agamemnon's right to a replacement for Chryseis, whom he has been forced to return to her father. His speech is not introduced by any of the words that might signal a rebuke. Indeed, it is made clear that what Nestor is to say is intended as placatory rather than an expression of anger, as can be seen from Homer's use of ἐϋφρονέων ('wisely'), at 253, to indicate the tone of what is to follow;[16] and Nestor's use of ὢ πόποι ('O, for shame', 254), to express his distress at the turn of events. Nestor's speech, nevertheless, takes the form of a rebuke, but in the course of element (4)—from 269—moves into an exemplum that is to reinforce his first proposal (259) and then—from 273—into an attempted reconciliation.

As far as the structure of the rebuke is concerned, observe the presence of a generalizing expression to render element (3), here preceding element (2). The generalizing element is almost uniform throughout Homeric rebukes.[17] And note Nestor's use of ἀλλά ('but') at 259, to introduce the command contained in his proposal. This combination of ἀλλά ('but') and an imperative form is used in each one of the rebukes cited below; it appears regularly as a cue in all others in which a proposal, element (4), is included.[18] The shape of the speech follows the pattern that I set out above:[19]

(1) emotional response (254)
ὢ πόποι, ἦ μέγα πένθος Ἀχαιΐδα γαῖαν ἱκάνει·
Oh, for shame. Great sorrow comes on the land of Achaia

[15] For an analysis in these terms of a larger sample of rebukes from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, see my Appendix.

[16] For this translation see André Lardinois, 'Characterization through Gnomai in Homer's *Iliad*', *Mnemosyne* 54 (2001), 000.

[17] In the examples that I cite, only the rebuke of Athene to Nausikaa (*Odyssey* 6.25–40) uses the indicative mood to express this third element. In all others the speaker generalizes in hypothetical terms.

[18] Cf. John Miles Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art* (University Park, Pa, 1999), 224, on the use of a phrase such as this as a 'rhetorical fulcrum' within a speech act.

[19] I use throughout the translations of Richmond Lattimore, *The Iliad of Homer* (Chicago, 1951) and *The* Odyssey *of Homer* (New York, 1965).

(2) problem (257–8)
εἰ σφῶϊν τάδε πάντα πυθοίατο μαρναμένοιϊν
οἳ περὶ μὲν βουλὴν Δαναῶν, περὶ δ' ἐστὲ μάχεσθαι.
were they to hear all this wherein you two are quarrelling,
you, who surpass all Danaans in council, in fighting.
(3) action viewed from a broader perspective (255–6)
ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες
ἄλλοι τε Τρῶες μέγα κεν κεχαροίατο θυμῷ
Now might Priam and the sons of Priam in truth be happy,
and all the rest of the Trojans be visited in their hearts with gladness
(4) proposal (259–84)
ἀλλὰ πίθεσθ' . . .
Yet be persuaded . . .

Lohmann notes a series of internal correspondences in this last element, the proposal, which is the segment of reconciliation. They are not present in the speech as a whole.[20] Martin also notes these, which he refers to as Nestor's 'binary stuctures'; they are clearly intended to indicate Nestor's even-handedness in his treatment of the two heroes.[21] Indeed, Agamemnon praises the old man's impartiality at 286. The balance that Lohmann notes in 275–84 or the binary structures that Martin observes are not a component of rebukes in general, as we shall observe in the examples below. They are an outcome of the rhetorical strategy that Nestor has adopted on this occasion, as he attempts to deal with two strong-willed people who are at odds.

My second example is the rebuke that Hektor addresses to his brother, Paris (*Iliad* 6.326–31). Hektor has returned to Troy to accomplish two tasks: to fetch his brother back to battle and to speak with Andromache, his wife. Hektor finds Paris in his apartment. He is busying himself with his armour. Helen is sitting by, overseeing work on her great tapestry. Hektor, fresh from the battle, has come in

[20] Lohmann, *Komposition der Reden*, 224, n. 18, analyses the composition of this speech: thus:

1. 254–258 Klage über die Situation.
2. 259–274 Appell an die beiden Streitenden, zu gehorchen.
3. 275–284 Wechselseitiger Appell zur Versöhnung.

He detects ring composition in the exemplum of 2: a—259, b—260–1, c—262–8, b¹—269–73, a¹—274, and in the alternations of 3: a—275–6 (to Agamemnon), b—277–81 (to Achilles), a¹—282–4 (to Agamemnon). His analysis, preoccupied as it is with internal parallels within this particular rebuke, does not further our understanding of the composition of rebukes in general.

[21] Martin, *Language of Heroes*, 101: 'Binary structures abound, presenting a rhetorical model, or icon, for two-sidedness'.

upon this scene of domestic peace and has rebuked (νείκεσσεν, 325) his brother 'in words of shame' (αἰσχροῖς ἐπέεσσι). His words, however, are not as bitter as his rebuke of *Iliad* 3.39–57, in which he all but threatens Paris with a stoning. Nor are they as bitter as we might have expected from his comment to his mother about Paris (*Iliad* 6.279–85), when Hektor says that he wishes his brother dead. On arriving at Paris' apartment, Hektor's words are softened. Is it the presence of a lady—or is it the presence of Helen, for whom he always demonstrates a protective affection?—which takes the sting from his rebuke?[22] Note again the structure of the speech:

(1) words of reproach (326)
δαιμόνι', οὐ μὲν καλὰ . . .[23]
Strange man! It is not fair . . .
(2) problem (326–9)
χόλον τόνδ' ἔνθεο θυμῷ.
λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι περὶ πτόλιν αἰπύ τε τεῖχος
μαρνάμενοι· σέο δ' εἵνεκ' ἀϋτή τε πτόλεμός τε
ἄστυ τόδ' ἀμφιδέδηε·
(It is not fair) to keep in your heart this coldness
The people are dying around the city and around the steep wall
as they fight hard; and it is for you that this war with its clamour
has flared up about our city.
(3) action viewed from a broader perspective (329–30)
σὺ δ' ἂν μαχέσαιο καὶ ἄλλῳ
ὅν τινά που μεθιέντα ἴδοις στυγεροῦ πολέμοιο.
You yourself would fight with another
whom you saw anywhere hanging back from the hateful encounter.
(4) proposal (331)
ἀλλ' ἄνα, μὴ τάχα ἄστυ πυρὸς δηΐοιο θέρηται.
Up, then, to keep our town from burning at once in the hot fire.

A third example is a brief rebuke. Apollo in the likeness of Asios, son of Dymas, rebukes Hektor for hesitating, just at the moment when the Achaians, led by Patroklos, were about to overpower Troy. His rebuke (*Iliad* 16.721–5) is brief, but to the point:

[22] See, for example, his gentle words at *Iliad* 6.360–8, and note Helen's account of Hektor's kindness to her and of her love for him at *Iliad* 24.762–75.

[23] G. Kirk notes that this term has different nuances of meaning in different contexts. Whereas he reads it as 'affectionate remonstrance' in *Iliad* 1.561, he notes that it marks a stronger rebuke elsewhere (for example, *Iliad* 4.31): *The Iliad: A Commentary* 1 (Cambridge, 1992), 111 (on *Iliad* 1.561). On the other hand, Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art*, 193, notes that 'this single *sêma* serves throughout Homer as a signal implying verbal contest and urging some kind of change'.

(1) address (721)
Ἕκτορ,
Hektor,
(2) problem (721)
τίπτε μάχης ἀποπαύεαι; οὐδέ τί σε χρή.
why have you stopped fighting? You should not do it.
(3) action viewed from a broader perspective (722–3)
αἴθ' ὅσον ἥσσων εἰμί, τόσον σέο φέρτερος εἴην;
τῶ κε τάχα στυγερῶς πολέμου ἀπερωήσειας.
If I were as much stronger than you as I am now weaker!
So might you, in this evil way, hold back from the fighting.
(4) proposal (724–5)
ἀλλ' ἄγε, Πατρόκλῳ ἔφεπε κρατερώνυχας ἵππους,
αἴ κέν πώς μιν ἕλῃς, δώῃ δέ τοι εὖχος Ἀπόλλων.
But come! Hold straight against Patroklos your strong-footed horses.
You might be able to kill him. Apollo might give you such glory.

A fourth example is the rebuke that Achilleus utters when he seeks to settle the dispute that arises in the course of the chariot-race in the Funeral Games for Patroklos. Here (*Iliad* 23.492–8) he addresses Aias, son of Oileus, and Idomeneus, who disagree about the identity of the driver who appears to be in the lead. Again, all four elements are used to express the rebuke.

(1) address (493)
Αἶαν Ἰδομενεῦ τε,
Aias and Idomeneus,
(2) problem (492–3)
μηκέτι νῦν χαλεποῖσιν ἀμείβεσθον ἐπέεσσιν,
. . . κακοῖς, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικε.
No longer now, Aias and Idomeneus, continue
to exchange this bitter and evil talk. It is not becoming.
(3) action viewed from a broader perspective (494)
καὶ δ' ἄλλῳ νεμεσᾶτον, ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι.
If another acted so, you yourselves would be angry.
(4) proposal (495–8)
ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς ἐν ἀγῶνι καθήμενοι εἰσοράασθε
ἵππους. οἱ δὲ τάχ' αὐτοὶ ἐπειγόμενοι περὶ νίκης
ἐνθάδ' ἐλεύσονται· τότε δὲ γνώσεσθε ἕκαστος
ἵππους Ἀργείων, οἳ δεύτεροι οἵ τε πάροιθεν.
Rather sit down again among those assembled and watch for
the horses, and they in their strain for victory will before long
be here. Then you each can see for himself, and learn which
of the Argive horses have run first and which have run second.

Note that the binary structures that we observed in the first example above are not re-created here. Achilleus has not attempted to

judge between Aias and Idomeneus or to instruct them separately. Rather, he has considered them equally guilty (for their dispute is spoiling the other spectators' pleasure) and disciplines them both.

In a fifth example, at *Iliad* 23.570–85, Menelaos publicly rebukes Antilochos for his tactics during the chariot race and proposes a solution to what he regards as an unjust outcome. Note the use of a reproach in this first element. Through evaluative language of this kind a speaker is able to adjust the affective force of his rebuke. In this case, by conveying to Antilochos his earlier high esteem, Menelaos is able to catch his attention (we all respond to praise) and to convey disappointment as well as anger. This is a communicative strategy that is familiar to us from everyday talk. Menelaos' rebuke follows the predictable course, with one omission:

(1) address/words of reproach (570)
'Αντίλοχε, πρόσθεν πεπνυμένε,
Antilochos, you had good sense once,
(2) problem (570–2)
ποῖον ἔρεξας.
ᾔσχυνας μὲν ἐμὴν ἀρετήν, βλάψας δέ μοι ἵππους,
τοὺς σοὺς πρόσθε βαλών, οἵ τοι πολὺ χείρονες ἦσαν.
See what you have done.
You have defiled my horsemanship, you have fouled my horses
by throwing your horses in their way, though yours were far slower.
(4) proposal (573–85)
ἀλλ' ἄγετ', 'Αργείων ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες,
ἐς μέσον ἀμφοτέροισι δικάσσατε, μηδ' ἐπ' ἀρωγῇ,
Come then, o leaders of the Argives and their men of counsel:
judge between the two of us now; and without favour,

Notice that Menelaos does not offer any broader comment on the young man's behaviour. Indeed, he has already shared his indignation at Antilochos' tactics in the protests he uttered during the race (*Iliad* 23.426–8, 439–41). We know already that these tactics were perhaps questionable and certainly dangerous.

Let us also consider two rebukes from the *Odyssey*. Both exhibit the same structural characteristics that we have noticed in rebukes from the *Iliad*. My first example is the rebuke that Athene offers to Nausikaa, over the state of her garments (*Odyssey* 6.25–40). Note in element (4) the dual proposals: ἀλλ' ἴομεν . . . ('but let us go', at 31); ἀλλ' ἄγ' . . . ('but come on', at 36).

(1) words of reproach (25)
Ναυσικάα, τί νύ σ' ὧδε μεθήμονα γείνατο μήτηρ;
Nausikaa, how could your mother have a child so careless?

(2) problem (26)
εἵματα μέν τοι κεῖται ἀκηδέα σιγαλόεντα,
The shining clothes are lying away uncared for,
(3) action viewed from a broader perspective (27–8, 29–30, 34–5)
σοὶ δὲ γάμος σχεδόν ἐστιν, ἵνα χρὴ καλὰ μὲν αὐτὴν
ἕννυσθαι, τὰ δὲ τοῖσι παρασχεῖν οἵ κέ σ' ἄγωνται.
while your
marriage is not far off, when you should be in your glory
for clothes to wear, and provide too for those who attend you.
ἐκ γάρ τοι τούτων φάτις ἀνθρώπους ἀναβαίνει
ἐσθλή, χαίρουσιν δὲ πατὴρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ.
It is from such things that a good reputation among people
springs up, giving pleasure to your father and the lady your mother.
ἤδη γάρ σε μνῶνται ἀριστῆες κατὰ δῆμον
πάντων Φαιήκων, ὅθι τοι γένος ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτῇ.
For already you are being courted by all the best men
of the Phaiakians hereabouts, and you too are a Phaiakian.
(4) proposal (31–3, 36–40)
ἀλλ' ἴομεν πλυνέουσαι ἅμ' ἠοῖ φαινομένηφι·
καὶ τοι ἐγὼ συνέριθος ἅμ' ἕψομαι, ὄφρα τάχιστα
ἐντύνεαι, ἐπεὶ οὔ τοι ἔτι δὴν παρθένος ἔσσεαι·
So let us go washing tomorrow when dawn shows. I too
will go along with you and help you, so you can have all
done most quickly, since you will not long stay unmarried.
ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἐπότρυνον πατέρα κλυτὸν ἠῶθι πρὸ
ἡμιόνους καὶ ἅμαξαν ἐφοπλίσαι, ἥ κεν ἄγῃσι
ζῶστρά τε καὶ πέπλους καὶ ῥήγεα σιγαλόεντα . . .
So come, urge your famous father early in the morning
to harness the mules and wagon for you, and it shall carry
the sashes and dresses and shining coverlets for you . . .

Finally, at *Odyssey* 23.166–72, Odysseus is driven to rebuke his wife, Penelope, for the apparent coolness of her reception, despite the earlier rebuke from her son (23.97–103):

(1) words of reproach (166)
δαιμονίη, . . .[24]
You are so strange, . . .
(2) problem (166–7)
. . . περὶ σοί γε γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων
κῆρ ἀτέραμνον ἔθηκαν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες·
. . . The gods, who have their homes on Olympos,
have made your heart more stubborn than the rest of womankind.

[24] See above for comment on this word and its use in Homer as a signal of verbal contest.

(3) action viewed from a broader perspective (168–70)
οὐ μέν κ' ἄλλη γ' ὧδε γυνὴ τετληότι θυμῷ
ἀνδρὸς ἀφεσταίη, ὅς οἱ κακὰ πολλὰ μογήσας
ἔλθοι ἐεικοστῷ ἔτεϊ ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.
No other woman, with spirit as stubborn as yours, would keep back as you are doing from her husband who, after much suffering, came at last in the twentieth year back to his own country.
(4) proposal (171–2)
ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι, μαῖα, στόρεσον λέχος, ὄφρα καὶ αὐτὸς
λέξομαι· ἦ γὰρ τῇ γε σιδήρεον ἐν φρεσὶν ἦτορ.[25]
Come then, nurse, make me up a bed, so that I can use it here; for this woman has a heart of iron within her.

II. *The rebuke in spoken discourse today*

In surveying the expression of rebukes in today's world, I observed that the most common occurrences of this form of speech act are in the relationship between parents and their young children or between teachers and their students. As adults we do not issue rebukes to our peers with the same frequency as we do to our children. Certainly, we do not issue rebukes to our peers with the same frequency as they are uttered in Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*: if we wish to modify the behaviour of our colleagues and friends we try to find less confrontational modes of speech.[26]

Over a period of weeks in September 1999 I noted several rebukes uttered in a number of contexts by Ann to her (then) two-year-old daughter Aislinn.[27] In reporting a selection of these in this paper I

[25] Should this speech be considered a speech of rebuke, that is a (gentle) scolding, or of protest? There is no difference *in structure* between the two in Homer. The difference is one of application. I consider a protest to be a sub-class of the rebuke. The protest, to the extent that it can be distinguished from the rebuke, is spoken by someone stung personally by the behaviour (usually speech) of another. Homer often uses phrases such as 'what sort of word escaped your teeth's barrier?' (for example, *Iliad* 4.350, 14.83) to mark the protest. For commentary, see Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art*, 226–7, 256.

[26] Society's norms today preclude this kind of overt criticism of another's behaviour (and the associated imperatives), when the other is someone of the same, or higher, status. As S. Ervin-Tripp observes, imperatives are used in adult speech 'whenever cooperation can be assumed' (that is, when the addressee is of lower status): 'Ask and It Shall be Given Unto You', *Georgetown University Roundtable on Languages and Linguistics* (1982), 238.

[27] I thank Ann Cleary for her permission to use her words for the purposes of this discussion.

am not claiming to offer an exhaustive account of rebukes in everyday talk in the English-speaking world. My intention is simply to indicate to readers the structure which underpins this familiar speech act. Because a real-world urgency underlay each of Ann's rebukes, she was far more concise in expression than most Homeric speakers. Nevertheless, Ann's 'speeches' follow the same format as those that I have discussed above. To contextualize the first two examples below, I am in a newly landscaped garden with Ann and Aislinn, who has begun to wander across the freshly planted area. Ann calls her back:

(1) address (simply an address by name)[28]
Aislinn . . .
(2) problem
. . . come off the grass. There are tiny seeds there, trying to grow.
(3) action viewed from a broader perspective
Tess will be very sorry, if you hurt them.
(4) proposal
Come on! Over here!

A similar rebuke on the same occasion omits element (3): action viewed from a broader perspective. Ann wishes to move quickly to a proposal:

(1) address
Aislinn . . .
(2) problem
Don't walk on the garden. You're walking on the new plants.
(4) proposal
Come back here!

Of course, it is not necessary that element (1) be used, if the speaker feels that lines of communication between her and her child are

[28] The naming of names is a strategy to ensure that the addressee is actually listening. This is crucial in rebukes addressed to children, who, because of memory limitations, egocentrism, absorption in another activity, or uncooperativeness, may not otherwise hear an utterance such as a rebuke. For commentary and illustrations of strategies used to catch the attention of children, see E. Ochs Keenan, B. Schieffelin, and M. Platt, 'Questions of Immediate Concern', in E. Ochs and B. Schieffelin (eds.), *Acquiring Conversational Competence* (London, 1983), 117–19. Note that Ann does not use words of reproach to Aislinn in any of the examples that I have collected. This may reflect current child-rearing practice, according to which a parent or carer should not express negative evaluations of a child: its behaviour can be criticized, but not the child.

already open and if there is little time to spare. In the example below, Ann, on another occasion, does not pause to call Aislinn by name. She begins her rebuke with a command:

(2) problem
Don't rip the paper! . . . No! No! That's the docket for Daddy's jacket.

From the above examples, we note that the speech act format is adaptable, allowing the speaker to respond to a fluid situation. Indeed, certain elements of the speech act may be expressed by non-verbal means: for example, on the occasion of the last rebuke cited above, instead of expressing element (4): proposal, through words such as 'Give it to me!', Ann has approached Aislinn gently and has taken the docket from her. There had been no time for further verbal negotiation. There will be occasions, too, when the person being rebuked responds promptly to the first or second elements of the rebuke; in these cases there is no need for the speaker to pursue the full structure.[29] On the other hand, when addressees indicate that they are reluctant to change their behaviour, speakers are obliged to expand their rebukes in an effort to distract them from the undesirable activity, trying by reason and persuasion—that is, through element (3)—to effect a change of intention.[30] In the real-world context, therefore, the speaker's formulation of a rebuke is flexible, more so than in the Homeric world. Prior circumstances, and the changing situation, will influence its development; actions may replace words; and urgency will exert its influence on the expression of the whole.[31]

III. *The pragmatics of rebukes: Repetition and ring composition*

I have noted already that in an emergency a speaker, whether in the real world or in Homer, may begin his or her rebuke with a

[29] The naming of names—particularly in a certain admonitory tone—often in itself functions as a full rebuke. This is a scenario that is often played out at children's playgroups.

[30] Or, the speaker may move from rebuke to a stronger form, such as a threat. I have drawn attention to an example of this progression in the Homeric context at *Iliad* 2.225–42 above. Here, Thersites begins by addressing Agamemnon, rebuking him, but (at 235) he turns to the Achaians and makes a proposal to them (to leave Troy). This, indirectly, represents a threat to Agamemnon.

[31] C. Dickinson and T. Givón have criticized cognitive studies of discourse for ignoring its interactional aspects: 'Memory and Conversation: Towards an Experimental

negative command, as part of element (2): problem. It is possible that the speaker will reuse this expression that has already been formulated, now as part of element (4): the proposal.[32] Lohmann might read such reuse as ring composition.[33] I regard repetition of this kind principally as a pragmatic move, crisis-driven, rather than as a structural or an aesthetic choice.[34] The reuse or reshaping of an element of discourse that has been uttered just a moment before enables a speaker to produce language more efficiently, more fluently, and with less expenditure of effort.[35] Repetition, therefore, is in the first instance an economical response. But it has other advantages, also of a pragmatic nature. The repetition of a command conveys the speaker's insistence; it signals the need for compliance.[36] And, since repetition

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Paradigm', in T. Givón (ed.), *Conversation: Cognitive, Communicative and Social Perspectives* (Amsterdam, 1997), 92–3. The model I propose here takes into account both face-to-face interaction and informational aspects in the shaping of this particular speech act, the rebuke.

[32] That is, the negative command of element (2) (for example, 'Don't do that!') may be repeated at element (4). On the other hand, element (4) may incorporate a positive suggestion, proposing a new course of action (for example, 'Come over here!'). Repetition in rebukes is therefore possible, but not inevitable. The first of Ann's rebukes to Aislinn contains the repetition of 'come' in elements (2) and (4); the others do not.

[33] See above, and Lohmann, *Komposition der Reden*, 5–8. He regards ring composition in the Homeric context as an internal linking device and as a structural principle, a 'Bau-Elemente' (7), in composition. For sceptical comments on the principle of ring composition as a structural element in stories, see E. Minchin, 'Ring-Patterns and Ring-Composition: Some Observations on the Framing of Stories in Homer', *Helios* 22 (1995), 23–35 and P.V. Jones' introduction in G.M. Wright and P.V. Jones, *Homer: German Scholarship in Translation* (Oxford, 1995), 5–10.

[34] This is in line with research into repetition in the last decade or so (see below) that has begun to examine cognitive and interactional motivation for repetition, whether same-speaker repetition, as here, or second-speaker repetition. We cannot, however, discount a speaker's aesthetic pleasure in the rhythmic patterns of repetition for their own sake (as a sensory experience) even as they serve other, pragmatic, ends.

[35] See D. Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation: Towards a Poetics of Talk', *Language* 63 (1987), 581. Tannen describes neurolinguistic research that supports the notion that automatic language production is in all ways more economical than novel language production. She cites a paper by H. Whitaker, 'Automaticity', presented at the Conference on Formulaicity, Linguistic Institute, University of Maryland, 1982 (*non vidi*).

[36] These are the functions that Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation', 583–4, describes as 'connection' and 'interaction'. Here, she describes how repetition, even as it acts as a tying device, gives information to the listener about a speaker's attitude, and how repetition functions on an interactional level, accomplishing social goals (probably, in the case of rebuke, the goal of persuasion).

gives the addressee a second opportunity to hear the instruction and to take it in, the repeated command promotes comprehension.[37]

All conversation is marked by repetitions of the kind I have described above, which, according to Tannen, are 'spontaneous, pervasive, and relatively automatic'.[38] She describes conversation as a 'system of pervasive parallelism', without the rigidity of poetry.[39] As we have observed, repetition serves a number of communicative functions that relate to interpersonal involvement: its functions are in the main pragmatic. But, as Tannen observes, in today's world, which holds the written word and literature in high esteem, we are inclined to think of repetition first as a literary trope. She shows, however, that it is a spontaneous device, a strategy familiar to us from everyday conversation, that has been 'artfully developed and intensified' for literary discourse.[40] When scholars such as Lohmann identify so-called ring composition in Homer's speeches, they are reading the natural strategies of everyday rhetoric as formal devices for 'literary' ends. In the light of Tannen's observations, we should revise their claims.

IV. *Memory for 'scripts' and 'formats': Explicit and implicit memory*

I have shown above that as Homer was composing a rebuke for one of his actors, he referred to a format or template. It is interesting to observe that, in an everyday oral context, we appear to do the

[37] Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation', 582: 'The automatic nature of repetition and variation facilitates comprehension by providing semantically less dense discourse.' The listener benefits from redundancy as it gives him or her the opportunity to absorb all that is being said. As Simon Slings notes in his discussion of archaic poetry, such repetition helps the addressee 'to keep track of the line of thought': see S.R. Slings, *Symposium, Speech and Ideology: Two Hermeneutical Issues in Early Greek Lyric, with Special Reference to Mimnermus* (Amsterdam, 2000), 25. I am indebted to Professor Slings for his assistance on this point.

[38] Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation', 580–1; cf. 601.

[39] Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation', 601.

[40] Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation', 580–1. Tannen has kept her focus on what she apparently considers to be polar opposites: everyday conversation and literary discourse. She does so in order to make her point: that everyday oral communication has given rise to the techniques which we now so esteem in literary forms. We must recognize, however, that contributions to conversation may be of many kinds and may reflect varying degrees of self-awareness and creative effort. Literary discourse may be likewise simple and apparently unpolished or highly wrought. That is, everyday conversation and literary discourse are not of themselves exclusive domains.

same. What is more remarkable is that the structure of the rebukes that we express today has much in common with that of the rebukes that Homer attributes to his actors. I propose, therefore, that the rebuke-format which Homer used in composing epic song was the format with which he was familiar from the everyday world, as Martin has suggested (see above). Although the *language* in which Homer's rebukes are cast is something apart—it is special speech—the recurrent *pattern* that shapes each rebuke is familiar.[41] Bakker has argued that Homeric speech (at the level of word and phrase) is a stylization of ordinary discourse 'departing from it and yet retaining, or even highlighting, its most characteristic forms'. Homeric speech acts may be viewed in the same way: they are stylized forms that unfailingly highlight *the characteristic structure of the full speech act*, differing from the everyday by virtue of this stylization.[42]

We find support for such conclusions in recent work in cognitive psychology. In recent years, examination of Homer's so-called typical scenes in the light of research in cognitive psychology has revealed that his small-scale narrative patterns, such as harnessing horses or preparing meals, formerly regarded by us as peculiar to traditional oral epic, may be identified with the fundamental structures of episodic memory.[43] According to cognitive research, we all hold in memory a vast range of 'scripts' that we have acquired in the normal course of living. These situational scripts contain information stored in sequential form about routine experiences, such as (in today's world) using public transport, attending conferences, cooking a barbecue meal, or borrowing books from a library. Through reference to any one script, an actor can complete a sequence of appropriate goal-directed actions or predict at any point in a scripted sequence what should be done next. When it comes to giving a verbal account of scripted routines, a speaker, using the script as a prompt, is quickly able to locate the words needed. In the case of Homer, both the

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[41] For discussion of what makes Homeric poetry special, see E. Bakker, *Poetry in Speech: Orality and Homeric Discourse* (Ithaca and London, 1997), chap. 1. He argues that poetry is 'the special case of oral' (17) and that Homeric discourse should be considered not as oral poetry but as special speech.

[42] Bakker, *Poetry in Speech*, 17. On the ritualized nature of repeated speech acts, see Bakker, *Poetry in Speech*, 159.

[43] See E. Minchin, 'Scripts and Themes: Cognitive Research and the Homeric Epic', *Class. Antiq.* 11 (1992), 229–41 and *Homer and the Resources of Memory: Some Applications of Cognitive Theory to the Iliad and the Odyssey* (Oxford, 2001), chap. 1.

poet and his audience share scripts for setting out on a journey, dressing, preparing a meal, or making up a bed.[44] These are routines with which poet and audience are familiar not from listening to traditional epic but from their participation since their early years in these everyday activities. Lord had proposed that it was *during his apprenticeship* that a young man learned his so-called themes or typical scenes, preparing for the moment when he would take the floor as a singer in his own right. I have argued elsewhere that the apprentice singer's task is less complex than Lord's account suggests.[45] As he listened to the performances of his master, the apprentice was studying three aspects of oral song. He was working to build up a repertoire of story lines for performance. He was observing characteristic features of presentation: the ways, that is, in which traditional storytelling was different from storytelling in everyday circumstances (for example, in the singer's readiness to spell out scripts or to expand similes, and his predilection for lists).[46] And he was gradually acquiring the poetic language that would one day be the vehicle for his songs. But there was no need for him to learn typical scenes, for they were already part of his knowledge store, as situational scripts. Once he mastered the special language of epic song, the scripts that he already held in memory would point him, as he performed, to the words and phrases he needed. Thus we have a more plausible and more realistic view of a poet who composes as he sings—with reference to the narrative portions of his song at least.

Can speech acts also be accommodated in this structure? Our instincts tell us that this might be so: that knowledge about verbal behaviour is also stored in memory. Indeed, Mikhail Bakhtin makes this point emphatically in his essay on speech genres.[47] And recent

[44] The world of martial combat may be beyond the experience of both the audience and the singer. But the *activities* of the battlefield are either identifiable with or extensions of activities in the everyday world. They are therefore recorded in memory as scripts or as tracks (that is, sub-categories) of scripts. Donning armour, for example, is a track of the dressing script. And, I suggest, the script for single combat, the unconstrained version of the rough and tumble of children's aggressive play, is developed from childhood.

[45] Minchin, 'Scripts and Themes', 236.

[46] I respond to Matthew Clark's insistence on this point.

[47] See Bakhtin's important observations on stable generic forms, in 'The Problem of Speech Genres', in C. Emerson and M. Holquist (eds.), *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, trans. V.W. McGee (Austin, 1986), 60–102, esp. at 78–79: '[i]f speech genres did not exist and we had not mastered them, if we had to originate them

work, again in cognitive psychology, offers us a basis for discussion. Rubin, in his valuable compendium of research that has application to oral traditions, draws our attention to two complementary processes identified by a number of scholars: explicit and implicit memory.[48] Explicit memory is the type of declarative, script-based memory discussed above that encapsulates knowledge that has been acquired unconsciously over time about events. This kind of knowledge may be readily communicated in words. Implicit memory, which is more abstract, encapsulates knowledge about tasks. This knowledge, that has likewise been acquired over time and has been practised in a variety of contexts, is stored in memory as a number of standardized sets of procedures.[49] The resulting patterns, each prescribing the set of steps prescribed to accomplish any one task, are retained as 'tables' or 'formats'.[50] Such formats may be accessed in the same way as the more explicit sequences that we store in memory: our scripts or schemas. As I have shown above, in my analysis of everyday rebukes, we regularly produce, almost without forethought, certain predictable sequences of ideas that may be identified with the tables or formats described by Rubin. Because we have heard and practised these sequences of ideas on many occasions, they have acquired script-like status in our memories. As a consequence of their implicit, rather than explicit, nature, these formats do not lend themselves so readily to verbalization. This is the reason why we can go through life unaware of the patterns that underlie our discourse.[51]

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during the speech process and construct each utterance at will for the first time, speech communication would be almost impossible' (79). I thank Bill Dominik for drawing my attention to Bakhtin's work on speech acts.

[48] For a discussion of these distinctions, see D. Rubin, *Memory in Oral Traditions: The Cognitive Psychology of Epic, Ballads, and Counting-out Rhymes* (New York and Oxford, 1995), 190–1.

[49] See D. Rubin, W. Wallace, and B. Houston, 'The Beginnings of Expertise for Ballads', *Cognitive Science* 17 (1993), 436–8, 452–7. For a relevant experimental study, see A. Reber, 'Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge', *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 118 (1989), 219–35, who notes, at 222, the 'unconscious' and 'nonreflective' nature of implicit learning.

[50] For the analogy of the 'table', see D. Broadbent, P. Fitzgerald, and M. Broadbent, 'Implicit and Explicit Knowledge in the Control of Complex Systems', *British Journal of Psychology* 77 (1986), 48–9.

[51] For comment on the intuitive nature of this kind of knowledge, see N. Wolfson, L. D'Amico-Reisner, and L. Huber, 'How to Arrange for Social Commitments in American English: The Invitation', in N. Wolfson and E. Judd (eds.), *Sociolinguistics and Language Acquisition* (Rowley, Mass., 1983), 116–28; at 117: 'although native speakers are able to recognize intuitively and respond appropriately to speech acts

Each speech act format, therefore, is a schematic representation of a particular pattern of organization, a way to proceed when we wish to express, for example, a rebuke, an apology, an invitation, a threat, or words of consolation or reassurance. I have observed in this chapter the underlying format of the rebuke; I have documented elsewhere the format for descriptions of personal possessions and the format for stories.[52] By conceiving of such formats we are able to account for the structural similarities that underpin individual examples of rebukes, of descriptions, or stories. A speaker, as he prepares to express one of these units of discourse, refers to the appropriate abstract knowledge structure. This will guide him, as it were automatically, through this speech act.

Unlike the situational script, the speech act format is not a store of pre-arranged events or actions, but a sequence of marked slots, or of constraints. Each time such a format is activated, it generates a series of verbal moves, or tasks, that must be performed. When we rebuke a child, for example, we use our scripted rebuke-format to trigger a particular series of moves. We might—after some thought—verbalize the format for a rebuke in this way: (1) catch X's attention, (2) identify the problem and the immediate difficulty, (3) explain why this behaviour is not appropriate, and (4) tell X what should be done instead.[53] The format does not supply the words that will complete those moves, but it will point the speaker towards the ideas he or she might use. Some moves may be expressed in an identical way across a variety of contexts, a reflection of individuals' reliance on a limited range of speech formulas to express certain notions. But, with respect to the other elements, the speaker is left to find the words and phrases that will give expression to the ideas generated by the format. Fenik's observation, reported above, that no two rebukes in Homer are alike is therefore in one sense accurate.[54] On

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such as invitations, they are not in a position to describe how such interactions are patterned.'

[52] For the role played by memory in formulating a description and in shaping a story, particularly, but not exclusively, in the Homeric context, see Minchin, *Homer and the Resources of Memory*, chaps. 3 and 6.

[53] The format that I set out above in my discussion of the Homeric rebuke, a modification of Fenik's rebuke-pattern, corresponds to this in each detail.

[54] Cf. Griffin, 'Homeric Words and Speakers', who comments on the phenomenon more generally, and that Homer's speeches are 'more innovative' in comparison with narrative scenes and passages, that in their verbal detail are more traditional (37).

the surface, in terms of word-for-word expression, the rebukes we find in Homer may not have much in common with each other. But, as we have observed, they share a common structure. This concept of prefabricated or, more accurately, prepatterned speech is, in general terms, supported by studies in linguistics. Tannen, for example, observing that '[a]ll discourse . . . is more or less prepatterned', whether at the level of word, phrase, and larger unit,[55] concludes that the production of spoken discourse has 'more to do with repetition and memory than with generation'.[56]

V. *Prepatterning and the constraints of performance*

Although Tannen and others have consistently drawn attention to instances of repetition and prepatterning at the level of the word or the phrase, little attention has been paid to prepatterning in larger units of discourse. One recent and relevant study is Liddicoat's examination of answering machine messages, in which he studies the form of the messages that telephone subscribers leave on their machines and the messages that callers leave in response.[57] He observes that despite the variation in content of the messages, callers' contributions

[55] See D. Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation as Spontaneous Formulaicity', *Text* 7 (1987), 223. There has been some discussion in recent years in the world of theatre studies about how actors learn their scripts: H. Noice, 'The Role of Explanations and Plan Recognition in the Learning of Theatrical Scripts', *Cognitive Science* 15 (1991), 425–60. I propose that actors learn to refer to the formats that they hold in memory to supply them with the *structure* of the speech acts that have been scripted for them by the playwright (that is, the structure provides them with the steps they would take in a rebuke or an apology, for example). The precise words through which the playwright has expressed those steps must, however, be rehearsed.

[56] Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation', 238. See also Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation: Towards a Poetics of Talk', 601.

[57] See A. Liddicoat, 'Discourse Routines in Answering Machine Communication in Australia', *Discourse Processes* 17 (1994), 283–309. Liddicoat (290) identifies four moves in the subscriber's talk (the machine-contribution): (1) greeting and self-identification, (2) a warrant (indicating why the answering machine was used), (3) an instruction, and (4) an undertaking. He identifies three phases of the caller's message: (1) opening phase, (2) message phase, and (3) closing phase. Of these, the opening phase includes a greeting and self-identification, the message phase covers three types of message (simple, informational, and social), all of which have predictable formats, and the closing phase may follow one of three or four patterns. However, it is notably briefer than the normal farewells of everyday telephone talk (299–305).

still have 'a readily identifiable structure that contains a limited number of moves that occur in a predictable sequence'.[58] And he concludes that talk on answering machines is 'highly structured and highly routinized', each contribution having its own protocol and its own internal structure.[59] We observe a similar kind of prepatterned discourse in stock auction speeches, studied by Kuiper and Haggo, in apologies in everyday situations, as documented by Olshtain and Cohen and others, and in refusals of invitations.[60]

What is important for my discussion is that Liddicoat also notes that answering machine talk draws on the same 'pool of strategies' that participants draw on in everyday telephone conversations.[61] He explains this in terms of the constraints of performance that, he argues, lead to a certain 'systematic modification of the available stock of conversational routines'.[62] Indeed, a performative context, whatever it may be, places constraints on the participating speakers: on the answerer and the caller in communication through an answering machine; on one friend making an apology to another; on the person who administers a rebuke in everyday talk; on the storyteller telling stories in conversation or in an oral epic tradition; and on the storyteller who puts a rebuke on the lips of one of his actors.

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58 See Liddicoat, 'Discourse Routines', 305.

59 See Liddicoat, 'Discourse Routines', 305.

60 See K. Kuiper and D. Haggo, 'Livestock Auctions, Oral Poetry, and Ordinary Language', *Language in Society* 13 (1984), 205–34. Kuiper and Haggo describe the discourse structure of auctioneers in terms of 'context-free rewrite rules' or 'discourse structure rules' (208–10, 219–20). They argue that the structures they use are akin to the structures used by the Yugoslav poets studied by Milman Parry and A.B. Lord. See also E. Olshtain and A. Cohen, 'Apology: A Speech-Act Set', in N. Wolfson and E. Judd (eds.), *Sociolinguistics and Language Acquisition* (Rowley, Mass., 1983), 18–23, E. Olshtain, 'Apologies across Languages', in S. Blum-Kulka, J. House, and G. Kasper (eds.), *Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies* (Norwood, 1989), 155–73. The model proposed in the latter paper (at 157) has been empirically developed and has been shown to have universal applicability across languages: (1) illocutionary force indicating device (for example, 'I'm sorry!'), (2) explanation or account, (3) taking on responsibility, (4) concern for the addressee, (5) offer of repair, and (6) promise of forbearance. An apology will comprise element (1) and a set of elements (2)–(6), depending on the context. For some comments on the universality of this model, see M. Suszczynska, 'Apologizing in English, Polish and Hungarian: Different Languages, Different Strategies', *Journal of Pragmatics* 31 (1999), 1053–65. On invitations, see P. Drew, 'Speakers' Reportings in Invitation Sequences', in J. Maxwell Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversational Analysis* (Cambridge, 1984), 129–51.

61 See Liddicoat, 'Discourse Routines', 308.

62 See Liddicoat, 'Discourse Routines', 308.

Such constraints result in the kinds of standardization that we have observed in Ann's rebukes from the everyday world, and in Homer's. Furthermore, when the speaker is conscious of the performative context, he feels obliged to express his speech act in full, so to speak. Just as a message on a telephone answering machine strives for completeness (in that each of the archetypal moves is addressed), so do apologies in the real world. Bruce Fraser observes, indeed, that the more formal the occasion, the longer and more elaborate is the apology; he observes that apologies in formal situations indicate that the speaker feels a need 'to play out his role'.[63] When we are obliged to speak in an unfamiliar or formal context, in which we sense that our audience is measuring the adequacy of our performance, we become anxious. Our response to such anxiety is to follow the scripted format with care. At the same time we exhibit a tendency to elaboration. I observe the same behaviour when I look at the rebukes in Homer. Not only are they complete (that is, they address all the steps of the format), but also they are often elaborate. In accordance with the conventions of social interaction that hold in the Homeric world, the speaker can be confident that his listeners will not interrupt him—or undertake action of any kind—while he speaks. The world has, as it were, come to a temporary halt. This gives the speaker the opportunity to follow the speech act format to its end. Homer regularly chooses to include in his representations of rebukes that element that is more often omitted in everyday rebukes: generalization (element [3]). This segment is critical in the Homeric context, in which the singer is performing for his audience while each actor within his song is himself or herself 'performing' for the audience within the story world. For here generalizations serves a broader evaluative purpose. In the epics it conveys the moral and ethical background against which the actions of the story are carried out. Even as the words of the speaker within the story world are designed to remind his or her addressees of their duties and obligations, they also assist us, the audience, in evaluating the ongoing tale.[64]

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[63] See B. Fraser, 'On Apologizing', in F. Coulmas (ed.), *Conversational Routine: Explorations in Standardized Communication Situations and Prepatterned Speech* (The Hague, 1981), 268.

[64] The generalization-element in a rebuke addressed by one of Homer's characters to another allows us to assess what is appropriate behaviour in this world and what is not. Since this information is passed on to us indirectly, not by the poet

VI. *Conclusions*

By relating Homer's formats to cognitive psychology's account of the storage of implicit knowledge, we can draw some conclusions about the mind-based resources on which the poet drew as he sang and on which we draw as we speak. In our own world we are readily able to construct a rebuke, or an apology, or consoling words, without having to devise an appropriate form afresh on each occasion. This is a demonstration of the economy of our memory-store and the efficiency of our retrieval system. We already have a format 'in mind', as we say. We know how to shape what must be said on each of these occasions. It appears from our study of rebukes in Homer that he, too, had a format in mind. That format, remarkably, corresponds to the rebuke-format that we ourselves follow in everyday conversation. I suggest, therefore, that the poet did not learn this format by listening to a master singer and imitating his practice. Rather, the rebuke that he sang was cued by that same rebuke-format that served him in everyday discourse; he had acquired it unconsciously, early in life, through listening to the discourse of others and through his own experiences of rebuking his friends. The format for the rebuke was already part of his memory store, as it is part of ours. It is a timeless form, fixed by its own internal logic, and reinforced by the mutual understanding of speaker and listener. It should not surprise us, however, to observe that Homer's versions of rebukes are a further stylization of the everyday format. Whereas rebukes in everyday talk may be abbreviated, abrupt, or sustained, the rebuke of oral epic is always a complete and often elaborate performance, in which every step of the format is addressed. This, indeed, is what the apprentice singer took from his master: the special formulation of the rebuke for the purposes of oral song.

I suggest that further study of other speech act formats in Homer and the real world, in which a speaker apologizes, resists persuasion,

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himself but by one of his actors, it is both subtle and powerful. For discussion of implicit and explicit evaluation and the greater force of the former, see D. Tannen, 'Oral and Literate Strategies in Spoken and Written Narrative', *Language* 58 (1982), 1–21 and 'The Oral/Literate Continuum in Discourse', in D. Tannen (ed.), *Spoken and Written Language: Exploring Orality and Literacy* (Norwood, 1982), 1–16. For discussion in the Homeric context, see E. Minchin, 'Describing and Narrating in Homer's *Iliad*', in E.A. Mackay (ed.), *Signs of Orality: The Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World* (Leiden, 1999), 49–64.

or attempts to offer consolation, will reveal the same parallels, and that we shall see in a range of speeches from the Homeric epics, as Martin has suggested, stylized, even rhetorical—but authentic—versions of everyday discourse from his own world.[65]

[65] I thank participants at the conference, the editors of this volume, and Brill's anonymous reader for several helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.

Sample of Rebukes from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*

location	*context*	*address/ reproach*	*problem*	*generalization/ broader perspective*	*proposal*
Iliad 2.173–81	Athene to Odysseus	173	174–5	176–8	179–81
Iliad 2.200–6	Odysseus to a common soldier	200, 201–2[1]	200	203–6	200–1
Iliad 4.412–18	Diomedes to Sthenelos	412	412	413–17	412, 418
Iliad 5.889–98	Zeus to Ares	889	889, 890–1	892–4	895–8
Iliad 6.407–39	Andromache to Hektor	407	407–10	410–30	431–9[2]
Iliad 7.109–19	Agamemnon to Menelaos	109	110–12	113–14	115–19
Iliad 10.159–61	Nestor to Diomedes	159	159	160–1	159
Iliad 12.409–12	Sarpedon the the Lykians	409	409	410–11	412
Iliad 14.83–102	Odysseus to Agamemnon	83–7, 95	88–9, 96–7	90–4, 97–102[3]	90
Iliad 15.128–41	Athene to Ares	128–9	130–7	139–41	138
Iliad 16.422–5	Sarpedon to Lykians	422	422	423–5	422
Iliad 17.142–68	Glaukos to Hektor	142	143	146–8	144–5
		150	149–53 166–8	154–65	—
Iliad 17.556–9	Athene to Menelaos	556–7	557–8	—	559
Iliad 21.472–7	Artemis to Apollo	472, 474	472–3	473–4	475–7
Iliad 23.69–92	Patroklos to Achilleus	69	69–70	72–4, 75–81	71, 75, 82–92
Iliad 24.33–54	Apollo to the gods	33	33–8, 39–45 50–2	46–9	53–4

Odyssey 2.243–56	Leokritos to Mentor	243–4, 251	243–4, 251	244–51	252–6
Odyssey 6.199–210	Nausikaa to her handmaids	199	199	200–8	199, 209–10
Odyssey 7.159–66	Echeneos to Alkinoos	159	159–60	161	162–6
Odyssey 13.330–51	Athene to Odysseus	330–2	333–8	339–43	344–51
Odyssey 15.10–42	Athene to Telemachos	10	10–12	12–13	14–42
Odyssey 15.326–39	Eumaios to Odysseus	326–7	327–9	330–4	335–9
Odyssey 16.69–89	Telemachos to Eumaios	69	70	71–7	78–89
Odyssey 17.46–51	Telemachos to Penelope	46	46–7	47	48–51
Odyssey 17.454–7	Odysseus to Antinoos	454	454	455–7	(457)
Odyssey 18.215–25	Penelope to Telemachos	215–20	221–22	223–5	—
Odyssey 21.85–95	Antinoos to Eumaios and Philoitios	85–6	86–7	87–8	89–95
Odyssey 22.226–35	Athene to Odysseus	226–30	231–2	—	233–5

1 The reproach here is administered physically also (the blows at 199). The implied problem is the man's shouting, hence the instruction 'Sit still and listen!' (200).

2 Foley identifies Andromache's speech (6.407–39) as a lament (J. Miles Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art* [University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999], at 188–98). Although it looks ahead to Hektor's death with sorrow, it is also structured as a rebuke, as demonstrated here.

3 Note that longer rebukes may repeat the rebuke pattern, as in this instance and at *Iliad* 17.142–68 below.

CHAPTER FIVE

HOMERIC SIGNS AND FLASHBULB MEMORY

Ruth Scodel

In recent years, scholars have paid considerable attention to Homeric *semata*. Gregory Nagy has examined the relationship between *sêma* and *noesis* in archaic hexameter poetry, seeing a parallelism between the intelligence required to encode and to decode signs.[1] Andrew Ford discusses the grave marker as a foil for poetry; like epic song, it can preserve fame, but it is liable to be destroyed, or moved, or to lose its meaning.[2] Thus, for Ford, the *sêma* helps us see how Homer does not treat his song as a fixed monument. C. Sourvinou-Inwood argues that 'The primary type of reference in the signs referred to as *sêma* is indexical; but the indexical reference slides into a symbolic one which is more pronounced in some types of *sêmata* and less so in others': that is, they function as parts of the greater whole to which they point, but also convey messages.[3] Haun Saussy sees Odysseus' scar as a form of writing that Eurycleia reads.[4] Deborah Steiner also has discussed Homeric signs as antecedents of writing, noting especially that the reader of a sign must perform a double intellectual task, first recognizing that the sign is a sign, and then interpreting it.[5] On this basis, she very helpfully distinguishes signs recognizable as signs only to those who have special preparation to understand them from signs based on established conventions, so that anyone can potentially see them as signs and try to interpret them. The first are 'inferential', the second 'semiological'.

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[1] G. Nagy, 'Sêma and Noesis: Some Illustrations', *Arethusa* 16 (1983), 35–55.

[2] A. Ford, *Homer: The Poetry of the Past* (Ithaca, 1992), 137–45.

[3] C. Sourvinou-Inwood, *Reading Greek Death* (Oxford, 1995), 136–9 (quote on 139).

[4] H. Saussy, 'Writing in the *Odyssey*: Eurykleia, Parry, Jousse, and the Opening of a Letter from Homer', *Arethusa* 29 (1996), 299–338. I strongly disagree with Saussy's view of Parry and of oral transmission.

[5] D. Steiner, *The Tyrant's Writ. Myths and Images of Writing in Ancient Greece* (Princeton, 1994), 10–29.

J.M. Foley has placed signs in relation to 'traditional referentiality'.[6] He argues that *semata* have to be interpreted metonymically, for they reach outside the poem itself to signal an emerging reality. Thus, in his view, signs generally (and not just grave markers) stand for epic itself and the process of its reception. Only the person competent in the traditional register can understand them. Indeed, *sêma* is a central term in his *Homer's Traditional Art.*

Although this chapter will examine one group of signs, the recognition signs of the *Odyssey*, their peculiarities are much clearer within the context of a more general discussion of the Homeric sign, and more significant as they cast light on this wider context. The sign that permits Penelope's recognition of Odysseus, in particular, is potentially relevant both to the 'Penelope question' that has been important in recent scholarship and to the older debate about the authenticity of the recognition scene.[7] Understanding these signs thus has significant interpretive consequences in itself, and the way Homeric characters use signs, furthermore, offers insights into Homeric psychology.

The sign, however, is also central to our understanding of the background to literacy. The only allusion to writing in the epics is, of course, the 'nasty signs' on Bellerophon's tablet (*Iliad* 6.168): if the Greeks placed the technology of writing, when they acquired it, into an intellectual frame of reference constituted by traditional signs, understanding that framework should help us understand how they understood writing. Interpreters have tended to emphasize those aspects of the sign that correspond to modern semiotic thought—signs are coded messages. Such an understanding of sign can easily be transferred to writing, as a further code. Such a model can account for most Homeric signs. However, recognition signs have a very strong affective component that models of encoding and decoding do not sufficiently emphasize.

All *semata* have in common that they point beyond themselves—that is what makes them signs. Not all Homeric signs are the same,

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[6] J.M. Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art* (University Park, Pa., 1999), especially 25–34.

[7] 'Penelope question': L. Doherty, *Siren Songs: Gender, Audiences, and Narrators in the Odyssey* (Ann Arbor, 1995), 31–63, F. Ahl and H. Roisman, *The Odyssey Re-Formed* (Ithaca, 1996), 220–72 and *passim.* The Analytic debate was re-started by W. Schadewaldt, *Neue Kriterien zur Odyssee-Analyse* (Heidelberg, 1959). Unitarian defenses: S. Besslich, *Schweigne-Verschweigen-Übergehen: Die Darstellung des Unausgesprochen in der Odyssee* (Heidleberg, 1966), 83–96 and H. Erbse, *Beitrage zum Verständnis der Odyssee* (Berlin, 1972), 55–72.

however. Besides the distinction between inferential and semiotic signs, another useful typology would stress the differing 'not-here' to which signs point and the nature of the signs themselves. Further, among inferential signs, some genuinely require decoding while some need only be recognized as signs for their meaning to be self-evident. They serve less as signs than as memory cues. Recognition signs, along with the more general category of durable signs to which they belong, are not ambiguous tokens. Once the viewer perceives them, they evoke memory, and they are effective less through rational inference than by memory's affective force.

By far the most common sign in Homer is the permanent marker, whose most frequent form is the tomb. Such signs are 'durable'. Such a sign modifies the physical world in a way that stimulates later memory; it encapsulates a narrative about the past. The second most common sign is the portent sent by Zeus. It refers to the future, and is in itself evanescent—most often, a clap of thunder. Bird omens are never called *semata*, but they share the epithet *enaisima* with thunder and function similarly—the bird flies past and is gone. Third are the marks human beings make for specific uses, that have meaning only within the context of a particular action; I call these 'temporary' signs. To this category belong the *semata* of the throws at the Phaeacian games (*Odyssey* 8.192), the marks the Achaean heroes place on their lots (*Iliad* 7.189), the 'evil signs' that Proetus sent along with Bellerophon, and the markings Odysseus leaves to help him find Dolon's armor (*Iliad* 10.466). Then there are the 'occasional' signs, events or objects in a future itinerary that the forewarned hero can use as guides: the man who will ask why Odysseus carries a winnowing-shovel (*Odyssey* 11.126), and the turning-post of the chariot race (*Iliad* 23.326), are signs of this kind. Finally, the Dog star is the only member of its class in Homer, a recurring divine sign: whenever it appears, it portends the same thing (*Iliad* 22.30). These types differ not only analytically, but in their narrative function and formulaic context.

Signs differ in their intentionality. Zeus is the sender of portents, and their characteristic (though not obligatory) formula is *endexia/enaisima/paraisiasemata phainon*. The interpreter of portents seeks to understand Zeus' messages, and these are the most 'semiotic' of Homeric signs: they are deliberately encoded, and the decoder must be intelligent, or even a technical specialist. These signs make a powerful impression on those who encounter them, both because they transmit

messages from the divine, and because they have to be especially marked so that they will be recognizable as signs to their recipients.[8] 'Temporary' signs likewise have meaning only within a particular social interaction and likewise depend on the intention of the sign's creator. They refer to the immediate past, and are created in order to be 'consumed' in a near future. Mortals use them to convey messages to each other or to themselves. They also require decoding, though this may be minimal in simple situations: Odysseus makes a 'clear' sign at the spot at which he leaves Dolon's armor (*Iliad* 10.466)—a heap of reeds and twigs—simply to make the spot more visible in the dark. When he and Diomedes return, the poet does not even mention the sign (*Iliad* 10.525–9). They find it without difficulty. It is a straightforward memory cue.

In contrast, 'occasional' signs are not usually in themselves intended as signs. They are fixed points within a future that one speaker predicts for another. Whether the speaker's foreknowledge is prophetic or natural, the sign identifies the moment at which the recipient of the sign needs to follow a particular course of action. They are 'signs' within a particular sequence of future events. So, for example, Odysseus tells Eumaeus that it is to be a sign that the suitors refuse to let him have the bow (*Odyssey* 21.231). At that moment, Eumaeus is to give the bow to Odysseus and give instructions to the women. The suitors' predictable behavior is a sign only because Odysseus incorporates it into his plan. Tiresias' prediction that as Odysseus travels inland bearing an oar, a man will say that he is carrying a winnowing-fan (*Odyssey* 11.126–8) is likewise a sign only because it marks the moment at which Odysseus is to fix the oar in the ground and perform an offering to Poseidon. The formulae 'nor will it escape you' may appear when one person announces such a sign to another. These signs require no real decoding. Once the character recognizes the predicted sign—and the formula suggests that this is not difficult—Eumaeus or Odysseus knows what to do. The man who will not recognize the oar is obviously a meaningful sign, and indeed a rich one.[9]

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[8] To these signs the comments of R.A. Prier, *Archaic Logic: Symbol and Structure in Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles* (The Hague, 1976), 27, are appropriate, that the *sêma* 'is always surrounded by an aura of the cosmic, supernatural, affective, or we should say, I think, "meataphysical" or "orther worldy".'

[9] On the significance of the sign, see S.D. Olson, 'Odysseus' 'Winnowing-Shovel' (Hom. *Odyssey* 11.119–37 and the Island of the Cattle of the Sun)', *ICS* 22 (1997), 7–9.

Because he has no experience of the sea, he marks the place where nobody has worshipped Poseidon in the past. Ironically, then, in serving as a sign he also misinterprets Odysseus' appearance, which would have significance for him if he knew how to read it. Yet this significance is important only for the audience of the *Odyssey*; for Odysseus, all that matters is that he knows when to plant the oar and perform the ritual. The turning-post in the chariot-race in the *Iliad* is a conventional, intentional occasional sign: the organizer of a race selects an appropriate object as the turning-point, and a skilled charioteer knows that he needs particular skills at this point in a race (*Iliad* 23.326).

'Durable' signs are usually intended as signs. Grave markers, the most common form, are of course intentional signs. However, any object in the world may become a sign of this kind if it serves as a memory cue, somehow being able to prompt a narrative. Like occasional signs, such markers do not demand special decoding; they are not ambiguous.

Most categories of sign are situationally bound. A clap of thunder can have meaning only within the situation when it is heard. A man who confuses an oar with a winnowing-fan is significant only for Odysseus, and only during the journey Tiresias predicts. Durable signs, however, though they may be either semiological or inferential, are re-usable and always have the same signification, although their meaning can be lost if memory fails. Any number of people can pass by a monument and remember what it signifies. These categories of sign thus do not fit the same map as Steiner's categories.

This chapter is especially concerned with the peculiar subset of durable signs that serve as recognition tokens in the *Odyssey*. These are not monuments, but long-term, though not necessarily permanent, physical traces of the past that arouse memory although they were not deliberately created to serve as signs. For example, the white, moon-shaped marking on a horse's forehead is a *sêma* at *Iliad* 23.455, because anyone who is already familiar with the horse can use this durable trace to remember whose horse it is. It is, in effect, a public recognition token for this animal. Although Idomeneus uses the sign to argue for a present reality—that Diomedes, contrary to expectation, is leading in the chariot race—the sign itself connects the present with his memory of the chariot teams. Idomeneus and Ajax do not argue about whether this sign indicates that the leading

horse is Diomedes', but about whether Idomeneus can actually have seen clearly enough to notice the sign.

Odysseus' scar clearly belongs within this category. It is re-usable and always points to Odysseus' identity. Eurycleia spontaneously recognizes Odysseus through this token, he displays the scar to Eumaeus and Philoetius and to his father in order to support his claim to be Odysseus, while Eurycleia refers to it in trying to convince Penelope. Although these signs are not as durable as grave markers, like them, as present physical realities, they remind those who see them of events in the past.[10]

Both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have near their beginnings assemblies in which the present action is placed within a traditionalizing context, evoked by the recollection of signs from an earlier moment in the story. Halitherses describes how he predicted Odysseus' solitary and unrecognized return when Odysseus left for Troy (*Odyssey* 2.172–6), while not only does Odysseus recall the omen of the snake and the birds, but Nestor also reminds the Achaeans of Zeus' thunder when they embarked (*Iliad* 2.350–3). An epic apparently requires such a 'placement' within the tradition, in which the past and future of the narrative moment are brought into play simultaneously. At such moments, the sign points both forward and back. Otherwise, however, portents usually are as evanescent in action as in appearance. Halitherses connects his earlier prophecy with the bird-omen that the Assembly has just witnessed. The eagles are both a memory-cue and an evanescent portent. Eurymachus, however, angrily rejects his interpretation. Such recalled signs provide an opportunity for communal understanding, but in this case there is no shared memory and no shared interpretation. Halitherses recalls his speech later in reproaching the suitors' families, but he does not mention the sign (*Odyssey* 24.451–62). The sign is not received into ongoing memory, and its meaning disappears.

The recognition signs all belong to the same unusual subcategory. In Steiner's terminology, these are all 'inferential'. None of them

[10] Only one sign in Homer combines these categories: the omen of the snake and the sparrow with her chicks (*Iliad* 2.305–20). In the vulgate text, this begins as an evanescent sign, which the god makes ἀρίζηλον (318) by turning the snake to stone. Aristarchus, however, read ἀίζηλον ('invisible') and athetized line 319; cf. G.S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary* 1: Books 1–4 (Cambridge, 1992), 149–50 (on lines 318–19).

could be recognized as signs by someone lacking esoteric knowledge. In the typology just outlined, they are all durable signs, but they are unusual in that they were not created in order to be signs, unlike grave markers (though like the star on the horse's forehead). The recognition signs, along with the clothing that leads to the pseudo-recognition of *Odyssey* 19.214–50, share the further characteristic of being cues for autobiographical memories. Other durable signs prompt mostly semantic memory; they are intended to preserve past events for people who have no direct experience. They exist in order to prompt those who see them to recall a distant past; the snake at Aulis, like the epic itself, points back to the beginning of the Trojan War for generations yet to come. The recognition signs, however, prompt extraordinarily intense personal memories, flashbulb memories.

Flashbulb memories, in the language of contemporary psychology, are the peculiarly vivid and strongly visual (but not always reliable) memories individuals carry of particular events.[11] Most familiar and intensely studied are the memories many people have of where they were and what they were doing when they heard the news of a significant event, such as the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the assassination of President Kennedy. (The death of Princess Diana has surely generated many flashbulb memories). However, most flashbulb memories are not connected with public events, but with personal life. Although flashbulb memories are not completely accurate, they decay less over time than other memories, and their strength does not appear to depend on how often they are recited. Surprise is not a crucial variable in whether an event forms a flashbulb memory, but it seems to be a contributing factor, and personal, emotional engagement is another, more important one. 'Firsts' are especially likely to lead to flashbulb memories. Some, though not all, psychologists believe that these memories receive special processing when they are generated; it has been called a 'Now Print' command. The sign at Aulis seems to have created such a memory in Odysseus, and indeed we would expect such a memory in everyone who witnessed it. When Nestor recalls the less vivid sign of Zeus' thunder, he recalls the moment of departure, a 'first' (*Iliad* 2.350–3). Significant signs tend to occur at such moments, rendering both the sign and the event potentially memorable.

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[11] M. Conway, *Flashbulb Memories* (Hove and Hillsdale, 1995).

Homer had no special term for such memories, of course, but the experience of intense memory is universal, and the *Odyssey*'s main recognitions depend on durable signs that prompt individual flashbulb memories. Eurycleia's is spontaneous and Odysseus does not want it to take place, so that the recognition sign must be so powerful in this instance that it works even though Odysseus seeks to conceal it. With Penelope and Laertes, in contrast, Odysseus must use signs to overcome doubts. Eumaeus and Philoetius express no doubts in response to Odysseus' self-revelation; he shows them the scar, but it hardly seems necessary—the audience may well take for granted that their response is a milder version of Eurycleia's. The suitors seem not to doubt Odysseus' self-revelation; his ability to perform Odysseus' feat with the bow is evidence enough (*Odyssey* 22.45). Dolius and his sons do not hesitate either (*Odyssey* 24.391–2). Telemachus is doubtful but cannot be convinced by signs. In each case, the use of signs to overcome doubt shows a particular view of recognition as relying less on the rational reading of the implications of the sign than on the sign's ability to prompt vivid contact with a past moment that unites the characters. The more difficult the recognition, the more powerful the memory must be. Such memory is crucial in the *Odyssey*, since the poet repeatedly reminds the audience that Odysseus' success depends on his being still the hero he was as a younger man.[12]

The first use of a durable sign as memory cue is Penelope's pseudo-recognition of Odysseus as the Cretan Aethon, who once entertained Odysseus. After he provides a circumstantial narrative of how he met Odysseus, she challenges him to describe Odysseus' clothes, his appearance, and his companions (*Odyssey* 19.218–19). Odysseus' reply is remarkable, for he does not describe what he himself looked like. Doubtless, he does not wish to draw Penelope's attention to the basic similarities between the Odysseus who left and the man sitting with her—similarities Eurycleia will remark upon in a moment (*Odyssey* 19.380–1). Instead, he begins with an apology for any failure of memory, pointing out that he saw Odysseus twenty years ago (*Odyssey* 19.221–4). The apology obliquely criticizes the test, whose demands on fallible human memory are excessive, especially since Odysseus' appearance would not have been as significant, and thus memorable, for Aethon as for Penelope.

[12] S. Murnaghan, *Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey* (Princeton, 1987), 15.

He then proceeds to describe Odysseus' clothes in splendid detail: his crimson cloak, the golden broach decorated with a dog attacking a deer, and his *chiton*, sheer as an onion skin, much admired by the Cretan women (*Odyssey* 19.225–6). (The women's admiration constitutes yet another hint that the test is inappropriate, since women, who make clothes, notice them better than men). He then goes on to a second apology, a further implicit critique of Penelope's choice of sign: he does not know whether Odysseus was wearing these clothes when he left home, or whether he was given them by one of his companions or a guest-friend on the way. After all, Aethon himself gave him a sword and a *chiton* (*Odyssey* 19.237–43). He then describes Odysseus' herald Eurybates.

Penelope's response is simultaneously intellectual and emotional. It follows a pattern for responses to such signs: a main verb describing the intense physical effects of the recognition on the character, who is referred to by a pronoun in the dative or genitive case. The following line, in paratactic enjambment, connects this emotional response with the recognition of the signs through a circumstantial participle. So here Penelope weeps as she recognizes (or because she recognizes) the accuracy of the signs (*Odyssey* 19.249–50):

> τῇ δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο
> σήματ' ἀναγνούσῃ, τά οἱ ἔμπεδα πέφραδ' Ὀδυσσεύς
>
> And in her he roused ever more a longing for lamentation, as she recognized the signs, which Odysseus declared to her as they were fixed.

The formula ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο indicates, within traditional referentiality, the response to memory of the dead or to thoughts of those who are alive but unreachable. It indicates an unrealizable longing to make actual contact in place of the intense mental connection the character feels to an absent friend. So Priam's comparison of himself to Peleus arouses in Achilles the longing to lament his father (*Iliad* 24.507). The formula appears three times in the account of Patroclus' funeral (*Iliad* 23.14, 108, 153). At *Odyssey* 4.113, Telemachus feels this desire for lamentation when Menelaus refers to his ignorance of Odysseus' fate and the likelihood that his father, wife, and son lament him.

Penelope has already quoted Odysseus' speech at his departure (*Odyssey* 18.259–70), but the recital of the signs has aroused Penelope's vivid memory of how Odysseus looked when he left for Troy. The power of this image has significant narrative consequences: she dreams

of him as he was (*Odyssey* 20.88–9), and Odysseus, overhearing her prayer to Artemis, imagines that she recognizes him (*Odyssey* 20.93–4). She refers again to his appearance at his departure as she begins her test of the bed (*Odyssey* 23.175–6). In this instance, the gap between the vividness of memory and present reality is an obstacle to recognition. The bed-test relies on Odysseus' ability to evoke even earlier memories that overcome this difference.

When Odysseus remarks that he does not know whether Odysseus in Crete was wearing the same clothes with which he left Ithaca, he establishes his credibility. He arouses Penelope's precise memory of one moment, while pretending to evoke another, when the women admired Odysseus' clothing. In the lie, the clothes and the herald link Penelope's and Aethon's separate memories of Odysseus. While Aethon implicitly complains that the signs Penelope desires are inappropriate, they are actually unusual in a different way. These signs would normally be durable memory cues, as they are within Aethon's story. However, Eurybates is dead, and not only the clothing, but the golden brooch is lost. Words have replaced objects as memory-cues. *Empeda* is 'stable, fixed': while time has changed the external world, the verbal sign transcends time to evoke the past with accuracy. Homer typically implies that poetry is a better preserver of memory than monuments. However, this replacement of the object by its memory is typical of Odyssean recognition, where the emphasis always lies not on the thing itself, but on the memory associated with it.

Odysseus' scar is not called a sign at the moment Eurycleia recognizes him, but Eurycleia calls it a *sêma* when she tries to persuade Penelope at *Odyssey* 23.73–4. Penelope does not accept this sign—clearly, as critics have understood, because it lacks emotional resonance for her, since she did not know Odysseus when he acquired the scar.[13] Notoriously, the scar is unimportant except for those for whom it carries meaning. Odysseus girds up his scars to fight Irus, but nobody comments on the scar.[14] At this point in the poem, the poet has not yet mentioned the scar; but if earlier Returns-of-Odysseus had mentioned it, the uncovering of the hero's body might have

[13] Cf. C. Whitman, *Homer and the Homeric Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 302–4 (though he thinks Penelope has recognized Odysseus before the bow-contest).

[14] On this see S.D. Olson, *Blood and Iron: Stories and Storytelling in Homer's Odyssey*. (Leiden, 1995), 155–6.

brought it to mind. Yet for the suitors, who were children when Odysseus left, it is meaningless, even though we would expect that the story of the boar-hunt would be well-known on Ithaca.

The poem's lack of interest in the scar as a literal, visible sign available to anyone is even clearer in the case of Penelope, since Penelope is intimately familiar with Odysseus. Yet if Penelope accepted the scar as proof, it would be a recognition through rational inference. The beggar has the general look of Odysseus; he has a scar where Odysseus has one; he has killed the suitors as Odysseus would. The poet, however, has no interest in such reasoning.

Instead, he is interested in memory. I.F. de Jong has argued that the narrative of Odysseus' scar is focalized through Eurycleia.[15] Her argument is cogent, but perhaps illustrates the limits of technical narratology along with its strengths. For the scar narrative does not use focalization as a modern author would. At the moment of recognition, both Eurycleia and Odysseus are thinking about the scar. As Eurycleia approaches him, Odysseus turns away from the fire, towards the darkness, because he has remembered the scar and is afraid the old woman will recognize him (*Odyssey* 19.388–91). He had asked for an old woman to wash his feet, probably expecting that Eurynome would be selected.[16] Eurynome is more closely associated with Penelope than with Odysseus, and that he does not worry about her recognizing him again demonstrates the peculiarly experiential nature of these signs. The narrator might have chosen to let the recognition take place without Odysseus' having thus tried to prevent it, but he emphasizes that the scar is on both their minds at the moment she feels and knows it.

The story of the boar hunt itself does not show any effect of Eurycleia's perspective. It follows the classic style of heroic narrative. If this is Eurycleia's memory, Eurycleia sounds very much like Homer. To be sure, the narrator informs us that Odysseus described the boar hunt in detail to his parents, so we the hearer can assume that Eurycleia knows the story behind the scar as she recognizes it. Still,

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[15] I.F. de Jong, 'Eurykleia and Odysseus' Scar: *Odyssey* 19.393–466', *CQ*[2] 35 (1985), 517–18. There is a critique of de Jong's argument in Doherty, *Siren Songs*, 155–6. On the narrative functions of the episode, see A. Köhnken, 'Die Narbe des Odysseus', in *Homer: Die Dichtung und ihre Deutung* (Darmstadt, 1991), especially 500–4, on why the poet does not focalize through Odysseus.

[16] Köhnken, 'Narbe des Odysseus', 103–4.

it is surely Homer, not Eurycleia, who can comment that Autolycus excelled everyone in theft and deceptive oaths, because Hermes gave him these abilities, because Autolycus sacrificed so diligently to Hermes (*Odyssey* 19.395–8).

On the other hand, this episode varies greatly in narrative duration, the amount of story-time relative to narrative time. The most fully dramatized moment is the one in which Eurycleia actually participates. When Autolycus visited Ithaca, his daughter had only recently borne her son, and Eurycleia placed the baby in his grandfather's lap (*Odyssey* 19.399–412) to be named. Autolycus' visit includes Eurycleia's and Autolycus' quoted speech.

The story of the boar-hunt requires, perhaps, that the narrator explains the relationship between Odysseus and Autolycus, but it certainly does not require this full a narrative. The poet has carefully prepared for this episode by having Penelope introduce Eurycleia as having received Odysseus at the moment of his birth (*Odyssey* 19.355–6). This segment focuses on Eurycleia and represents her memory, then, without necessarily being strictly focalized through her. She associates the scar with the naming. Autolycus is the first link. Also the trip to visit his grandfather was presumably the first time Odysseus left home, and Eurycleia connects the naming—his entry into the social order—with his entry into the larger world. Odysseus' naming is clearly a flashbulb memory for her.

The second vivid sections of the scar narrative are Odysseus' arrival at his grandfather's house and especially the boar-hunt itself, though no section has the clarity of Eurycleia's memory. It is worth noticing what the narrative does not describe, Odysseus' journey, for example, or Autolycus' house. Almost everything is summarized: Autolycus and his sons greet Odysseus with 'kind words' (*Odyssey* 19.415), but these are not quoted. They give him fine gifts when he leaves (*Odyssey* 19.460), but these are not enumerated, although they were the ostensible reason for the visit. The narrator does include one special detail in Odysseus' arrival at his grandfather's, the embrace his grandmother gives him. The welcoming feast receives moderate detail (*Odyssey* 19.440–4).

The extended description of the dark glade where the boar hides is certainly not Eurycleia's memory, nor is it likely to be a detail that the young Odysseus included in his original account. For the external audience, it strongly echoes the (narratively) earlier grove of trees where Odysseus takes shelter after reaching Scheria; it marks

the importance of such places in significant transitions in Odysseus' life.[17] In modern psychological terms, we could speculate that the recent night spent in such a dark grove on Scheria has brought back the memory of the grove where the boar hid. The focalization of the visit must loosely follow Odysseus' own. His first meeting with his grandmother is the focus of his memory of his arrival, while the words of his grandfather and cousins are background. Similarly, he remembers the dark grove with special clarity because the boar emerged from it; the moment the boar appeared and attacked is a typical situation for the creation of a flashbulb memory—the hero's first encounter with danger. The narrative shapes itself around the intense memories of the two characters.

The scar, then, is a physical link between the flashbulb memories of Eurycleia and Odysseus. It cues a different memory for each, but these memories are linked. Odysseus has no direct memory of his own naming, although he knows the story (he refers to it at 24.335), while Eurycleia did not witness the fight with the boar, although she heard about it. The physical sign, the scar itself, prompts an intense visual memory for each of them, and the power of this memory links their semantic memories. Each remembers as a story what the other remembers as a powerful moment of lived experience, and their memories thus overlap. The recognition takes place through actual physical contact, as Eurycleia handles the scar, the action emphasizing the connection of memories. Because the recognition is involuntary, the narrator does not use the usual formulae to describe it, but gives six lines to describing the intellectual act of recognition and the intense emotional response to it.

The other elaborated recognitions likewise depend on flashbulb memories. Although durable physical realities carry these memories, the actual presence of the signs is almost irrelevant to their function (though Eurycleia had to feel the scar, of course, since Odysseus did not want her to recognize him). In the recognition with Laertes, Laertes demands a sign. Odysseus shows the scar and describes the day his father gave him the orchard (*Odyssey* 24.331–44): he presents the signs as narrative. Although he directs his father to look at the scar, he confirms what it is by telling the story, summarizing it briefly

[17] Cf. J. Russo in J. Russo, M. Fernandez-Galiano, and A. Heubeck, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey* 3: *Books 22–24* (Oxford, 1992), 97–8.

in a form appropriate to Laertes. He then tells his father the trees in the orchard. He does not, however, point to them; the fact that Odysseus and Laertes are actually standing in the orchard seems almost irrelevant. When Laertes gave his son the gift, the father and son walked through the orchard and vineyard, as the son asked questions and the father explained the various trees. Neither the orchard nor the scar is exactly a sign in itself. They become signs when Odysseus turns them into narratives, and the narratives, perhaps combined with the presence of the durable traces, prompts memory: Laertes is overcome as he recognizes the signs. In this case, the memory is fully shared. The day in the orchard was spent together, and their memories do not need to be distinguished. The occasion was evidently a 'first'—the occasion when Laertes initiated Odysseus into his role as heir of the property.

The bed-sign is complex. Odysseus has asked to have his bed made, since his wife's heart is iron (*Odyssey* 23.171–2). He sees the issue not as one of intellectually reading signs, but of emotional response. Penelope in answer insists that she knows what Odysseus was like *when he left.* She carefully sets up the testing sign, instructing Eurycleia to make up the bed outside the room Odysseus himself built (*Odyssey* 23.178). He then angrily narrates how he built the room and the bed inside it (*Odyssey* 23.183–204). He calls the bed a *sêma* twice in this speech (*Odyssey* 23.188, 202).

The second time, he realizes that the sign is a test. The first usage, though, cannot refer to the bed as a sign of recognition. Obviously, he did not build the bed as a recognition token. The peculiarity of the bed's construction, which incorporates the living tree, is a sign as the star on a horse's forehead is a sign: it renders this object different from all others, and thus recognizable to those who have seen it before.[18] As a sign, however, this is odd, since the bed was concealed inside a room only Odysseus, Penelope, and one servant ever entered. Odysseus can have intended it, as an intentional sign, only as a memorial for themselves, and for his descendants. It symbolizes not just the marriage of Odysseus and Penelope, but the dynastic continuity of the household.

[18] W.B. Stanford, *Homer: Odyssey* (New York, 1967), 399 (on 23.188–9), argues that *sêma* here should be translated 'distinguishing mark, a unique feature'. He is followed by Heubeck in Russo, Fernandez-Galiano, and Heubeck, *Commentary, ad loc.*

Again, the bed is a durable sign, but the bed is not itself visible when Odysseus narrates its creation. Once again, Penelope has an overwhelming emotional response: 'her knees and her dear heart came undone' (*Odyssey* 23.205–6). Like the scar, the bed evokes intense memories that do not appear to be exactly identical. For Odysseus, who built the bed, its essential characteristic is its immovability, and his narrative concerns the building, not the bed's use. Penelope, however, recognizes Odysseus through her memory of their shared experience of the bed, presumably on her wedding-night. She, of course, knows how he built the bed, just as he surely remembers using it, but their memories complement each other rather than being identical. Again, the making of the bed was a unique event for Odysseus, presumably in anticipation of his marriage, as Penelope's memory of it seems to depend on that night.

Penelope's memory arouses the desire for lamentation in Odysseus. His reaction is less powerful than hers since he does not simultaneously remember the past and link it to the present. Nonetheless, through this response he effectively accepts her memory of the bed as his own as she has accepted his memory as hers. The narrator continues with the famous simile comparing her to a shipwrecked sailor reaching land (*Odyssey* 23.233–9).[19]

Once the requisite link in shared memory is established, Penelope can in some way appropriate Odysseus' experience as her own memory, even though she did not share it. The simile, then, extends into more recent, separate experience the merging of separate but closely related memories characteristic of recognitions.

Recent interpretations that see the fixity of the bed solely as a figure for Penelope's sexual fidelity to Odysseus ignore this aspect of the sign. Of course, as Froma Zeitlin has pointed out, the immovability of the bed bears no direct connection to Penelope's loyalty—she could have had sexual relations without moving the bed.[20] Penelope's suggestion that the bed could have been moved has implications broader than her chastity: Odysseus built the bed to be

[19] H. Foley, '"Reverse Similes" and Sex Roles in the *Odyssey*', *Arethusa* 11 (1978), 59–78, especially 69: 'In the simile of the shipwrecked sailor Penelope takes on the mature Odysseus' experiences as her own'.

[20] F. Zeitlin, 'Figuring Fidelity in Homer's *Odyssey*', *Playing the Other* (Chicago, 1996), 26; at 27–42 she discusses how the immovability of the bed is related to the validity of the sign (through play on the word *empedon*).

immovable, so that to cut through the wood and move it would have been to destroy the monument. The recognitions depend on signs each of which always evokes the same story, and so prompt closely related memories in different characters.[21]

The recognition with Eumaeus and Philoetius are very different from these, because the servants express no doubt about Odysseus' identity. Odysseus simply ends his announcement of his identity by offering them the scar as proof (*Odyssey* 21.217–20).[22] They weep, but do not experience the overwhelming emotional response of Penelope or Eurycleia. Odysseus kisses them, but it is not clear whether he also weeps. However, the poet emphasizes the intensity of their feeling with 'and the light of the sun would have set on them as they cried'. That is, the sign is convincing without an overt link to flashbulb memory, but only because the herdsmen feel no impulse to doubt—and because the theme of remembering the scar has already been fully developed and can be taken for granted.

The recognition with Telemachus demonstrates the function of signs in the poem precisely because signs are completely absent. Realistically, Odysseus could convince Telemachus of his identity by enumerating facts he knows about Ithaca and his household. He could describe special pieces of property in his household, any identifying marks on the women, anecdotes of family history Telemachus would surely know. He could, for example, describe his bow, or narrate how Laertes bought Eurycleia. While his knowledge of the family could not prove his identity, it could certainly make it credible (cf. for example, Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris* 809–26). However, he uses none of these: he simply asserts his identity. Having suddenly and dramatically changed his appearance, he must either be a god or have divine support, and Telemachus accepts the latter explanation. Signs, in other words, are not naturalistic. A recognition accomplished through such a demonstration of knowledge would rely on semantic or on autobiographical memory organized as information, and the poet has no interest in that. The *Odyssey* allows a recognition

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[21] M. Katz, 'Homecoming and Hospitality: Recognition and the Construction of Identity in the *Odyssey*', in S. Oberhelman, V. Kelly, and R. Golsan (eds.), *Epic and Epoch: Essays on the Interpretation and History of a Genre* (Lubbock, 1994), 49–75, argues that Odysseus' identity is not so much revealed as constituted by his story.

[22] P. von der Mühll, *Homer: Odyssea* (Basel, 1946), brackets these lines, which are missing in P. 28.

through signs only where the sign can evoke an intense autobiographical memory that two characters share, although their memories may not be identical. No other form of memory is effective.

The recognition with Telemachus, like the recognition with the herdsmen, continues with weeping. In this case, however, the poet expands with an unusual simile (*Odyssey* 16.215–29), in which the reunited father and son weep like raptors whose young the country people have taken. This simile resembles other 'reverse' similes in the poem insofar as Telemachus becomes a parent, but this reversal is not its most striking characteristic. The father and son become a mated pair. The simile does not tidily correspond to the experience of either Telemachus or Odysseus, although it effectively evokes the way Odysseus' absence has threatened the dynastic continuity of his line. The birds weep for a loss that is irrecoverable, while the characters have just been reunited. They have just re-established the very generational continuity that is disrupted in the simile. Insofar as they weep for a loss, they weep for the intervening years and the shared experience they do not have. The simile seems, in fact, to replace what they lack: it turns the father and son who lack shared memories on which fully to recognize each other become a pair of birds who have had offspring. The simile replaces their real separation from each other with a shared separation from someone else, and so perhaps substitutes for the shared memory of the usual sign.

This aspect of the Homeric signs has several implications for broader questions. These signs depend on the private memories of the characters. They are thus at the opposite end of the continuum of self-declared traditionality from narrative elements that are described as having *kleos* or being a concern to everyone. It seems likely that when the poet has Odysseus say that his fame reaches heaven (*Odyssey* 9.19–20), or that the Argo is known to all (*Odyssey* 12.70), he points to especially familiar items in the traditional repertory.[23] The recognition signs, in contrast, even when they are not secret, are not significant for those who were not close to the events. I therefore suspect that they were areas of considerable variation among different versions and performances, depending greatly on which pieces of 'backstory' the performer wished to invoke and how he wished to direct audience sympathies.

[23] *Odyssey* 8.74 may be an exception, if the *tote* implies 'then' in contrast to 'now'.

Again, recognition through signs is not a rational process for Homer, but has a powerful affective component that demands personal experience. This suggests that the understanding of signs is not always a good model for the appreciation of poetry, since in Homer the correct enjoyment of poetry seems to depend precisely on not having direct personal experience of the events narrated.

Along these lines, I wonder whether the sign cannot serve as a figure for a written text and help explain why such a text might have been created. The writing on Bellerophon's tablet is a red herring in this context, for these signs are the wrong kind: they are akin to bird-omens, in which conventional rules of decoding allow the skilled user to extract a message about the future. Tombs and other durable signs, despite their fallibility, are powerful memory cues, and the recognition signs are strongest of all. Such signs are important stimulants of memory. The written form of a song, then, could be a monumental memory cue. By making a song an object, the poet does not seek to preserve a particular wording. Instead, the object evokes previous performances. It is a source of authority, even if it is never consulted, and a valuable prestige object.[24]

[24] S. Blackburn, *Singing of Birth and Death* (Philadelphia, 1988), 28, describes how a palm-leaf manuscript is present as a guarantor of authenticity during a performance of Tamil bow-song, even when it is not consulted.

CHAPTER SIX

DANCING THE ALPHABET: PERFORMATIVE LITERACY ON THE ATTIC STAGE

Niall W. Slater

Book 10 of Athenaeus preserves a curious collection of citations from Attic drama which deal with the alphabet and encounters by the illiterate with the alphabet. The most famous of these is the much-discussed *Alphabet Tragedy* (once cited as the *Alphabet Show*) of Callias. Recently Ralph Rosen has convincingly demonstrated that the *Alphabet Tragedy*, despite Athenaeus' confusing claims of its influence on Sophocles and Euripides, was an Old Comedy by the known late fifth- and early fourth-century comic poet Callias, not an otherwise unknown tragedian.[1] Pöhlmann suggests the most plausible theme: the *Alphabet Tragedy* satirized debates over Athens' official adoption of the Ionic alphabet in 403 BC.[2] The other elements in Athenaeus' collection include one mention of alphabetic letters in satyr play and three in tragedy. We thus have some evidence from all three dramatic genres for characters' engagement with the alphabet on stage. All the material taken together still does not give us a unified picture of literacy on the Attic stage, but these passages do allow us to outline the Greek imaginary of the alphabet in the later fifth and early fourth centuries. Now that Rosen has established that Callias is reacting to precedents in tragedy earlier in the fifth century, moreover, we can look for changes over time in audience reception of the stage picture of alphabetic literacy. While the evidence from Athenaeus cannot be translated straightforwardly into statistics for the frequency and degree of literacy in the Athenian population, these fragments are at least suggestive of a broadening of literacy over time.

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[1] Ralph Rosen, 'Comedy and Confusion in Callias' *Letter Tragedy*,' *CP* 94 (1999), 147–67. Jennifer Wise, *Dionysus Writes* (Ithaca, 1998), 15–17, takes the *Alphabet Tragedy* as the beginning of a fascinating discussion of literacy and drama, but relies on earlier treatments dating it to the 430s.

[2] E. Pöhlmann, 'Die *ABC-Komödie* des Kallias', *RhM* 114 (1971), 230–40.

The context of all of these passages in Athenaeus is a larger discussion of riddles. Riddles are an intentionally complicated form of symbolism; the fun lies in decoding them. For the illiterate, the alphabet itself is a riddle. Let us begin with the evidence from tragedy. Athenaeus cites three tragedians, Euripides, Agathon, and the fourth-century poet and rhetorician Theodectas, all of whom portray an illiterate character on stage. This character proceeds to describe the letters forming the name of Theseus in a way that allows his hearers, onstage and in the audience, to recognize the name, even though the speaker himself is not able to decode the symbols. The repetition of this motif over a period of several decades is remarkable. Although 'comic relief' at the expense of humble characters is not unknown in tragedy, we should beware of dismissing this motif simply as reinforcing the sense of superiority of city dwellers in the audience over their country-bred fellow citizens.[3] Athenaeus puts the passages together for us but unfortunately gives us virtually no context. The possible context is of considerable interest and yet has been very little discussed. The developments from one passage to the next are of interest for their own sake but also allow us to conjecture something about the literacy of the audience for which these dramas were performed.

The earliest of the three passages is likely to be that from Euripides' *Theseus* (fr. 382 N²):

> ἐγὼ πέφυκα γραμμάτων μὲν οὐκ ἴδρις,
> μορφὰς δὲ λέξω καὶ σαφῆ τεκμήρια.
> κύκλος τις ὡς τόρνοισιν ἐκμετρούμενος·
> οὗτος δ' ἔχει σημεῖον ἐν μέσῳ σαφές.
> τὸ δεύτερον δὲ πρῶτα μὲν γραμμαὶ δύο,
> ταύτας διείγρει δ' ἐν μέσαις ἄλλη μία.
> τρίτον δὲ βόστρυχος τις ὣς εἱλιγμένος,
> τὸ δ' αὖ τέταρτον ἡ μὲν εἰς ὀρθὸν μία,
> λοξαὶ δ' ἐπ' αὐτῆς τρεῖς κατεστηριγμέναι
> εἰσίν. τὸ πέμπτον δ' οὐκ ἐν εὐμαρεῖ φράσαι·
> γρμμαὶ γάρ εἰσιν ἐκ διεστώτων δύο,
> αὗται δὲ συντρέχουσιν εἰς μίαν βάσιν.
> τὸ λοίσθιον δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ προεμφερές.

[3] W.V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 109 n. 194, insists that Euripides' scene, discussed below, 'was not . . . a joke at the herdsman's expense; it would have been clumsy and un-Euripidean to mock a man at length for what was a common condition'.

> I'm not skilled in letters, but I'll tell their shapes and clear signs. There's a circle, as if measured out by compasses; this has a clear mark in the middle. The second letter has first two lines, and another one keeps them apart in the middle. The third is like a hair curl wound round, while the fourth, again, has one upright and three slanting lines propped against it. The fifth is not easy to explain: there are two lines set apart, but they run together into one support. The last letter is like the third.

The only context we have for this speech is one introductory sentence in Athenaeus 454b:

> βοτὴρ δ' ἐστιν ἀγράμματος αὐτόθι δηλῶν τοὔνομα τοῦ Θησέως ἐπιγεγραμμένον οὕτως.
>
> There is an unlettered herdsman in the play describing the name of Theseus written as follows.

W.V. Harris, apparently following T.B.L. Webster and Gilbert Murray,[4] suggests that the herdsman in Euripides is reading Theseus' name inscribed on his ship. *LSJ* cites a first-century BC inscription that refers to a ship's name as an *epigraphê*.[5] Yet this suggestion seems highly implausible, both within the world of myth and in light of historical evidence for names of ships.

I have been unable to find any named ship in Greek mythology apart from the Argo herself. A ship known as 'the ship of Theseus' was preserved in Athens down to the time of Demetrius of Phaleron,[6] but there is no name otherwise given for it—and certainly no indication that it was itself called the 'Theseus'. This ship's annual voyage to Delos delayed the execution of Socrates.[7] The names of the two Athenian state galleys, *Paralus* and *Salaminia*, are preserved at *Birds* 1204 and a number of places in Thucydides, but otherwise named ships are rare in literary sources, and I have been unable to

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[4] Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 109; cf. T.B.L. Webster, *The Tragedies of Euripides* (London, 1967), 106–7, citing also Murray's notion that Theseus' name was on the sail of his ship (a reference I owe to Joseph A. Smith). B. Gauly, L. Käppel, R. Klimek-Winter, H. Krasser, K.-H. Stanzel, and V. Uhrmeister, *Musa Tragica: Die griechische Tragödie von Thespis bis Ezechiel* (Göttingen, 1991), 283 n. 17, assume the herdsman is reading an 'Inschrift', but the passage in Euripides does not specify where the name appeared.

[5] *LSJ* s.v. 3: *OGIS* 447. On the other hand, most ships' names were probably *not* written on the ship: 'Daß der Name ausgeschrieben war, ist nicht anzunehmen' (F. Miltner, s.v. 'Seewesen [Namen]', *RE Supplement* 5 (1931), 946–56; at 946).

[6] Plut., *Theseus* 23.1; *RE Supplement* 13, 1103–5.

[7] Plato, *Phaedo* 58a–c.

find any attested names earlier than these in the late fifth century.

It is by no means clear to me that the Greeks named all their ships from early on. It is striking that the *Paralus* and *Salaminia* are the *only* ships that Thucydides names, even though he has many occasions to refer to other ships of the Athenian navy. Ships only need names when it is necessary to differentiate them from each other. In many cases an owner's or captain's name will have sufficed. Ian Worthington has suggested to me that Athenian warships in general may not have needed names until the days of shared trierarchies in the fourth century.[8] The two Athenian state galleys, however, *Paralus* and *Salaminia*, would have had shared commands and thus names already in the fifth century.

Many ships' names are recorded in epigraphical sources, and some patterns of naming are discernible there. F. Miltner's study of these makes two important points: 'es fehlt aber vollig die Gruppe von Namen nach bedeutenden Persönlichkeiten und in allgemeinen auch nach Schlachten . . . Wichtig ist . . . daß bei den Griechen noch ausschließlich weiblichen Namen in Verwendung stehen und daß die Namen der obersten Gottheiten vermieden sind'.[9] A historical ship named 'Theseus' is thus most unlikely. Ships named for the heroes of Greek myth in general are very rare indeed,[10] although things change somewhat by Roman times.[11]

[8] Worthington (pers. comm.). See his discussion of shared trierarchies in Ian Worthington, *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus. Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth-Century Athens* (Ann Arbor, 1992), *ad* 1.42.

[9] Miltner, 'Seewesen (Namen)'.

[10] The two most useful studies on the naming of Greek ships are Miltner, 'Seewesen (Namen)' and Lionel Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton, 1971, repr. Baltimore, 1995), 344–60 (with his n. 39, correcting some errors in Miltner). Miltner's citation of a ship named Ἀχιλλεύς is apparently in error (Casson, *Ships and Seamanship*, 350 n. 39), although the adjectival form Ἀχιλλεία appears as a ship's name, as well as six citations of a ship named Ἀσκληπιός (*IG* ii^2 1607, 66, etc.). On the other hand, at least one ship was named the Τραγῳδία (*IG* ii^2 1604, 20, 1611, 88).

[11] Here 'Ships were generally named after deities . . . The name and guardian deity might be the same . . . or different': Lionel Casson, *Ships and Seafaring in Ancient Times* (Austin, 1994), 110–11. The British Museum has an anchor inscribed ΖΕΥΣ ῞ΥΠΑΤΟΣ, presumably from a ship of this name (Cecil Torr, *Ancient Ships* [Chicago, 1964], 71–2, figs. 45–47), while a tomb painting at Ostia of the second or third century AD shows a ship labelled the 'Isis Geminiana'. We have epigraphical evidence for a ship named the 'Nile' around the middle of the first century AD (Torr, *Ancient Ships*, 66 n. 149): *Ti[berio] Claudio, Aug[usti] lib[erto], Eroti, trierarcho liburnae Nili.* It is unlikely that the names of any of these vessels were painted on them: Torr illustrates (fig. 25) a relief contemporary with the inscription just cited showing a

If not inscribed on a ship, then, where does the herdsman see the name of Theseus written? In other words, how did a fifth-century audience imagine literacy in the mythic past? We may prefer to imagine that past without writing, but the same audience that viewed the *Theseus* saw the *Hippolytus*, in which Theseus reads Phaedra's final message, written on the tablet.[12] The fact that the illiterate herdsman here describes *only* Theseus' name encourages me to think of an inscription on public view rather than a signature or isolated word in a letter. Intriguingly, Fragment 386 of the Euripidean *Theseus* does mention an *agalma*, but the fragment is so brief we can say little more than this.[13]

Why and for what on-stage audience does the herdsman work so hard to describe these letter forms? This speech has no point if the audience can see the written name; it must be a messenger speech describing something off stage. It therefore must convey information of interest or value to others in play. The fact that the herdsman describes the written name and not the figure of Theseus himself suggests to me at least that the two were somehow separated from each other. Could the written name be marking a dedication Theseus has left somewhere, marking his presence though he himself is now absent, or a representation of him, either painted or carved? An inscription on a victor's dedication of arms, such as a shield, might be a possibility.

Ruth Scodel has suggested to me that the herdsman might have seen Theseus' name written on an object in the warrior's possession, perhaps his famous sword, during a period in which Theseus wished to conceal his identity.[14] She imagines a rustic encounter, on the order of the later story of Theseus and Hecale. Theseus might then

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crocodile figure on the side of a ship's prow and suggests this ship was also named the 'Nile'. Most sailors would more easily have identified a ship by such a design than by an inscribed name. The racing ships in Virgil, *Aeneid* 5.114ff. are named Pristis, Chimaera, Centaurus, and Scylla (here too we imagine figureheads), but there is no known Greek epic precedent.

[12] *Hippolytus* 857–9: ἥδε δέλτος . . . ἐπιστολὰς / ἔγραψεν ἡ δύστηνος ('this tablet . . . did the unfortunate woman write a letter?').

[13] A. Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, with supplement by B. Snell (Hildesheim, 1964), 477, gives the meagre evidence that the *Theseus* was set on Crete, but this could well be wrong.

[14] Pers. comm. during the conference. Before opting for the idea of the name on the ship, Webster, *Tragedies of Euripides*, 106, initially suggested that Theseus' name may be inscribed on his sword, citing the recognition of Theseus by the sword he possesses in Euripides' lost *Aigeus*.

have given no name or a false name to the herdsman and trusted in the latter's illiteracy if he was even aware that the herdsman had seen his name in writing. The surviving passage would then come from a messenger speech in which the herdsman does nonetheless describe the letters, enlightening someone in power about the arrival of Theseus.

The problem with this appealing reconstruction for me is the lack of evidence for warriors writing their own names on weapons or armor. Homeric myth depicts individualized weapons and armor, instantly recognizable without inscriptions. Some shields of the title warriors in Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes* bear inscriptions, but none includes the owner's name.[15] I am aware of one red figure vase depicting a fallen warrior whose shield rim bears the inscription *Lacheas kalos.*[16] Given the general practice of writing *kalos*-inscriptions on vases, it is unclear whether the inscription is simply placed in a convenient space or is meant to be a realistic part of the scene,[17] but even if the latter, it depicts the shield owner's sentiment about a beloved; it is not an assertion of his ownership of the shield.

The second passage in Athenaeus comes from Agathon. The manuscripts attribute it to a play called *Telephus*, although the title *Tlepolemus* has also been suggested.[18] The introduction here is even briefer (Athenaeus 454d):

[15] Capaneus' shield bears the inscription 'I shall burn the city', Πρήσω πόλιν (Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes* 434) in letters of gold. The shield of Eteocles also bore an inscription, but it is reported only in indirect discourse: 'nor would Ares cast him down from the ramparts' (οὐδ' ἂν Ἄρης σφ' ἐκβάλοι πυργωμάτων, 469).

[16] Red figure kalyx krater (Boston 97.368) of the Tyszkiewicz Painter, J.D. Beazley, *Attic Red-figure Vase-Painters*^{2} (Oxford, 1963), 290, 1.

[17] In general, see Niall W. Slater, 'The Vase as Ventriloquist: *Kalos*-inscriptions and the Culture of Fame', in E.A. Mackay (ed.), *Signs of Orality: The Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World* (Leiden, 1999), 143–61, pl. 16 and François Lissarrague, 'Publicity and Performance: *Kalos* Inscriptions in Attic Vase-painting', in Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne (eds.), *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy* (Cambridge, 1999), 359–73. Lissarrague illustrates and discusses (369–70, fig. 9) a cup of the Antiphon Painter (Beazley, *Attic Red-figure Vase-Painters*^{2} 336, 14), showing an athlete with a *kalos*-inscription on his thigh; despite the existence of statues with inscriptions on the thigh, it seems clear that the athlete here is meant to be living, not a statue, yet this does not deter the painter from placing the inscription in this visual space.

[18] See the Loeb Classical Library edition of Athenaeus. Gauly et al., *Musa Tragica*, make no mention of the other title.

ἀγράμματος γάρ τις κἀνταῦθα δηλοῖ τὴν τοῦ Θησέως ἐπιγραφὴν οὕτως.

An unlettered person here describes the writing of Theseus as follows.

In Agathon therefore we know nothing of the illiterate's social status, but the language suggests somewhat wider experience than a herdsman (fr. 4 Snell):[19]

γραφῆς ὁ πρῶτος ἦν μεσόμφαλος κύκλος·
ὀρθοί τε κανόνες ἐζυγομένοι δύο,
Σκυθικῷ τε τόξῳ τὸ τρίτον ἦν προσεμφερές.
ἔπειτα τριόδους πλάγιος ἦν προσκείμενος·
ἐφ' ἑνός τε κανόνος ἦσαν ὕπτιοι δύο.
ὅπερ δὲ τρίτον ἦν καὶ τελευταῖον πάλιν.

The first part of the writing was a circle with a navel in the middle; then two upright rules yoked together, and the third resembled a Scythian bow. Then nearby lay a trident on its side; then mounted on one bar were two slanting lines. And the last again was just what the third was.

This speaker knows what a Scythian bow looks like and twice uses the rather technical word κανών.[20] Agathon compresses his description, using precisely one line for each letter described, which implies a swifter recognition on the part of the audience. It seems highly likely that Agathon expects his audience to remember the Euripidean precedent. The suspicion lies near to hand that Agathon is showing off, attempting to better a quite recent production of Euripides.

It is very tempting to speculate about the context for such a passage in a play called *Telephus*. While we cannot be sure that his play treated the same plot events, Agathon here takes up the subject of one of Euripides' most notorious plays. Thanks to Aristophanes' merciless jokes, we all know that Telephus disguised himself as a beggar to infiltrate the Greek camp. Thus the one character we know to have appeared to be of low social status in the play is the title character himself. It would be a particularly delicious Agathonian

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[19] A. Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, with supplement by B. Snell (Hildesheim, 1964).

[20] See *LSJ*. It is used of staves strengthening a shield in Homer, *Iliad* 13.407 and of a weaver's 'heddle bar', *Iliad* 23.671; for this piece of weaving equipment, see the discussion in E.J.W. Barber, *Prehistoric Textiles: The Development of Cloth in the Neolithic and Bronze Ages* (Princeton, 1991), 110–12 and figs. 3.27 and 12.3 (a reference I owe to the kindness of Peter M. Smith). Numerous fifth-century uses, however, are already metaphorical even before Polycleitus creates his famous 'Canon'.

irony if he portrayed the disguised Telephus pretending to be illiterate—and describing the name of Theseus in language that played with another well known Euripidean passage.[21] In any case, Theseus should be a figure from the past to the generation of Trojan War heroes, and his name might well be described as it appears on a monument or artistic representation of the hero.

The fourth-century poet Theodectas produces a pastiche indebted to both his predecessors, but much more heavily to Agathon (fr. 6 Snell, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*):

γραφῆς ὁ πρῶτος ἦν μεσόφθαλμος κύκλος.
ἔπειτα δισσοὶ κανόνες ἰσόμετριοι πάνυ·
τούτους δὲ πλάγιος διαμέτρου συνδεῖ κανών.
τρίτον δ' ἑλικτῷ βοστρύχῳ προσεμφερές.
ἔπειτα τριόδους πλάγιος ὡς ἐφαίνετο,
πέμπται δ' ἄνωθεν ἰσόμετριοι ῥάβδοι δύο,
αὗται δὲ συντείνουσιν εἰς βάσιν μίαν.
ἕκτον δ' ὅπερ καὶ πρόσθεν εἶπον βοστρύχος.

The first part of the writing was a circle with an eye in the middle. Then, two rules of quite equal measure; a sideways rule ties these together clear in the middle. The third is like a hair curl wound round. The next looked like a trident on its side, and two rods of equal length above make the fifth, and these extend together into one support. The sixth was just what I said before, a curl.

Theodectas' first line quotes Agathon but attempts to top him by substituting μεσόφθαλμος for μεσόμφαλμος. He borrows the image of the 'canon' and the 'trident on its side' as well, but takes the 'curl' for the sigma from Euripides. Athenaeus 454d–e specifically tells us that Theodectas' character is again an 'illiterate rustic' (ἄγροικον τινα ἀγράμματον), so perhaps the 'Scythian bow' sounded out of character on his lips.

The natural assumption is that the dramatic situations in Euripides and Theodectas are the same, although Athenaeus does not tell us the name of Theodectas' tragedy. We must be more cautious in the case of Agathon's plot. What seems remarkable is that the same motif remained of interest to the audience after so many years. Many must still have been familiar with fellow citizens so illiterate that they could not even recognize and name single letters.

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[21] The ironies would be extreme if Theseus were also a disguised hero, in accord with Ruth Scodel's suggestion above!

We may have wrung nearly all we can from these three passages, but permit me one final speculation. While we are obviously at the mercy of Athenaeus for the survival of these texts at all, it may be worth asking why all three deal with recognizing the name of Theseus. We recall that the larger context in Athenaeus is a discussion of riddles. If any other dramatists had played with the notion of names being recognized by descriptions of their letters, we might expect to hear of it here—but we do not.[22] Apparently, only the local Athenian hero Theseus merited this treatment. Could this relate to the fact that the iconography of Theseus was still developing in the fifth century and an ability to recognize his name as a label on monuments (either sculpture or paintings) was desirable? Tragedy taught the audience, sometimes quite literally. Many Athenians presumably had no more than the so-called 'phonetic literacy', which would allow them to recognize the name of their tribe posted on the call-up lists on the monument of the eponymous heroes.[23] The passage in Euripides might add one more recognizable name to their repertoire.

Let us turn to the evidence of satyr play. Athenaeus' briefest mention is of the Sophoclean *Amphiaraus*, where a character 'danc[es] the letters' (fr. 121 Radt).[24] Eight other fragments of this play survive, more than one citing it as a satyr play,[25] but nothing clarifies the identity of this character or why he might be dancing the letters. The leader of the satyr chorus seems a plausible candidate, as the

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[22] Actually, Athenaeus records elsewhere one more example of a character spelling out an inscribed name, but it is not a riddle. A fragment of a satyr play by Achaeus, a tragedian contemporary with Euripides, shows us a satyr reading the name of Dionysus written on a cup (fr. 33 Snell, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* = Athenaeus 7.277b). Elsewhere Athenaeus (10.451c) describes the style of Achaeus as 'riddling' (αἰνιγματόδως), but the satyr in Fragment 33 knows his letters at least: he reads out one by one the letters forming the name ΔΙΟΝΥΣΟ in the genitive, inscribed on the cup (τό τ' οὖ is a single letter, so it must be Attic O standing for OY). Achaeus may have been particularly interested in literacy: he also wrote a *Linus* about the centaur who taught Heracles and is often credited with introducing the Phoenician alphabet; I am grateful to Johan Schloemann for the latter reference.

[23] P. Saenger's term, followed by R. Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, 1992), 9. See the picture of a man reading a call-up list in Aristophanes *Peace* 1183–4; cf. Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 34–5 on 'second-hand literacy'.

[24] S. Radt, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 4: *Sophocles* (Göttingen, 1977); Athenaeus 10.454f: 'and Sophocles wrote something similar to this in his satyr play *Amphiaraus*, bringing on one dancing the letters' (καὶ Σοφοκλῆς δὲ τούτῳ παραπλήσιον ἐποίσεν ἐν 'Αμφιαράῳ σατυρικῷ τὰ γράμματα παράγων ὀρχούμενον).

[25] Radt, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 4, *ad loc.*, raises the possibility that there were two Sophoclean plays of this title, one tragic, the other satyric, but most fragments seem to be from the satyr play.

satyrs are the most likely illiterates in the play and the most likely to try to convey meaning through dance rather than words. Unfortunately we cannot date the *Amphiaraus* within Sophocles' career. A possible argument from silence, though it is no more than that, is the inference that the audience knew what letters were being danced before the performer began; otherwise, Athenaeus would point the parallel to the name of Theseus in Euripides. Even so, the episode implies fairly widespread alphabetic literacy for the audience to find this humorous.

We return now to Callias' *Alphabet Tragedy*. The chorus was composed of the 24 letters of the new Ionic alphabet, introduced in the prologue (Athenaeus 453c–d [= text of Callias test. 7 K-A.]). This prologue section can be restored as verse. Later the chorus danced out syllabic two-letter combinations of consonants and vowels, as described in Athenaeus but without, apparently, quoting the accompanying verses themselves. Callias' syllabic chorus then implies at least some public recognition of units for the analysis of words larger than the individual letter.

Finally, Athenaeus 454a specifically refers to an obscene joke based on the combination of the letters *psi* and *omega*, and somewhere near this syllabic chorus is the obvious place for the joke:

> δεδήλωκε δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἰαμβείων γράμμα πρῶτος οὗτος ἀκολαστότερον μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, πεφρασμένον δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·
> κυῶ γὰρ, ὦ γυναῖκες. ἀλλ' αἰδοῖ, φίλαι,
> ἐν γράμμασι σφῷν τοὔνομ' ἐξερῶ βρέφους.
> ὀρθὴ μακρὰ γραμμή 'στιν· ἐκ δ' αὐτῆς μέσης
> μικρὰ παρεστῶσ' ἑκατέρωθεν ὑπτία.
> ἔπειτα κύκλος πόδας ἔχων βραχεῖς δύο.

Callias is the first to describe a letter in iambic verse, a letter vulgar in meaning and phrased in this way:

> For I am pregnant, ladies, yet through my modesty, my dears, I will tell you the name of the babe by means of letters. There is a long straight stroke; at the middle of it, on each side, stands a small reclining stroke. Next comes a circle having two short feet.[26]

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[26] Translation: C.B. Gulick, Loeb Classical Library edition of Athenaeus. *LSJ* detects a sexual symbolism in these 'feet', referring (s.v. πούς II) to the related word ποδεών, II. 1, the ragged ends of animal skins where the feet have been. The context is the oracle given by the Pythia to King Aigeus, warning him not to have sex until he returned to Athens. His failure to obey resulted in the birth of Theseus.

The two letters are clearly *psi* and *omega*, which must be the first letters of the word the speaker is too modest to mention. Brozek noted that both of these letters were part of the new Ionic alphabet, and Pöhlmann then suggested that they might represent the speaker's 'illegitimate' Ionic child.[27] Various completions of the word have been suggested.[28] A number of them are words for a penis with retracted foreskin, including the variants ψωλή, ψωλός, and ψώλων.[29] As Svenbro notes, 'these two letters have a pictographic character that could well be exploited for obscene purposes'.[30] A superimposition of the two letters forms [see Figure] suggests the point.

I argue that the form ψωλή is the likeliest. If the syllabic chorus sang and danced its way through every combination of consonant with vowel, as Svenbro points out, the *psi-omega* combination would have been the very last in the series. While we cannot reconstruct it in detail, the choreography must have involved pairs of dancers in the chorus forming the syllabic combinations. The dance would

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Two variant versions of the oracle survive. Plutarch, *Theseus* 3.3 says: ἀσκοῦ τὸν προὔχοντα πόδαονα . . . μὴ λύσῃς ('do not loose the wineskin's protruding foot'). Apollodorus 3.15.6 preserves the *lectio difficilior*: ἀσκοῦ τὸν προὔχοντα ποδά . . . μὴ λύσῃς ('do not loose the wineskin's protruding foote'). The problem is that the omega has *two* short feet; the image should be testicular rather than phallic. I have not, however, found any explicit use of the metaphor of feet for testicles elsewhere in Greek. For πούς as a phallic image in Greek comedy, see Jeffrey Henderson, *The Maculate Muse* (New Haven, 1975), s.v. See also below, n. 30.

27 M. Brozek, *De Calliae 'tragoedia grammatika'* (Krakow, 1939), 29; Pöhlmann, 'Die *ABC-Komödie*,' 327–8.

28 Starting with Daléchamp in 1583, who proposed ψωά.

29 Rosen, 'Comedy and Confusion', 156 n. 20. The unattributed cup Villa Guilia 50404 (Beazley, *Attic Red-figure Vase-Painters*² 1565), illustrated in L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin, 1877), pl. 4, 1, shows a large standing phallus, inscribed ΚΑΛΗ. Martin Kilmer, who kindly called my attention to this vase, reports the suggestion of Eric Csapo that this feminine form might be meant to be understood with ψωλή (*Greek Erotica* [London, 1993], 217 and his illustration R607). The inscription ΨΟΛΩΝ appears on a bell crater (Beazley, *Attic Red-figure Vase-Painters*² 1607), which H.A. Shapiro, 'Kalos-inscriptions with Patronymic', *ZPE* 68 (1987), 117 n. 37, takes this to be a satyr name. A satyr named ΦΣΟΛΑΣ (for Ψωλάς) appears on an aryballos: J.D. Beazley, *Attic Black-figure Vase-Painters* (Oxford, 1956, repr. New York, 1978), 83.4.

30 Jesper Svenbro, *Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca, 1993), 185. The phallic character of the capital Ψ is clear: the side bars can be read as the retracted foreskin around the glans. The pictographic character of the Ω is less clear. Ralph Rosen has suggested to me (pers. comm.) that it may represent the cavity into which the capital Ψ threatens to insert itself; he aptly compares the comic cutout figures representing a rear view of a person bending over which sometimes appear in gardens and flowerbeds today. Such an image also gives meaning to the 'feet' of the Ω noted by the speaker in Callias.

have given the seven vowels a serious workout and would have established a visual expectation of pairs. The word could then be formed as the climax of the dance by a pair of pairs, *psi-omega* and *lamda-eta*. We will have seen *lamda* and *eta* dance together before, about halfway through the chorus. Other variants are five letters long. Best of all, the word ψωλή incorporates three of the new Ionic letters: *eta* is also an addition in 403.

Athenaeus testifies to the fact that the chorus members were represented as women. Like the chorus of *Clouds*, therefore, we should imagine them dressed in female costumes. This would not exclude the possibility that the chorus members were wearing the phallus underneath those robes. Until the so-called Getty birds vase turned up, we had no clear evidence that comic choristers were ever represented as ithyphallic. Now, whether one accepts Richard Green's identification of the Getty vase as Aristophanes' *Birds* or sees it as an otherwise unknown comedy with a theriomorphic chorus, we do have late fifth or very early fourth century evidence for ithyphallic choristers.[31] I suspect that the syllabic chorus of Callias' *Letter Tragedy* ended with these four choristers 'flashing' the audience.[32]

We have come a long way from Theseus. Athenaeus' collection of 'performances' of the alphabet implies widespread minimal alphabetic literacy in the audience by the last quarter of the fifth century. More than that, Callias' chorus demands at least some public recognition of syllabic units for the analysis of words—even if they turn out to be four-letter words.

Additional Note

After this article was accepted for publication, I learned of a major new work on the *Alphabet Tragedy*: C.J. Ruijgh, 'Le *Spectacle des lettres*,

[31] J.R. Green, 'A Representation of the *Birds* of Aristophanes', *Greek Vases in the J. Paul Getty Museum* 2 (Malibu, 1985), 95–118. Oliver Taplin, 'Phallology, *Phlyakes*, Iconography and Aristophanes', *PCPhS* 33 (1987), 92–104, argued for these figures as the two Logoi of *Clouds*, although he has seemed less certain recently, and the strong resemblance of the two bird figures to each other as they dance around the flute player does suggest choristers rather than actors on the stage.

[32] I suspect an even more complex visual joke here, though it may be subliminal. The gesture of a female figure lifting her skirt to display the genitals is called 'anasyrma' and is attested by later Aphrodite and Isis representations. Here of course the gesture changes the gender identity of the chorus members, metatheatrically revealing them to be 'really' male.

comédie de Callias', *Mnemosyne* 54 (2001), 261–339. I am most grateful to Prof. Ruijgh and the *Mnemosyne* editorial board for sharing a copy of this article with me in advance of its publication. Professor Ruijgh accepts the view that the *Alphabet Tragedy* was an Old Comedy, by the known comic poet Callias, but dates it c. 435, accepting at face value the statement in Athenaeus that "some" thought it had influenced Euripides' *Medea.* A brief note cannot even outline the numerous textual and metrical arguments he musters in support of his case, but the whole chronological question ultimately turns on whether Clearchus' anonymous sources are sound witnesses for literary history and are accurately reported. Rosen's explanation, while speculative, does accord with other misreadings of comic exaggeration by later scholars removed from the Athenian setting. Doubtless the chronological debate will continue.

PART TWO

RHETORIC AND SOCIETY

CHAPTER SEVEN

ENTERTAINMENT AND DEMOCRATIC DISTRUST: THE AUDIENCE'S ATTITUDES TOWARDS ORAL AND WRITTEN ORATORY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

Johan Schloemann

In the television broadcasts of our time, written texts play a strange role. Although they are hardly visible anywhere, a great part of what is said on television, especially in news programs, is based upon more or less carefully prepared texts, written by news agencies or by the television station's editorial staff. The reason why we in most cases cannot see the presenter read his text from a piece of paper is a machine called a teleprompter, or Autocue, an electronic device that projects the text on the camera lens at an adjusted speed and thus causes the illusion that the viewers are addressed directly, without the help of a manuscript.[1] This technique is obviously used because the (seemingly) direct eye contact with the viewers makes the appearance more personal and more immediate, and less bureaucratic. If the person who speaks to us does not rely on something written—or if we think that he does not, which in a rhetorical circumstance like this is the same thing, at least from the viewer's or listener's perspective—then the truth or plausibility of what he says is far more connected with his trustworthiness as a person than it is the case when we actually see him read. So in the case of television, one seeks to evoke the illusion that the speaker does not use a prepared text, even though he does. And interestingly, this illusion of spontaneity always works, at least to a certain extent. If we gave it a thought, we would, of course, not assume that the television speaker has personally internalized the details of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea or the exact results of the basketball play-offs. But if we

[1] See for example W. Holly, 'Fernsehrhetorik', *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* 3 (1996), 243–57 and 246–9, J. Schloemann, 'Für Dagmar Berghoffs Erben sei die freie Rede Silber, das Ablesen ist Gold', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27th June, 2000, 64.

accept the role of a more or less passive listener—and that is what we do in most cases—it is not the *actual* involvement of the speaker that counts, but the pretence of it, which is provided by the teleprompter in quite an effective way.

In a more traditional rhetorical setting, with the speaker and the audience being physically present in the same place, the situation is quite similar. If we set aside the special case that the speaker uses a teleprompting machine even there—which is done by prominent politicians, for instance in presidential campaigns—and if the speech is not improvised but prepared, the normal practice is to read out a paper. Although the audience accepts this in a literate (or still fairly literate) culture like ours, there is still, at least if the speech is well done, the impression or illusion of a personal and immediate communication that distinguishes a 'speech' situation from a 'reading' or 'lecture'. This distinction, however, is purely founded upon the reception on the audience's side in the particular speech situation; it depends on how determinant and important the written manuscript is *felt* to be for the speaker's presentation. For the speaker himself, the technical procedure of reading it out is the same in both circumstances. But the more the institutional context moves away from an academic or professional gathering, the more the listeners expect the person to be more present and visible than the paper. This is aptly demonstrated by the importance of lecterns in the architectural organization of parliaments and churches, for example: this device serves to give oratory its spatial *mise en scène*, but at the same time its function is to conceal the speech's written origin. And the more eye contact the orator manages to have with the audience while reading, the more convincing his appearance. In short, even in the present Western culture, where writing is fundamental to many aspects of life, a rhetorical audience needs to be given at least the illusion that the speaker is personally involved and does not depend solely on a prepared text, even if he does just that.

In classical antiquity, the relationship between writing and oratory was even more complex.[2] In democratic Athens—and although my

[2] In general, see F. Desbordes, *La rhétorique antique. L'art de persuader* (Paris, 1996), 38–44. For a fuller treatment of some of the points discussed in this chapter, and for more bibliographical details, I refer to my forthcoming Ph.D. thesis 'Freie Rede. Rhetorik im demokratischen Athen zwischen Schriftlichkeit und Improvisation' (Humboldt Universität, Berlin).

focus here is on that period, this point can also be made for the whole of antiquity—it was neither usual nor desirable for the political or forensic orator to bring a manuscript with him and read it out in front of the audience. Generally speaking, the evidence for this rule consists in the largely oral nature of ancient political and legal procedure (which has in recent years been pointed out by several scholars),[3] in the inconvenience of ancient reading methods (which required the use of two hands and a rather close and concentrated inspection of the text), in the apparent absence of lecterns in the sphere of public gatherings, in the eminent relevance of gesticulation in ancient rhetoric (for which, naturally, the hands were needed), and finally, and perhaps most importantly, in the fact that memorization and mnemotechnics (*memoria, mnêmê*) were one of the five canonized stages of the ancient orator's working process.

More specifically, in Athens there are various indications that after one had begun to prepare speeches by writing them down sometime in the second half of the fifth century BC,[4] learning them by heart before delivery was thought of as being not just commendable, but necessary. Firstly, the learning by heart of prose texts seems to have been an important part of the pedagogical program of the sophists.[5] This tendency is shown by a famous passage at the end of Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* (183b), where the handing out of model texts is said to have been the method of Gorgias, by the introduction of Plato's *Phaedrus*, and by the case of Hippias, who is reported to have developed an effective method of mnemotechnics.[6] This sophistical stress on memory can surely be seen as a reaction to the practical requirements of public oratory. Secondly, we have two passages in Aristophanes suggesting that the preparation of a speech

[3] For instance by Michael Gagarin, 'The Orality of Greek Oratory', in E.A. Mackay (ed.), *Signs of Orality. The Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World* (Leiden, 1999), 163–80, and 'Writing and the Orality of Greek Law' (unpublished paper).

[4] M. Gagarin, 'Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rhetoric', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion. Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London, 1994), 59–60, M.J. Edwards, 'Antiphon and the Beginnings of Athenian Literary Oratory', *Rhetorica* (forthcoming). The exact date of, and the person responsible for, that innovation are not relevant to my present purposes.

[5] See M. Erler, *Der Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen Platons* (Berlin and New York, 1987), 71–6.

[6] Plato, *Hippias minor* 368d, *Hippias maior* 285e, Xenophon, *Symposium* 4.62 (L. Radermacher, *Artium Scriptores* [Vienna, 1951], B XI 14).

was inseparably connected with its memorization. In the *Knights* (347–9), an apparently written speech is rehearsed all night long: 'I suppose you gave a good speech in a piffling little case against an alien immigrant, after muttering it over all night, repeating it to yourself in the streets, drinking water, rehearsing to an audience (*epideiknys*) and exasperating your friends' (trans. A.H. Sommerstein). And, when Strepsiades in the *Clouds* is eager to learn about rhetoric in order to speak successfully in court, the first requirement he is asked for by Socrates is a good memory (*ei mnêmonikos ei*, 483; cf. Aeschines 2.43: *deinos eipein kai mnêmonikos*). Thirdly, one of the arguments that Gorgias' pupil Alcidamas employs in his criticism of the use of written speeches is that the memorization of a speech is troublesome, and forgetting parts of it during delivery is extremely embarrassing (*De sophistis* 18–21). When you chose to prepare your speech in writing, he says (18), then you must remember the exact wording—what Thucydides (1.22.1) calls *tên akribeian tôn lechthentôn*—of the memorized text: '. . . in written speeches you must necessarily learn and remember very precisely (*poieisthai tên mnêmen kai tên mathesin akribê*) the words and even the syllables' (trans. M. Gagarin). In another passage (*De sophistis* 11), it becomes also clear that learning by heart is the necessary consequence of writing a speech down (*syntheson kai mathesomenos logon*). Here *syntithenai* ('composition') is followed by *manthanein* ('memorization') in the same automatic order as *elocutio* is followed by *memoria* in later rhetorical theory.

This evidence suffices, I think, to demonstrate that the use of a manuscript during the actual delivery of a speech was not only avoided in most cases (or avoided by the most professional orators, whereas the more inexperienced speakers would be tolerated to have a text with them from time to time—as some scholars have assumed),[7] but that a public speaker with a written text in his hand was an entirely unthinkable concept in the Athenian democracy. This necessity of learning by heart, if you had written, or had let somebody write, your speech in the first place, is closely connected with a suspicion against an intellectual specialisation and expertise that was associated with the use of books and writing. I will go into that shortly, but first I want to point out the difference between the

[7] So S. Usher, 'Lysias and his Clients', *GRBS* 17 (1976), 36 with n. 18, followed by E. Hall, 'Lawcourt Dramas: The Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory', *BICS* 40 (1995), 47.

Athenian rhetorical practice and the modern situation outlined above, where the speaker, even if he, as I explained, will try to conceal it as well as he can, can actually read from a piece of paper. The difference lies not only in the practical consequences for the speaker himself and his methods of preparation and presentation, but to a large extent also in the audience's perception of the rhetorical performance. Public oratory in Athens was a visibly textless sphere. If you watched a court trial, this was demonstrated by a significant contrast: you could see an usher, a public servant who was reading out relevant evidence such as laws and, in the fourth century, also written testimonies of witnesses, and at the same time, you could see the orator himself with his hands free in a more than literal sense—a man using his freedom of speech, and not a bureaucrat fiddling with written documents. And, unlike a modern audience, the members of an Athenian jury or of the democratic Assembly could not establish directly, that is, from whether a manuscript was present or not, whether the orator was prepared beforehand or not; the level of anticipation and preparation could only be perceived or conjectured from the orally delivered speech itself. This means that the opposition was not between reading off in a lively and convincing and reading off in a boring and bureaucratic way, but between oral speech prepared in writing and oral speech delivered extemporaneously, or, in the words of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (36.37), between *gegrammena legein* and *agrapha legein* (cf. Alcidamas, *De Sophistis* 24–5).

Thus there was no alternative to the oral mode of delivery. Before methodical, text-based rhetorical instruction and the written composition of whole speeches began in the fifth century, this would not cause any major problems. Although a sort of tension between preparation and improvisation, between what is premeditated and what is fully extemporized, might exist even in an oral society, it has virtually no consequences for the appearance of the orator, because the improvised character of his formulations is so dominant. So if a speaker such as Themistocles was felt to be an impressive orator, the audience would not suspect any special technical preparation behind that ability, but would simply see him as somebody who is more capable and more experienced in this field than others.

But when prose speeches began being composed in writing sometime around the year 430, things changed. This innovation was surely introduced as a measure to make a stressful and potentially dangerous situation, an appearance before the large, demanding and

intimidating audience of the Athenian democracy, more controllable. The quick emergence of professional speech-writers shows that there was a considerable demand for the service offered by them, and that the technique of written preparation was viewed by those engaged in law-suits and in political affairs as a positive instrument to handle the imponderable of an encounter with the institutions representing the democratic majority. But what seemed to be a solution of problems soon created new ones. For this, Alcidamas' essay *On the sophists* is eloquent evidence. Apart from the more technical difficulties that Alcidamas names—the unproportionally high effort that the memorization and remembering of a speech means, the inflexibility of a memorized speech in contexts where new questions are brought up by the momentary situation, and the danger to lose the thread and forget the prepared text—it is obvious that the new written basis of what was said in front of the audience also altered the overall design and appearance of the speeches that were delivered. So, one might say, not only did the democratic institutions and their mass audiences prompt the increased production of written speeches, but the new employment of written oratory on its part also changed the character of the utterances that formed the essence of the meetings of the democratic institutions. And the audience undoubtedly became aware of that change very quickly. The people must have felt that the speeches which were learnt by heart from an elaborated text sounded quite different from the improvised speeches they had listened to in earlier years and that they still could hear from those citizens who were not able or willing to deliver a memorized written speech. Thus, what I have called the tension between preparation and improvisation not only became a more or less technical problem for the production of texts and for the individual speaker, but became conspicuous for all listeners in the rhetorical situation, as some speeches seemed far more prepared and elaborate than others. Even if writing and written speeches were not visible for the audience in a physical sense, the impact of writing could become visible indirectly through the general character and the stylistic nature of the speeches. I will not go into the vexed question here of what distinguishes 'oral style' from 'written style', and I am well aware that seemingly simple or improvised language can nonetheless be a product of writing,[8] but still I think we can safely

[8] On 'gespielte Mündlichkeit' (a term coined by R. Harder, 'Bemerkungen zur

assume that in general the Athenian audience could feel a difference between a speech completely learned by heart and a speech completely extemporized.

The reason why this perception could cause a problem for the orator is the well-known phenomenon that the democratic majority was suspicious of specialization and intellectual experts, an attitude which focused especially on the so-called 'sophists'.[9] There is ample evidence, and it has been shown by several scholars, that the sophists made intense use of the possibilities of the written medium, and that they were associated by the public with this sort of activity.[10] As a short reminder of this, it is surely sufficient to name the passage in the *Phaedrus* (257d), where it is said that politicians do not publish books in fear of being called sophists, and a passage in Demosthenes (19.246) where speech-writing and sophistry are connected (cf. Isocrates 5.29). Equally familiar is a consequence of this suspicion of sophistry for the public speakers' self-presentation, in which one had to avoid any impression of a special rhetorical and intellectual training that was not available to the majority. Basically, this form of self-presentation amounts to the assertion that the opponent is a good orator but a bad person, whereas the speaker himself is a bad orator, but a good man.[11] The inexperience that the speakers in Attic oratory regularly claim to have is supposed to make them a part of the democratic community in which the success of a speech should ideally not depend on an eloquence achieved through a special technical training, but on the justness of their cause. In contrast, the opponent is portrayed

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griechischen Schriftlichkeit', *Antike* 19 [1943], 102) see for example Alcidamas, *De sophistis* 13, Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.2, with Desbordes, *Rhétorique antique*, 40–1.

[9] On this see M. Lavency, *Aspects de la logographie judiciaire attique* (Louvain, 1964), 106–9, J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton, 1989), 169–74.

[10] See, for instance, R. Pfeiffer, *Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie. Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Hellenismus*[2] (Munich, 1978), 49–52, Erler, *Sinn der Aporien*, 55–6 and 71–7, N. O'Sullivan, 'Written and Spoken in the First Sophistic', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Voice into Text. Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece* (Leiden, 1996), 115–21. I see no substance in the claim of T.J. Morgan, 'Literate Education in Classical Athens', *CQ*[2] 49 (1999), 46–61, that there is 'no explicit reference to texts being used for teaching' (p. 60) and that 'we have no indication whether sophists used the texts they wrote for teaching' (p. 60 n. 49). What about Isocrates 13.17–8 or Plato, *Phaedrus* 227b–8e (where Lysias' lecture is called a *diatribê*)?

[11] Cf., among many others, A. Hellwig, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Göttingen, 1973), 292–3; J. Hesk, 'The Rhetoric of Anti-Rhetoric in Athenian Oratory', in S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (eds.), *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy* (Cambridge, 1999), 201–30. On the democratic idea that lies behind this sort of assertions see [Xenophon], *Athenian Constitution* 1.7.

as a manipulator who uses rhetoric to ruin justice or the city. This simple strategy, which nevertheless is part of a complex system of democratic ideology, is not only found in the extant speeches, but also recommended in rhetorical theory; for example, in the Doric rhetorical treatise *Anonymus peri megaloprepeias* (not dated with certainty, but probably from the fourth century), which says that 'the people accept those who are like them' (*hoi gar polloi tês homoiôs apodechontai*),[12] and in Aristotle, who says (*Rhetoric* 3.17) that 'for him who wants to be seen as reasonable it is more fitting to seem like a fine fellow himself than for the speech to seem accurate', and elsewhere (2.22) that 'in front of the crowds, the uneducated are more convincing than the educated'.

Now this ideal of amateurism, of the *idiôtes*, and the corresponding suspicion of special rhetorical ability, was certainly connected with the consequences the new technique of learning written speeches by heart had on the audience's perception of the orators. The people had surely realised that, compared to others, some speeches had taken on a more 'written' character and showed a refinement in style or argumentation which they could easily trace back to the written preparation of the speech anticipating the actual delivery. To their mind, the orator had tried to transfer the responsibility for his success to a specialist context which was not accessible or controllable for the decision-making public, and had moved it outside the sphere of the *kairos* in which the proceedings were to take place.[13] To use a written speech was, so to say, a violation of the unity of time and place in which the legitimate gatherings of the democratic institutions were held. In Alcidamas' essay, we have plenty of evidence that the carefulness of a speech's language, the *akribeia*, was associated by the audience with its written character and thus a cause of disapproval (*phthonos*). Alcidamas says (12): '[when written speeches] appear to be constructed and composed with much preparation, they fill the minds of the listeners with distrust and resentment'. The word for 'preparation' used here, *paraskeuê*, is used as a negative catchword elsewhere.[14] And there is another telling passage in the *Rhetorica*

[12] Radermacher, *Artium Scriptores* D IV 3–4.

[13] See the important paper of S. Gastaldi, 'La retorica del IV secolo tra oralità e scrittura: Sugli scrittori di discorsi di Alcidamante', *QS* 7 (1981), 189–225.

[14] See for example S. Halliwell, 'Between Public and Private: Tragedy and Athenian Experience of Rhetoric', in C. Pelling (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and the Historian* (Oxford, 1997), 124 and M. Christ, *The Litigious Athenian* (Baltimore, 1988), 38–9.

ad Alexandrum (36.37) showing that the use of writing in the preparation of a speech was a point you could make against your opponent and thus something of which the audience was fully aware.

Thus, there was a clear disapproval of the special rhetorical ability that a polished speech, which had evidently been produced with the help of writing, showed. The orators who used the new technique of writing speeches down before delivery, or some of them, appear to have been not very good at concealing their preparation; their speeches were so different that the anticipation in writing was very conspicuously lurking behind their oral delivery, and this made no favourable impression upon a democratic audience, where the idea of the simple and honest citizen had created what has been called an 'ideology of improvisation'.[15]

However, this was not the only approach the Athenian public had towards oratory. Public speeches were also seen as a form of entertainment; the audience expected a clever argumentation and an aesthetically satisfying form of presentation. Throughout antiquity, prose speeches were looked at from an aesthetic perspective which has seemed odd to some modern interpreters. Moreover, we have many sources from the fifth and fourth centuries confirming that the democratic audiences expected the orators to deliver a good show, of which it is enough to name the two most famous, Cleon's speech in Thucydides (3.47–50) and Plato's attack on rhetoric, which shows that he was not at all pleased by this sort of public entertainment. As examples showing that this approach was not only about the content of exiting personal or political conflicts, but also about the artful quality of the speech's *style*, one can mention the admiration Gorgias is said to have provoked by his highly artificial prose-style, or, just as an arbitrary sample, a passage in Isocrates (12.2) where peculiar stylistic devices are said to be positively received by the audience: '. . . [speeches] rich in many telling points, in contrasted and balanced phrases not a few, and in the other figures of speech which give brilliance to oratory, and compel the approbation and applause of the audience'. (trans. G. Norlin).

This approach can be compared with poetical and theatrical performances, and, in recent years, the similarity and partly identical composition of the theatre audience and the audience in the courts

[15] Gastaldi, 'La retorica del IV secolo', 196.

and the Assembly, and the resulting comparability of the role of the actor and that of the orator, have been pointed out by several scholars.[16] In this sphere, the stylistic accuracy, *akribeia*, which can effectively only be reached through written composition, is not arousing suspicion, but is appreciated.

Thus, there was an opposition or ambivalence between scepticism against and enthusiasm for rhetorical abilities—in the words of Halliwell, 'a cultural mentality which sustained and mistrusted rhetoric in equal measure'.[17] Despite the seeming inconsistency of these two attitudes, it is as puzzling as obvious that it is the same audience that wants to be entertained and convinced at the same time. I am convinced that due to the collective nature of the democratic audience, these are not two attitudes which could be separated if we had more direct evidence about the audience's behaviour than we have, but that they were as inseparable for a classical Athenian as they are for us. Despite the possibility of different personal preferences (think of Plato), there was not one group that liked the skilful preparation of speeches, and another which did not. Rather, there was an inner tension between these feelings in the very same audience as soon as the individuals were part of a democratic collective.

Although this interestingly ambivalent attitude has been noted by some, if not many, scholars, there is so far, at least in my view, no really convincing explanation of it. I am aware of the fact that the negative attitude towards public orators I have spoken about cannot exclusively be attributed to the technical aspects of speech production, but has to be seen in a broader political framework and in the light of the bad experiences that the people had made with their leaders in the fifth century, and which the extant literature tells us so much about. Yet, I want to suggest that the seemingly contradictory appreciation and rejection of rhetorical skills has to be closely linked with the introduction of written speech composition in the latter part of the fifth century.

However, let me first review two scholarly opinions. Firstly, Sir Kenneth Dover in his book on Lysias briefly touches upon our sub-

[16] Among them are J. Ober and B. Strauss, 'Drama, Rhetoric and Discourse', in J.J. Winkler and F.I. Zeitlin (eds.), *Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context* (Princeton, 1990), 237–70, Hall, 'Lawcourt Dramas', *passim*, L.E. Rossi, 'Lo spettacolo', in S. Settis (ed.), *I Greci. Storia, cultura, arte, società. 2. Definizione* (Turin, 1997), 785–9.

[17] Halliwell, 'Public and Private', 141.

ject.[18] He describes what he calls the 'logical inconsistency in making it a point against an opponent that he writes speeches or has consulted a speech-writer and at the same time listening to speeches with the ear of a connoisseur', but he goes no further than to ascribe this inconsistency to the typical 'double standard' of the society and to see the use of the different attitudes in an orator's argumentation as a sign of the usual and convenient hypocrisy. Secondly, a more profound interpretation is found in the work of Josiah Ober. He focuses on the political aspects of the relationship between audience and rhetorical experts; put simply, he thinks that the combination of distrust and applause that characterizes the mass' attitude towards the specialized speakers was a constituent part of the balance of power that he so impressively has described as the central stabilizing factor in the Athenian democracy.[19] According to Ober, the coexistence of two different 'ideologies' resulted in a *modus vivendi* between mass and elite. He thinks that the relationship between audience and speaker resembled a kind of role-play in which the orator's contention to be a simple citizen without special rhetorical training was not really believed by the audience, but accepted as a fiction which was needed to enhance the society's stability. In Ober's words, 'the conspiracy of speaker and juror in maintaining the fiction helped to integrate the citizenry by encouraging *homonoia*'.[20] This thesis, by the way, fits well into a general tendency to view characteristics of the Athenian democracy, which were formerly seen as negative or conflicting aspects, as stabilizing factors. I will not go into the question of how convincing Ober's suggestive model is as a general description of Athenian democracy (altogether, I think it is very convincing), but I might remark in passing that I am not so sure whether one can really speak of a permanently *conscious* fiction that the audience accepted. Rather, I would say that the public was sceptical about elite experts in general, but as in politics, especially election campaigns, of our time, they are always prepared to let themselves be persuaded by somebody—because they have no choice but to trust

[18] K.J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), 158–9.

[19] Ober, *Mass and Elite*, especially 189–91 and 306–9; cf. 'Drama, Rhetoric and Discourse', 250–1, and his 'Power and Oratory in Democratic Athens: Demosthenes 21, *Against Meidias*', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion. Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London, 1994), 88–9.

[20] *Mass and Elite*, 307.

somebody. Thus, I do not believe that the Athenians were *aware* that they were playing a game and wearing social masks all the time.

However, what is more problematic with Ober's thesis—and this brings us more closely back to our subject—is that he, not unlike Dover, explains the ambivalence that I have sketched in a tautological way: the ambivalence is accounted for by the statement that there was an ambivalence. I think, however, that it is more fruitful not just to explain the two different attitudes of the democratic audience by their balance, but to trace them back to what I would call two different modes of reception. To propound a consciously schematic model, I would say that the 'entertainment' mode, which accepts the orator's speech as a performance, is an 'oral' one, whereas the sceptical mode, which sees oratorical abilities as a sign of potentially undemocratic specialisation, is directly connected with the fact that the speeches in the late fifth century began quite considerably to show, and were felt by the audience to show, signs of written preparation. The oral mode, in which the audience related to the orator in quite a similar way as to an actor, to a rhapsode, or to a performer of lyrical poetry, was the more traditional one. The critical attitude to rhetoric was, on the other hand, a fairly new feeling which was caused by the emerging democratic consciousness and by the perceptible increase of rhetorical professionalism, which on its part was not possible without the use of writing in rhetorical composition which started in the late fifth century. I find it quite probable that, due to this correlation, there is not only an effect of writing on rhetoric in the fifth century, but by its newly introduced techniques, based on literate methods, rhetoric played conversely an important role in the democratic audience's perception of the role of writing in the public sphere. In the late fifth century, quite suddenly, the consequences of writing upon prose composition were more or less openly manifest in a context where written preparation never had been an issue. In the oral mode, I think, the audience did not even care whether the performance that was delivered could be traced back to writing or no. They simply accepted its declamatory character and did not enquire after the technical method of production, which—and this has to be pointed out—had, however, in the field of poetry, relied on writing for a long time past in the fifth century.[21] When this attitude was dominant, there was no big

[21] Professor Greg Nagy, not surprisingly, protested against this point in the dis-

difference between the reception of a play by Euripides and a speech by Gorgias. In contrast, the more sceptical attitude to rhetorical preparation and its written basis was a new thing in the classical era; it is a democratic approach that views personal trustworthiness as a higher value than the formal perfection of a speech. This attitude, I would suggest, did not emerge simultaneously with, or shortly after, the introduction of written speech preparation by coincidence, but is rather, at least partly, caused by the fact that writing—or, more precisely, the consequences of writing in style and presentation—intruded into the sphere of democratic decision-making, where it actually and originally had no place.[22]

If this picture, which cannot be more than a sketch here, is correct, then public oratory played a larger part in the emergence of a critical attitude towards writing than is normally supposed. Under the impression of Plato's *Phaedrus*, it is often said that the Greeks had a deep general suspicion of writing.[23] But possibly we should not assume that there was such a general scepticism about writing before it became more visible and manifest in the public sphere during the fifth century.[24] My guess would be that this visibility not only has to do with the increase of public inscriptions or literacy education, but also with the more and more 'written' character of oratory, which was meant to be an oral context in which written manuscripts, as can be seen from the fact that you could not bring one, were

cussion at the Orality IV conference. Though by no means an anti-oralist, I assume with many scholars that the greater part at least of the non-stichic poetry in the seventh and sixth centuries was, though performed orally, composed in writing. Thus, the broad claim that 'it can be argued in general that the traditions of Archaic Greek song, poetry, and prose required the medium of writing neither for composition nor for performance or reperformance' (G. Nagy, 'Early Greek Views of Poets and Poetry', in G.A. Kennedy [ed.], *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism*, 1. *Classical Criticism* [Cambridge, 1989], 10), is overstated.

22 David Mirhady suggested in the discussion that my observations would hold only in the context of forensic, but not of deliberative, oratory. I think, however, that the effect of writing on speeches was also to be felt in the Assembly, where speeches, although possibly not to the same extent as the forensic speeches, also began to be prepared in writing; for example, by Andocides. (I thank David Mirhady for reading my chapter and correcting much of my English.)

23 See the classic formulation of Pfeiffer, *Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie*, 52: 'Platons Argumente sind der Ausdruck einer allgemeinen, tief verwurzelten Abneigung der Griechen gegen das geschriebene Wort . . . dieses instinktive Mißtrauen . . .'.

24 See the remarks of L.E. Rossi, 'L'ideologia dell'oralità fino a Platone', in G. Cambiano, L. Canfora, and D. Lanza (eds.), *Lo spazio letterario della Grecia antica*, 1: *La produzione e la circolazione del testo*, tomo 1: *La polis* (Rome, 1992), 91.

not supposed to play a part. Thus, the ambivalence of the two different attitudes towards orators, the tension between extemporaneous engagement with the people's interest on one side and accurate written preparation on the other (which was made a fundamental conflict between honesty and manipulation, between truth and flattery especially by Plato) has its roots in two different modes of audience reception that have different historical and situational origins. However these come together in the seemingly contradictory behaviour of an Athenian audience that wants to be convinced and entertained at the same time. As can be seen in the role of teleprompters in television which I outlined at the beginning, this tension is still an issue in our time, and it still has a lot to do with the role of writing, which, in a sense, represents a careful preparation that lies outside the context of the rhetorical situation—whether this writing is directly visible as a manuscript or not. Although the performance conditions vary, the relationship between writing and spontaneity is a constant feature in any context of rhetorical persuasion. Let us give Quintilian the last word for now on this timeless problem (*Institutio* 11.2.46; trans. Butler):

> He who seems as though he were learning what he says by heart, he loses all the grace that a well-written speech can give, simply by the fact that he makes it obvious that he has written it. On the other hand, a good memory will give us credit for quickness of wit as well, by creating the impression that our words have not been prepared in the seclusion of the study, but are due to the impression of the moment (*ut illa, quae dicimus, non domo attulisse, sed ibi protinus sumpsisse videamur*), an impression which is of the utmost assistance both to the orator and to his cause.

CHAPTER EIGHT

LITERACY, ORALITY, AND LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

James P. Sickinger

The subject of this chapter is Athenian law and legislation, and how both oral and literate practices were involved in the process of making new laws and decrees. It is well known that the Athenians began to write down legal rules and regulations as early as the seventh century. The laws of Dracon (c. 620) and Solon (594/3) were recorded on objects called *axones* and *kyrbeis*, and the Athenians set up laws and decrees enacted in later periods on stelae made from bronze or stone, or simply deposited their texts in the city's archives. What effect the existence of these written measures had on Athenian society, however, is more difficult to assess, and in recent years scholars have emphasized the limited uses of writing at Athens and elsewhere, and the persistence of oral practices long after the introduction of written laws. Discussion, debate, and oral methods of proof dominated the administration of justice in Athenian courts, and not until the fourth century, it seems, did advancing literacy begin to make significant impact on the legal sphere.[1] In the same way oral practices dominated legislative procedure. The making of speeches for or against proposals was a key feature in the enactment of new measures, and it is tempting to assign writing a restricted role, perhaps only at the end of a long oral process when ratified proposals were written down and published.

Such a conclusion, however, would be mistaken, for both reading

[1] On the limited impact of written law on Greek society and the administration of justice, see W.V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 50–1, 71–5. On the persistence of oral practices in Greek law see A. Maffi, 'Écriture et pratique juridique dans la Grèce classique', in M. Detienne (ed.), *Les savoirs de l'écriture. En Grèce ancienne* (Lille, 1988), 188–210, R. Thomas, 'Written in Stone? Liberty, Equality, Orality, and the Codification of Law', in L. Foxhall and A.D.E. Lewis (eds.), *Greek Law in Its Political Setting. Justifications not Justice* (Oxford, 1996), 9–31. On the laws of Dracon and Solon, see most recently J.P. Sickinger, *Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens* (Chapel Hill, 1999), 8–34.

and writing could play a significant role at all stages of the legislative process, as I hope to show. The authors of new laws and decrees sometimes submitted their proposals in writing, so that debate in the Council and Assembly revolved around not oral motions but written texts. Some types of proposals were displayed in writing, thereby giving citizens opportunity to examine and reflect on their contents before they cast their votes. In addition, Athenian citizens occasionally cited and consulted the written texts of older laws and decrees when they drafted new motions or spoke about them in the Assembly. Evidence for citation and consultation appears in both inscriptions and the speeches of the orators, and it offers an important and perhaps under-appreciated perspective on Athenian attitudes toward writing and written documents. Consultation of older documents shows that Athenians did have occasion to read their laws and decrees, while the citation of older texts illustrates not the suspicion so frequently associated with Greek attitudes toward writing, but a deep respect for the authority of the written word in a central area of Athenian democracy.

The procedures by which the Athenians enacted new legislation during the fifth and fourth centuries are relatively clear. Proposals were presented first to the Council of 500, and those approved by this body were passed on to the citizen Assembly as *probouleumata* for final debate and a vote. Decisions ratified by the Assembly fell into two categories. *Nomoi* or laws were general rules with permanent validity that affected all citizens, while *psêphismata* or decrees were more specific measures whose duration was limited. The Athenians did not distinguish sharply between laws and decrees in the fifth century: both were enacted by the Council and Assembly, and the same measure could be labeled either a law (*nomos*) or a decree (*psêphisma*). But at the end of the fifth century the Athenians reviewed their existing laws and sought to impose some order on them. One of several steps they took was to declare that henceforth *nomoi* would possess greater validity than *psêphismata*, and at that time or in the early years of the fourth century they deprived the Assembly of its power to make new *nomoi*. In the fourth century new laws were ratified not by the Assembly but by groups of citizens called *nomothetai*, who were specially appointed for this purpose.[2]

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[2] For a general overview of the legislative process, including the distinction between

Oral practices figured prominently in the enactment of laws and decrees throughout the classical period. Meetings of the Assembly opened with a sacrifice, followed by the recitation of a curse and prayer by a herald. Debate only began when the herald asked which citizens wanted to give advice on a particular motion, and many speakers might come forward to argue for or against a proposal.[3] Thucydides recreates several debates from meetings of the Assembly held both before and during the Peloponnesian War, and published versions of speeches given before the Assembly by Andocides, Demosthenes, and other orators survive.[4] The oral character of enacting new legislation is further illustrated by some of the terms associated with the process. The surviving texts of Athenian laws and decrees are routinely introduced with the words 'so-and-so spoke' (*ho deina eipe*), which are used to designate the name of the individual who proposed the original motion. This formula first appears in two decrees dating from just before the middle of the fifth century (*IG* i³ 9, 10) and it can be restored with some probability in another measure from the same period (*IG* i³ 8).[5] Its use seems to suggest that, at least originally, individuals who proposed new legislation delivered their motions orally before the Council or Assembly or both. This impression is reinforced by the title *rhêtôr*, 'speaker', which is sometimes given to individuals who proposed laws and decrees.[6] This usage seems to suggest that a citizen rose before the Council or Assembly and delivering a speech that included his motion. Other speeches followed and a vote was finally taken, and writing may have entered the picture only late: perhaps only after a measure had been approved was its text fixed in writing. Such a process is hinted at in a passage of Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*. At a meeting of the women's Assembly held at that play's celebration of the Thesmophoria, a

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laws and decrees, see M.H. Hansen, *Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford, 1991), 141–75; cf. also P.J. Rhodes with D.M. Lewis, *The Decrees of the Greek States* (Oxford, 1997), 11–34.

[3] For procedure in the Assembly, see M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford, 1987), 88–93 and J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton, 1989), 132–8.

[4] For a catalogue of extant speeches, arranged by author and category, see Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 341–8.

[5] Curiously, two measures of slightly earlier date (*IG* i³ 1, 5), whose texts are relatively well preserved, do not preserve this formula.

[6] On the term *rhêtôr* used for speakers in the Assembly and proposers of decrees, see *IG* i³ 46, 25, Hansen, *Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes*, 49–69, Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 104–18.

character makes a proposal calling upon her fellow women to condemn Euripides for revealing the women's secrets. She delivers a long speech supporting her motion, and she concludes by saying that she will work out the details of her proposal with an undersecretary (431–2). That is, she implies that her motion will be written down only after it has been voted upon and ratified.

Other practices reinforced the oral nature of legislative proceedings. According to Aristotle (*Athênaiôn Politeia* 54.5) the Athenians employed a secretary whose sole duty was to read documents aloud to both the Council and Assembly. This official is almost certainly to be identified with the 'secretary of the city' (*grammateus tês poleôs*) who read out to the Assembly a letter sent by Nicias from Sicily in 414 (Thucydides 7.10), but his chief duty was more probably to read out drafts of laws and decrees when they were introduced to the Council and Assembly for discussion and debate. One fourth-century law on *nomothesia* (law-making) required the proposers of new laws to give copies of their proposals to a state secretary, who then read the texts out at one or more meetings of the Assembly.[7] Since the Assembly was not involved in the final stage of ratification of new *nomoi*, this reading may have been the chief and only means by which some citizens learned of pending legislation. Texts of proposed decrees were also read aloud in the Assembly (Aeschines 2.68), and although this secretary is not explicitly associated with decrees, he is the most likely official to have performed this function.

The spoken word thus figured prominently in the making of new laws and decrees at Athens, and it is tempting to characterize the legislative process as essentially oral in character.[8] But written texts also played a role, even at the earliest stages. Written agendas of meetings of both the Council and Assembly, for example, were publicly displayed. According to Aristotle, the *prytaneis* posted what business the Council was to handle each day and where it was to meet; they did the same for meetings of the Assembly.[9] It is not clear how

[7] Demosthenes 20.94. See also [Plutarch] *Moralia* 841f, describing a Lycurgan law that required a secretary to read out the official texts of tragedies to actors. For further discussion of this secretary, including possible epigraphic references, see P.J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford, 1972), 136.

[8] R. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1989), 61–4, notes some uses of writing in the making of decrees, but she emphasizes the oral features of the process.

[9] Aristotle, *Athênaiôn Politeia* 43.3–4. According to Photius (s.v. *propempta*) and the *Lexica Segueriana* 296.8, these notices were posted five days in advance.

detailed these agendas were, where they were posted, or what information they included, but apart from the locations and dates of meetings, they presumably included some indication of the items to be dealt with at individual meetings. We do not know whether the full texts of *probouleumata* or other pending measures were also displayed, but if they were, individuals attending meetings of the Assembly will have had at least some opportunity to learn of pending business from a written source. Aristotle does not say when the practice of displaying agendas began, but there is no reason to regard it as an innovation of his own day. Notices of lawsuits were being posted at the statues of the Eponymous Heroes from as early as the 420s, and nothing precludes the written display of either lawsuits or agendas from a much earlier date.[10]

In addition to published agendas, full texts of newly proposed *nomoi* were exhibited on wooden tablets during the fourth century. This form of display is first attested in 403 in the decree of Tisamenus, a text of which is preserved in Andocides' speech *On the Mysteries*, and display of proposed laws was a fixed part of *nomothesia* in the fourth century.[11] Display of proposals was presumably designed to give interested citizens more time to learn and think about pending legislation, and it freed them from having to rely on attendance at the Assembly and their memories for knowledge of a proposal's contents. Demosthenes makes this very point when he discusses the dissemination of proposed laws to the public. In the speech *Against Leptines* (20.93–4) he mentions that copies of proposals were both read out in the Assembly and posted on wooden tablets, and he puts equal emphasis on the oral and literate elements of dissemination. But when he discusses legislative procedure in the speech *Against Timocrates* (24.24–6), he does not even refer to the reading of proposals, but focuses instead on their written display. Individuals introducing new laws, he says, had to exhibit them in front of the monument of the Eponymous Heroes, where anyone who wanted could inspect them. If someone read a harmful or inexpedient proposal, that citizen had sufficient time to point it out and speak against the measure. Timocrates, Demosthenes claims, had failed to follow

[10] For the display of lawsuits, see the testimonia gathered by A.L. Boegehold, *The Lawcourts at Athens* (Princeton, 1995), 236–7.

[11] Andocides 1.83, Demosthenes 20.94, 24.18, 23, 36, Aeschines 3.39. For discussion, see Hansen, *Athenian Democracy in the Age of Democracy*, 168.

this procedure for his own proposal, and he had thereby denied the citizen body one of the safeguards by which the integrity of Athens' code of laws was maintained.

Demosthenes' discussion of law-making procedures also reveals that proposals for new laws originated as written texts. Surviving Athenian *nomoi* on stone are regularly introduced with the name of their proposers in the phrase 'so-and-so spoke'. But proposers actually gave copies of their proposals to a state secretary who read them out (Demosthenes 20.94). Proposals were written documents, and although their texts were read aloud, discussion revolved around a fixed, written text. The same was true of many fourth-century decrees. Literary sources regularly describe the proposing of a new motion not with the verb *legein*, 'to speak,' but with the verb *graphein*, 'to write'. A proposer could be identified with the words *ho graphôn*, 'the one writing,' and the normal phrase for submitting a decree or law for consideration was *graphein psêphisma* or *nomon*.[12] Curiously, this usage does not appear in the works of Herodotus or Thucydides, and its absence from these fifth-century authors might suggest that the practice of submitting written motions was a fourth-century innovation. But Aristophanes refers to politicians who 'write decrees' in the *Clouds* of 423 (1429), and the practice may be much earlier, although how much earlier is impossible to say. Citizens presumably began to hand in written proposals at a time when the volume of business handled by the Athenian Council and Assembly was increasing. Either the expansion of Athens' overseas empire in the 470s and 460s or the increase in the Assembly's powers following the reforms of Ephialtes' in 462/1 provides suitable occasions for such a development, although other dates and occasions are equally possible.

Several episodes recounted in literary sources illustrate how the process of submitting written proposals may have worked in practice. Aeschines describes in his speech *On the False Embassy* (2.68) how Demosthenes had, at a meeting of the Assembly in 346, shown a written proposal to someone seated next to him. Demosthenes' name was inscribed at the top of the draft, and Demosthenes supposedly asked this fellow citizen whether he should give the proposal to one of the presiding officers to be put to a vote. Although the motives

[12] See, among many others, Aeschines 2.18; Demosthenes 1.19, 7.19, 18.25, 20.2, 22.23, 24.28, Dinarchus 1.69.

Aeschines imputes to Demosthenes may not be accurate, the story must have been believable to his audience, and it perhaps suggests that citizens brought prepared motions with them to meetings of the Assembly. Actual submission of a written proposal is indicated in Xenophon's account of the meeting of the Assembly at which the fate of the generals who fought at Arginusae in 406 was decided (*Hellenica* 1.7.1–35). Xenophon includes in this account a long speech delivered by Euryptolemus, in which Euryptolemus offered an alternative proposal for trying the generals (*Hellenica* 1.7.16–33). Among other things, he urged the Athenians to apply the procedures outlined by the decree of Cannonus, which specified penalties for those wronging the people, or the laws on temple robbery or treason, which included similar sanctions. Simply expressing this proposal in a speech, however, does not appear to have been sufficient for the proposal to be considered. For, after he finished speaking Euryptolemus 'wrote his proposal' (*Hellenica* 1.7.34), meaning, presumably, that he submitted its text in writing. Xenophon presents Euryptolemus as making his proposal extemporaneously, and if that accurately reflects what transpired at this or other meetings of the Assembly, citizens may have actually brought writing materials to meetings and composed proposals as debates progressed. To be sure, not every law or decree brought before the Athenian Council or Assembly was submitted in this way, as the passage in *Thesmophoriazusae* mentioned above suggests: a secretary could draw up a motion after a speaker had proposed it orally. But the frequency with which the verb *graphein* is used in the fourth-century orators in conjunction with the proposing of new laws and decrees indicates that the writing out of proposals by their proposers was common. The seemingly oral environment of the Assembly thus actually revolved around written texts, and new legislation often had a written origin.

But the use of written texts in the legislative process was not limited to the drafting or display of proposals. Some citizens also consulted and cited existing documents before they drew up new measures or spoke about them in the Assembly. In the speech he delivered at the trial of the Arginusae generals, Euryptolemus mentioned both the decree of Cannonus and the laws on temple robbery and treason as alternative measures under which the generals should be tried (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.7.20–2). Euryptolemus' references to these texts are significant because they show a speaker citing older laws and decrees to support a motions he was making; new legislation

was not enacted in ignorance of earlier measures, and citing older documents is presumed to have some force. The same references also raise the question of how often the proposers or speakers examined other documents as they prepared to submit motions or deliver speeches. Xenophon's version of Euryptolemus' speech contains no suggestion that Euryptolemus looked up any of the statutes he cites, and it is possible that his allusions to them depended solely on his recollection of their content. But Euryptolemus' references are extremely specific, and even if he did not check their texts before giving his speech it seems reasonable to assume that other speakers sometimes did, either to find precedents for courses of action they advocated or to back up their proposals with the authority of earlier written texts.

Some scholars, however, have challenged such an assumption as anachronistic, because the simple existence of written texts did not mean that they were read, or even meant to be read. Many ancient documents, it is argued, were seldom if ever consulted, and they often functioned less as objects preserving information to be studied than as symbolic monuments or memorials.[13] This model of ancient writing owes much to the work of M. Clanchy on the functions of documents in mediaeval England.[14] Clanchy has argued that despite an increase in the number of documents in eleventh- and twelfth-century AD England, these documents were seldom used or consulted. References to the Domesday Book, for example, the great census of England carried out by William the Conqueror after his conquest of the island in AD 1066, are extremely rare in the centuries following its creation. Clanchy concludes from this dearth of citations that the Domesday Book served more as a symbol of royal power and authority than as a practical tool for consultation. In the same way, ancient historians have maintained that evidence for the

[13] Writing about Athenian laws, Thomas ('Written in Stone', 11) claims that 'evidence that individuals did go and look at the laws is surprisingly rare, and laws could be ignored because no one knew of them.' Others arguing for limited consultation of Athenian documents and their primarily symbolic value include Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record*, 45–83, R. Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, 1992), 84–8, C. Hedrick, 'Writing, Reading, and Democracy', in R. Osborne and S. Hornblower (eds.), *Ritual, Finance, Politics. Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis* (Oxford, 1994), 157–74, J.K. Davies, 'Accounts and Accountability in Classical Athens', ibid., 201–12.

[14] M. Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record. England 1066–1307*^{2} (Cambridge, 1993), 25–43, 149–54.

reading of many ancient documents is rare, and that a wide range of texts, from Athenian laws and decrees to Delian inventories to inscribed records of Roman priesthoods and senatorial decrees, were primarily symbolic in function.[15]

I do not wish to deny that written texts can have symbolic value, and the Athenians were fully aware of the symbolic potential of laws and decrees, as frequent allusions to the laws of Solon and other exemplary documents in the speeches of the Attic orators demonstrate. But the symbolic value attached to documents did not deny them practical value or mean that Athenians read them only rarely, as some studies have implied.[16] Indeed, evidence for the reading and consultation of Athenian laws and decrees is relatively abundant. Athenian magistrates sometimes read out laws to litigants who brought cases before them (Antiphon 6.38), and litigants themselves consulted public documents with some frequency, to judge from the number of citations, quotations, and paraphrases of laws and decrees in the courtroom speeches of the Attic orators.[17] Our evidence for legislative procedure is not nearly as voluminous as it is for the law courts, but epigraphic and literary sources both point to an awareness of older laws and decrees as new ones were introduced, and in many cases direct consultation of their contents.

Fourth-century laws on *nomothesia*, for example, virtually required some study of older laws, at least in theory. The Athenians viewed new *nomoi* as additions to or changes of existing ones, and some of their procedures for proposing new laws in the fourth century required the repeal of older ones before new ones could be approved.[18] One

[15] On the symbolic nature of Delian accounts on stone, see T. Linders, 'Inscriptions and Orality', *SO* 67 (1992), 27–40. On the symbolic qualities of Roman documents, see M. Beard, 'Writing and Ritual. A Study of Diversity and Expansion in the Arval Acta', *PBSR* 53 (1985), 114-62, C. Williamson, 'Monuments of Bronze: Roman Legal Documents on Bronze Tablets', *ClassAnt.* 6 (1987), 160–83, P. Culham, 'Archives and Alternatives in Republican Rome', *CP* 84 (1989), 100–15, and N. Purcell, 'Atrium Libertatis', *PBSR* 61 (1993), 125–55.

[16] Thomas, *Literacy and Orality*, 86, concedes that 'the written contents of inscriptions were read if needed', but her discussion tends to focus on potentially symbolic meaning of documents and not the circumstances in which they actually were read.

[17] On the citation of laws in Athenian law courts, see J.P. Sickinger, 'The Laws of Athens: Publication, Preservation, Consultation', in E.M. Harris and L. Rubinstein (eds.), *The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece* (London, 2001).

[18] Discussion of fourth-century laws on *nomothesia*: P.J. Rhodes, '*NOMOTHESIA* in Fourth-Century Athens', *CQ*[2] 35 (1985), 55–60, Hansen, *Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*, 165–8.

fourth-century law called for an annual, section by section review of Athenian *nomoi* at the first meeting of the Assembly each year. If any law was deemed unsatisfactory, then it could be changed in favor of a new one but only after the old law had been defended by representatives chosen by the people (Demosthenes 24.20–23). Another law allowed a citizen to propose the repeal of any existing law by putting another law in its place (Demosthenes 24.33), and still another law instructed the *thesmothetai* to conduct periodic searches through existing laws in search for contradictory measures (Aeschines 3.38–9). If the procedures laid down by these laws were actually followed in practice, the corpus of Athenian laws would have been the subject of regular scrutiny, from both the authors of new laws and from state officials.

Practice, however, does not always match theory. Demosthenes cites the laws on *nomothesia* in the speeches *Against Leptines* and *Against Timocrates* precisely because, he claims, his opponents have not followed the correct procedures; among other things they have not searched for measures contravened by their proposals. It is always dangerous to accept the words of an orator at face value, but inscribed laws of the fourth century also suggest that laws could be enacted without taking into consideration earlier ones. Both the law on silver coinage of 375/4 and the grain-tax law of 374/3 omit any reference to existing laws that they modify, replace, or repeal; both seem to be new measures with no connection to earlier legislation.[19] That silence, however, may be misleading. The anti-tyranny law of 337/6 similarly includes no reference to earlier legislation, but its text is clearly modeled on older laws regarding tyranny and subversion of the democracy.[20] The failure of new laws to mention earlier laws on similar subjects is not, therefore, evidence that consultation did not take place. The authors of new laws may simply have omitted references to earlier laws even when they had studied their texts.

Consultation of an earlier law at the time a new one was being introduced can be documented in at least one instance. An inscription of 353/2 preserves a law concerning the offering of first fruits

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[19] Law on silver coinage: *SEG* 26.72, Grain-tax law: R. Stroud, *The Athenian Grain-Tax Law of 374/3 B.C.* (Princeton, 1999), 3–4.

[20] Anti-tyranny law: *SEG* 12.87. On its relationship to earlier legislation, see M. Ostwald, 'The Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and Subversion', *TAPA* 86 (1955), 103–28.

to the Eleusinian goddesses (*IG* ii^2 140). The law begins (lines 8–13) by reaffirming the validity of an older law authored by a certain Chaeremonides and continues with apparent modifications of existing procedures. The citation of Chaeremonides' law by name removes any doubt that the new law's proposer was familiar with the old one's text, and the inscription itself offers some clue as to the source of the proposer's knowledge. The law's closing lines instruct the secretary of the Council to publish its text near the older law of Chaeremonides, which stood on a stele in front of the Metroön (lines 31–35). Chaeremonides' law was therefore inscribed on stone, and its location and text were known to the proposer of the present law. Although we cannot be absolutely certain, it is reasonable to suppose that the author of the new law acquired his knowledge of the law of Chaeremonides from the stele he specifically mentions. Consultation is implied, even where it is not mentioned explicitly.

Study of the contents of older measures also played a role in the debate surrounding the ratification of new decrees. The most explicit example occurs in Andocides' *On the Peace*, dating from the late 390s. Andocides had served as an Athenian ambassador to a congress of Greek city-states at Sparta, where terms for ending the Corinthian war between Sparta and her former allies were drawn up. Andocides and his fellow ambassadors brought the terms back to Athens, and Andocides addressed the Assembly to urge ratification. In the course of this speech he compared his proposal with the earlier treaty imposed by the Spartans on Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War (3.10–12). The older treaty severely curtailed Athenian freedom, while Andocides claims that his peace terms won the Athenians major concessions. He proceeds point by point through the older terms so that his audience could hear for itself just how well the Athenians were faring under his proposed treaty (3.12):

> Consider from these writings, which are written for us on the stele, on what terms it is now possible to make peace. There it is written that we must tear down the walls; in these it is possible to build them . . .

Andocides' explicit reference to the written text of the earlier treaty, and his mention of the stele on which it was inscribed, not only show that he was familiar with the older treaty; they all but prove that he had studied the inscription itself. He evidently searched out this document as he prepared to present his proposals to the Assembly,

apparently believing that a comparison with an existing document would reflect well on his proposal and strengthen its chances of passage.[21] This reference to the treaty ending the Peloponnesian War also implies an attitude, shared by Andocides and his audience, that saw documents as objects whose contents could be studied, consulted, and applied to present situations.

A similar attitude underlies a passage of Demosthenes' *Third Philippic*, dating from some fifty years later (341/0). In that speech, Demosthenes attempts to stir the Athenians to stand firm against Philip II, and he appeals to the fifth-century decree condemning Arthmius of Zelea as an example of the resolve taken by past generations of Athenians against those who threatened their freedom. In making this appeal Demosthenes, like Andocides, refers explicitly to the written contents (*ta grammata*) of the decree, which, he says, provided a reminder of how it was proper to behave in such circumstances, and he quotes from these writings (*ta grammata*) as found on the inscription.[22] Demosthenes does not describe his actual consultation of the decree, but his mention of the bronze stele on which it was inscribed and his quotation of specific terms of its text betray his familiarity with it. Moreover, his citation of the decree's contents illustrates respect for the value and authority of the written document; the inscription preserved evidence from the past with potential relevance to current conditions.

Other symbouleutic speeches of the fourth century do not contain equally explicit references to existing decrees or treaties, and this paucity of references might suggest that, unlike Andocides and Demosthenes, few speakers or proposers in the Assembly took the time to consult older documents. But very few symbouleutic speeches survive from the fourth century, and those that do are not completely ignorant of existing decrees, even where they do not cite their texts outright. Thus, for example, events transpiring after the ratification of the Peace of Philocrates between Philip II and Athens in 346 made that treaty the object of some controversy at Athens, and speeches of the 340s contain several allusions to it. Demosthenes in

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[21] Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record*, 67, suggests that 'Andocides' elaborate description implies he was doing something unusual.'

[22] Demosthenes 9.41. The same decree is frequently cited in forensic speeches: see Demosthenes 19.271–2, Aeschines 3.258, Dinarchus 2.24. For further discussion of these and other 'historical inscriptions' cited by fourth-century orators, see Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record*, 83–93.

On the Peace of 346 urged the Athenians not to break the Peace's terms, and in his *Second Philippic*, delivered in 344, he noted that Philip's alleged violations of the Peace had already provoked considerable debate (5.13–14, 6.1; cf. 6.31, 36). In his *On the Chersonnese*, delivered in 341, Demosthenes further argued that Philip had long ago broken the terms of the Peace, and in 340/39 the Athenians voted, on Demosthenes' motion, to tear down the stele (or stelae) on which the Peace terms were inscribed.[23] Nowhere does Demosthenes state that he had consulted the Peace of Philocrates, nor does he cite any specific provisions of that treaty. But the text was published on stone at Athens and was undoubtedly available in other forms, and Demosthenes clearly knew its terms well. He himself says that its text was written 'for all to see' (8.5–6), and it seems difficult to deny he and others consulted the treaty in these years as debate swirled around its contents.[24]

Fourth-century inscriptions lend additional support to the hypothesis that consultation of existing documents in support of proposed legislation was common. In 386 the Athenians became signatories to the King's Peace. Terms of the treaty were published on stelae at Athens and elsewhere, and over the next several years the text of this treaty was object of considerable discussion. Not only did Isocrates encourage his readers to compare the King's Peace with the fifth-century Peace of Callias (4.120), inscribed treaties and alliances of the 380s and 370s contain explicit references to the treaty itself. Thus, a treaty of 384/3 establishing an alliance between Athens and Chios begins by affirming that the alliance was not a violation of the peace that the Athenians, Spartans, and Great King had sworn, and a later provision makes the Chians allies of the Athenians on the condition that 'they (the Chians) do not transgress anything written (*gegrammena*) on the stelae about the Peace'.[25] The explicit reference to the written contents of the stele on which the peace was inscribed show the proposer's familiarity with that text, and we can easily imagine that the proposer had studied it, just as Andocides had studied an existing treaty a decade earlier. The charter of the

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[23] Demosthenes 8.4–6; cf. 8.39. Destruction of stele/stelae: Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F55a, b.

[24] Other references to documents in symbouleutic speeches include Demosthenes 15.9, 16.27, 17.1, [Demosthenes] 7.18, 24–6.

[25] M.N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* 2 (Oxford, 1948), no. 118, 19–24.

Second Athenian Confederacy, enacted in 377, also seems to have included a reference to the King's Peace, although the relevant passage was later erased.[26] Other treaties of the period contain similar references to other documents. An inscription recording an alliance between Athens and Thebes and dating from 378 preserves several references to stelae. The text is extremely fragmentary, but at one point it seems to refer to existing agreements (*synthêkai*) recorded on stelae, and it then seems to give instructions for reconciling differences between itself and earlier documents also recorded on stelae.[27] Still another treaty of 375 outlines procedures for the enrollment of the Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and Cephallenians into the Second Athenian Confederacy, ordering that the names of these states were to be added to the 'common stele of the allies'; that is, the stele on which the decree establishing the Second Athenian Confederacy was inscribed.[28] The proposer of the latter treaty was familiar with the membership provisions of the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy and with the list of allies recorded on its stele, and he drafted his own motion with these older, written documents in mind. Because these references are so brief we cannot trace the circumstances that led to their insertion into each inscription's text. The proposers of the decrees in which these references appear, however, presumably did not carry a detailed knowledge of individual decrees and treaties in their heads, and we must assume that at some point they checked the documents to which they refer before incorporating the references in their texts. Citations of existing stelae imply some awareness of their contents and some degree of consultation.

A treaty was not the only type of decree to incorporate citations of older legislation or to hint at the study of older documents during the legislative process. One feature of Athenian decrees honoring foreign benefactors are their allusions to the past services rendered by the honoree and his ancestors to Athens. Usually these allusions are vague, offering few clues as to the sources of a proposer's knowledge of an honoree's past actions. Thus, a proxeny decree of 349/8

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[26] *IG* ii[2] 43, 12–15. See J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League* (Berkeley, 1981), 28–32, for discussion of the erasure.

[27] *IG* ii[2] 40, 14–20. For text and discussion see Cargill, *Second Athenian League*, 52–6.

[28] *IG* ii[2] 96, 12–15; cf. *IG* ii[2] 42, 8–11, for a similar call to inscribe the name of a new allied city alongside those of existing allies.

begins with the words: 'Since Theogenes of Naucratis is a good man to the Athenian people, and he does whatever he can, both now and in the past, in private and in public, for those who arrive (in Naucratis), as did his ancestors' (*IG* ii^2 206, 7–13). No specific text is cited to document the past benefactions of Theogenes or his ancestors, and the proposer's knowledge of them could depend on his recollection of earlier decrees, if any existed, or more simply on the oral testimony of those who knew Theogenes and what he had done for Athens.

In other cases, however, proposers are more specific and offer fairly clear indications of their consultation of earlier texts. In 347/6 Androtion was the author of a decree awarding a series of honors to Spartocus and Pairisades, rulers of the Bosporus (*IG* ii^2 212). The two men were to receive the same honors as their father Leucon, including gold crowns to be made 'in accordance with the earlier decree voted for Leucon' (lines 7–13). That this earlier decree was recording in writing, and that Androtion had studied its written text, may be shown by a later clause of the decree. For its publication clause orders the secretary of the Council to publish the decree on a stele, not on the Acropolis where honorary decrees were usually published, but 'near the stele that carried the earlier decrees for Satyrus and Leucon' (lines 44–7). That is, the honors to Leucon mentioned earlier in Androtion's decree were published on stone, and Androtion knew the location of this older inscription. It stands to reason that Androtion learned of these specific honors for Leucon, including the gold crown he explicitly describes, from the stele that he mentions. He had consulted the inscription's text. Moreover, his citation of the older decree for the father of Spartocus and Pairisades illustrates his respect, and presumably that of other Athenians, for a written document. He cites and uses the decree because its contents had meaning and value to the motion he had proposed.

An especially interesting example of this attitude appears in a citizenship decree of 338/7 for two Acarnanians, Phormio and Carphinas: *IG* ii^2 237. The decree states that the two were to be made citizens not only because of their benefactions to Athens, but also because their grandfather had received Athenian citizenship some time before (lines 15–21):

> Since the demos made Phormio, the grandfather of Phormio and Carphinas, an Athenian, along with his descendants, and (since) the

> decree according to which the grant was made is published on the Acropolis, let this grant that the demos gave to Phormio, their grandfather, be valid also for Phormio and Carphinas.

Although these lines do not mention a stele, the reference to an earlier citizenship decree 'published on the Acropolis' is almost certainly an inscription, since citizenship decrees were normally erected there. But whether an inscription or a text in some other form is meant, the reference to the older citizenship decree is significant. Hegisippus, the proposer of the present decree, knew of the earlier decree, its contents, and apparently its location. He assumed that reference to it would strengthen his own proposal so he mentioned it in his decree. The inscription may have possessed symbolic associations, and its presence on the Acropolis may have lent it a certain degree of prestige, which perhaps played role in Hegisippus' decision to cite it explicitly. But Hegisippus refers to the decree primarily as a written record, one that preserved and documented a past legislative act that had real relevance to a motion coming before the Assembly.

The citation and consultation of documents illustrated by these examples are literate practices, ones that imply an appreciation of the value of writing as a tool for preserving information and a recognition of the power and authority of the written word. Not surprisingly, the examples also date from the fourth century. Most scholars agree that literacy was making great strides in fourth-century Athens, and that the uses of writing were advancing widely in both the public and private spheres. The citation of documents during legislative debates and in the texts of decrees could be just one more sign of the growth of literate practices in this period.[29] And yet we should be cautious before drawing too sharp a divide between fifth and fourth-century practice. Andocides apparently consulted the inscribed treaty ending the Peloponnesian War in the 390s, and the King's Peace was being cited in other treaties of the 380s and 370s. But even earlier, in 406, Euryptolemus had referred to laws and a decree in the course of the debate over the fate of the generals of Arginusae. If Assembly speakers and the proposers of decrees were already citing and consulting existing laws and decrees at these dates, then it

[29] On the growth of literacy and literate practices in the fourth century, see Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 66–93; for the increasing citation of documents, see Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record*, 38–45, 68–72, 81–2, 83–93.

is worth considering how far these practices built on ones in use even earlier in the fifth century. As we shall see, respect for the authority of the written word was not an innovation of the fourth century.

We may begin with the first book of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War.* It includes his versions of several speeches delivered in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war between Athens and Sparta. These speeches usually offer an assessment of what the speaker believed would be most expedient course of action for the parties involved in the current situation, and direct citation of documents generally plays little role in debate. But Thucydides' speeches are not entirely ignorant of documents. In the final speech of the first book Pericles attempts to persuade the Athenians to reject an ultimatum recently delivered to them by Sparta. Early on in the speech he complains that the Spartans had not proposed to submit their differences to arbitration, despite a clause of the Thirty Years' Peace of 446 that required both sides to do so (1.140.2). Pericles also refers directly to the Megarian decree, which had become one of the chief obstacles to peace (1.141.2–3).[30] Pericles does not say that he had consulted either document, and it is conceivable that he relied on his memory of their contents. But it is difficult to believe that debate at Athens could revolve around specific documents, apparently for an extended period of time, without any consultation of their texts. Indeed, Pericles' references to the Thirty Years' Peace are strikingly similar to later references to the Peace of Philocrates in speeches of the 340s, and this similarity should suggest that already in the 430s, some citizens were studying the terms of specific treaties so as to cite them in debates held before the Assembly,

Events of the year 418 lend this conjecture some support. In that year, the Spartans sent a garrison by sea to Epidaurus. The Argives complained to the Athenians that this action constituted a violation of what was written (*gegrammenon*) in the Peace of Nicias of 421. As a result, Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to append a statement to the stele recording that Peace's terms to the effect that the Spartans

[30] Other references to the Thirty Years' Peace include Thucydides 1.35.2, 40.2, 67.2, 78.4, 85.2, 139.1, 144.2. For discussion of this treaty's terms, see G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972), 293–94, but see also E. Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea* (Baltimore, 1993), 125–62, who questions the veracity of Thucydides' references to the peace. On the Megarian decree, see also Thucydides 1.139.1, 144.2.

had failed to abide by their oaths.[31] Thucydides does not offer an account of a speech delivered on this occasion, and we have no precise information about the arguments advanced by Alcibiades or other speakers. But debate at Athens evidently focused on the alleged Spartan violation of the written text of the Peace of Nicias, a copy of which was publicly displayed on stone. That the Athenians voted to append a written statement to the treaty's stele shows that they, or at least those citizens who played a leading role in the debate, were familiar with the inscription and that the written contents of the treaty did matter. Not only can we assume some consultation of this treaty's text, the episode also shows the high regard in which the Athenians held written documents already in the fifth century.

Fifth-century inscriptions offer additional evidence for the study of older laws and decrees as new ones were introduced. A decree of 418/7 (*IG* i^3 84) orders the fencing off and leasing of a sanctuary of Neleus and Basile according to written texts called *syngraphai* (lines 6–7). The identification and contents of these *syngraphai* are not made clear,[32] and the decree continues with instructions to the king archon to lease the sanctuary for twenty years, once again according to texts called *syngraphai* (lines 12–13). The decree then orders officials called *apodectai* to hand over the payments they receive from leasing of the sanctuary to the treasurers of the other gods, 'in accordance with the law' (lines 17–18). The contents of this law are not discussed, but after further details about cleaning out the sanctuary the decree calls upon the king archon to keep a copy of the name of the lessee, the amount of the lease, and the names of sureties, 'in accordance with the law on sanctuaries' (lines 22–25). Judging from the number of references to other texts in this decree, Adosius, its proposer, conducted considerable research before he introduced his measure. He knew well the texts called *syngraphai*, whatever their contents, and he required that the sanctuary be fenced and leased according to their terms. But he also took into consideration other documents that were potentially relevant to his decree, since he specified that sev-

[31] Thucydides 5.56.2–3. The same incident seems to be referred to by Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* 510–14: see J. Henderson, *Aristophanes: Lysistrata* (Oxford, 1987), 135.

[32] Rhodes, *Athenian Boule*, 97–8, identifies these *syngraphai* with instructions for leasing the sanctuary that are appended to the end of the decree (lines 29–38). According to M. Walbank (*Inscriptions. Horoi. Poletai Records. Leases for Public Lands* [Princeton, 1991], 155), however, the *syngraphai* are 'detailed instructions for the construction of the enclosure of the hieron, not the terms under which the temenos is be leased.'

eral payments and the lease itself were to be carried out in accordance with one or more laws. Adosius did not make his motion *ex nihilo*; he studied several existing documents first and ensured that his measure conformed to their contents.

Other fifth-century documents include equally explicit citations of older documents. The second Athena Nike decree orders officials called *côlacretai* to pay the priestess of Athena Nike 'the fifty drachmas which are written on the stele' (*IG* i³ 36, 4–8). What 'the fifty drachmas written on the stele' were is revealed by an older decree inscribed on the opposite side of the same stone. This earlier decree (*IG* i³ 35) calls for the appointment of a priestess of Athena Nike and for the payment to her of a salary of fifty drachmas. The date of the first decree is controversial, as are the reasons why a second decree was needed to implement the first one's provisions for the payment of a salary.[33] What matters for our purposes is the second decree's citation of the written contents of the stele. At some time in 424/3 the salary owed to the priestess of Athena Nike became a matter of public debate, and Callias, the author of the second decree, drew up a proposal on this issue. But before making his motion, Callias evidently checked the older decree and cited its contents, as recorded on the stele preserving its text. There is nothing symbolic about Callias' use of the stele: he cited it because it was a written record whose contents supported his motion.

Another reference to an existing text occurs in an inscribed decree establishing the Athenian colony at Brea (*IG* i³ 46), which is dated to the 440s. The opening lines of the decree are lost, and the preserved text begins with provisions calling for the appointment of surveyors, naming a founder for the colony, laying out sanctuaries, and requiring settlers to send a panoply and cow to Athens each year for the Panathenaea and Dionysia. The next clause orders the neighboring Thracian cities, presumably Athenian allies, to come to the aid of the new colony in accordance with *syngraphai* drawn up in the secretaryship of a individual whose name is too damaged to read (lines 18–21). This passage is our best evidence that the names of secretaries served as a finding aid for documents in the fifth

[33] The older decree is traditionally dated to the early 440s, but recent down-dating of fifth-century Athenian inscriptions make a later date possible: see C.W. Fornara and L.J. Samons II, *Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles* (Berkeley, 1991), 183–6, for discussion.

century,[34] but for our purposes it also illustrates how newer decrees could incorporate the contents of older ones. The proposer of the Brea decree was not satisfied with a simple call for allied cities to aid the new colony in the event of attack, so he backed up this provision of his decree by citing a written text. The citation implies both a familiarity with the contents of these *syngraphai* and the authority that a written document could have in this period.

A final example shows that already in the fifth century older decrees could sometimes serve as models for later measures. An Athenian treaty with the Euboean city of Chalcis (*IG* i³ 40) begins with two oaths to be sworn by the Athenians and Chalcidians respectively, and it continues with provisions of the treaty itself. The first of these provisions concerns the oath to be sworn by the Athenians and Chalcidians, an oath that was to be exchanged 'by the Athenians and Chalcidians just as it was decreed for the Eretrians by the demos of the Athenians' (lines 40–43). That is, the oath-taking process and perhaps the oath itself was to be modeled on procedures laid down in an earlier decree regarding Eretria. There is no mention of a stele or a specific document, and it is possible that the proposer relied on his memory of the decree concerning Eretria, which perhaps had been only recently enacted. But fragments of an Athenian treaty with Eretria survive (*IG* i³ 39), and they include parts of an oath, the text of which corresponds almost exactly to the oath preserved in the treaty with Chalcis. The conclusion seems inescapable that the Chalcidian oath is based on the Eretrian one, just as the treaty with Chalcis prescribed. We cannot know whether the Athenians copied the oath directly from the stele or from a text written on some other material. But the request itself, that the text of an oath be based on an earlier one, is significant. The Athenians recognized that an older document could serve as a model for a more recent one. They were comfortable with written texts as tools that preserved information, and they saw them as objects worthy of consultation.[35]

To judge from these epigraphic references, the use and citation of laws and decrees during the legislative process was not a phenomenon wholly new to the fourth century. Fifth-century proposers searched out earlier documents relevant to their proposals, and they

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[34] See Sickinger, *Public Records and Archives*, 85–6.

[35] For other references to earlier legislation in fifth-century decrees, see also *IG* i³ 52A, 2–4; 102, 16–18, 39–41; 131, 11–19.

cited these older texts to lend their measures more support or to justify specific provisions of their own proposals. Fourth-century practice followed fifth-century precedents. That is not to say that no changes whatsoever occurred between the fifth and fourth centuries. During the fourth century we have considerable evidence that speakers in the Assembly and in the law courts were citing old, historical documents for their rhetorical value with some frequency. Thus, Demosthenes cited the fifth-century decree against Arthmius of Zelea before the Assembly as an example of past Athenian zeal (9.41), and Aeschines is said to have read out the fifth-century decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles and the ephebic oath (Demosthenes 19.303). Similar citations of older documents as rhetorical *exempla* do not appear in fifth-century sources for proceedings in the Assembly, and their appearance in the fourth century may be a sign of growing respect for the written word and a greater sophistication in the use of written documents.[36] Nonetheless, we should not exaggerate the differences, or assume a sudden change in the uses of documents by speakers in the Assembly during the fourth century. Apart from the speeches of Thucydides, the authenticity of which is problematic, symbouleutic speeches for the fifth century do not survive, and we cannot pretend to know every type of argument advanced by Assembly speakers before the fourth century. Laws of Solon already could be cited to demonstrate a legal point in the fifth century (Aristophanes, *Birds* 1656–6), and the reference to the Eretrian decree in the treaty for Chalcis shows that an existing document could serve as a model for a later one. The fourth-century practice of citing old documents for their rhetorical value presumably grew out of the use and citation of documents already evident in fifth-century sources.

By emphasizing these citations of documents in the course of legislative debate and during the ratification process, I have tried to show that Athenians did not neglect existing laws and decrees when they enacted new legislation. The authors of proposals were consulting and citing relevant texts as early as the middle of the fifth century, the period in which sufficient evidence begins to appear. These practices illustrate a recognition of some of the uses to which the written word could be put, and they show that in the legislative sphere the Athenians did not neglect older documents. A few

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[36] See Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record*, 83–93.

qualifications of this argument, however, may be in order. First, the citation of documents by Assembly speakers and in the texts of Athenian laws and decree does not demonstrate widespread literacy at Athens or suggest that many individuals studied old laws and decrees to prepare themselves for debate in the Council or Assembly. Consultation was probably limited to those individuals who participated in debate and or actually proposed decrees. The numbers of such citizens was probably small, although by the middle of the fourth century the number of Athenians who proposed decrees could have numbered in the hundreds.[37] Second, consultation and research into existing laws and decrees need not have been a standard or essential component of the proposal of new measures. The majority of surviving laws and decrees on stone contain no references to older documents. This silence cannot be regarded as proof that documents were not consulted, and we must certainly allow that consultation was more widespread than the few instances that are explicitly attested. By the same token, however, we can hardly suppose that all speakers in the Assembly studied existing texts as they prepared for debate, and many proposals undoubtedly went forward in whose support their authors and advocates cited no documents.

Still, written texts did play a role in the enactment of new legislation, and these uses of writing merit some emphasis. One of the shortcomings of recent scholarship on ancient documents and record-keeping is its tendency to privilege oral practices and symbolic functions of writing, to emphasize the ambivalence of ancient attitudes toward writing, and to downplay the ways in which written documents found regular, practical use. In the realm of Athenian legislative procedure, we can say that proposals brought before the Athenian Council and Assembly were often written, not spoken ones. This means that debate often focused on fixed written measures, not loosely delivered spoken pronouncements. These written measures were sometimes advertised in advance, giving interested citizens the opportunity to reflect on proposals at greater length than would have been possible with an exclusively oral motion. And speakers and proposers often put these proposals into a broader context of writing and written documents by consulting and citing existing laws and decrees that they believed offered their motions some support. This

[37] For an estimate of the numbers of Athenians who proposed decrees, see M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Ecclesia* 2 (Copenhagen, 1989), 93–125.

latter practice in particular reflects not the ambivalence so frequently associated with Greek attitudes toward writing but an attitude of trust, not only on the part of those who proposed legislation, but also on the part of those who voted for the measures in which these citations appear. The citation of older documents also implies respect for the authority of the written word, an attitude at odds with the suspicion toward writing we encounter in Herodotus, the tragedians, and even Plato.[38] This discrepancy between literary sources and the activities of daily life is a useful reminder of how complex Athenian attitudes toward writings were, and how divorced the practice of Athenian democracy could be from the cultural milieu within which it operated.

[38] See especially D. Steiner, The *Tyrant's Writ* (Princeton, 1994).

PART THREE

PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER NINE

PHILOLOGY OR PHILOSOPHY? SIMPLICIUS ON THE USE OF QUOTATIONS[1]

Han Baltussen

Introduction

The recent shift of attention in classical studies to the Hellenistic period and Late Antiquity is proving to be a very fruitful one as part of a trend to expand beyond the narrow focus of Classical Athens or Republican Rome. Not only are post-classical periods becoming more appreciated in their own right, they are also being used to reflect upon and deepen our appreciation of the classical period itself. In the study of ancient philosophy major steps to reconsider the periods after Aristotle were A.A. Long's *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London, 1974) and John Dillon's *The Middle Platonists* (Ithaca, 1977) which surveyed Platonic tradition from 80 BC until 220 AD. Another was the publication of *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1987) by A.A. Long and D. Sedley (text and translation), which made available the fragmentary remains of Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptical thought, bringing on a significant revival in the study of these schools. The works of the late Platonists (or Neoplatonists) are also slowly emerging from obscurity. Although some pioneers like R. Wallis, A.C. Lloyd, H. Armstrong and H.J. Blumenthal already studied Plotinus in the sixties and seventies, Neoplatonism remained a very specialised area, inaccessible to most students of ancient philosophy.

[1] I would like to thank the organisers of the fourth biennial *Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece* conference, Professors Ian Worthington and John Miles Foley, for the opportunity to present this chapter as a paper to such an expert and critical audience. Special thanks should go to Ian Worthington for his hospitality and support, and to John García, Steve Nimis, Greg Nagy, and Dennis Trout for their helpful comments in discussion. I should in addition express thanks to the audiences for comments at earlier occasions where the first version of this chapter was presented, at the Center for Hellenic Studies (Washington D.C.), at Rutgers University, and at the Classical Association meetings (U.K.).

It is fair to say that the sheer bulk of the material (for example, the 15,000 pages of commentary on Aristotle) and the lack of scholarly tools (dictionaries, translations) were among the main reasons for this state of affairs. Now, important monographs and the translation project undertaken by Richard Sorabji (which started in mid-1980s) are producing a resource which makes an important part of the commentaries available in English. But much work remains to be done in order to fully understand (let alone disseminate) their views and impact on later thought.[2] Among classicists one aspect in particular has become object of study recently: the scholarly nature of (some of) these commentaries.[3]

This chapter will examine a small aspect of the scholarly method of the commentator Simplicius. It seems appropriate to start with some justification for dealing with an author from Late Antiquity on the theme of orality and literacy, as it is generally assumed that these terms refer to the 'early' stages of Greek culture when writing found its way into the intellectual activities of Greek society. As I shall discuss the methodology of a member of the Platonic school of around 530 AD, the briefest statement to qualify the terms for this period is to say that author belonged to a highly literate and tradition-conscious movement, which taught and studied philosophy building on previous attempts at exegesis. The teaching practice to explain the *texts* of the main thinkers (especially Plato and Aristotle) remained very much *oral* through the ages, but with the additional benefit (if that is the right word) of using writing to preserve discussions and lectures.[4] This does raise the question of what kind of orality (and literacy) we are dealing with. In what follows I shall attempt to argue that, in the case of Simplicius, it concerns a special kind of approach

[2] For an excellent starting-point for finding out more on the latter point see R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and their Influence* (London, 1990).

[3] See for example J. Mansfeld, *Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text* (Leiden, 1994), I. Sluiter, 'Ancient Grammar in Context' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1990) and 'Commentaries and the Didactic Tradition', in G. Most (ed.), *Commentaries—Kommentare* (Göttingen, 1999), 1–33.

[4] All texts referred to and translated are in the standard edition of Aristotelian commentators, the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (1887–1907; = *CAG*) published by the Berlin Academy under the direction of Hermann Diels. For an interesting treatment of preliminary issues (for example, authenticity, aim) discussed in commentaries in antiquity (including Christian authors) see Mansfeld, *Prolegomena.*

to texts. Usually the terms 'orality' and 'literacy' are used in a broad sense, ranging from limited literacy (for example, the mere ability to recognise one's own name) to highly sophisticated literacy which produces multi-layered documents in which notes from oral presentation become overlaid with revisions and added interpretations. Our present case study is closer to the latter. We should therefore not take the two terms as always being mutually exclusive in a strict sense: they are compatible and co-existent phenomena which operate and interact in different ways and at different levels.

The author I shall be discussing is the Platonist Simplicius who wrote a number of elaborate commentaries on Aristotle's works around 530 AD, after he and his colleagues had left Athens upon the closure of the Academy by Justinian's edict (529 AD).[5] The importance of Simplicius' works for recovering the words of many ancient philosophers is undisputed. His commentaries on Aristotle contain massive paraphrases and quotations (see diagram below). A few statistics will make this clear: our text of Parmenides owes 101 of 154 extant Greek verses to Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*;[6] in the case of Empedocles,[7] it is around 150 of 450 lines surviving, and for Anaxagoras 12 'verbatim' fragments of a total of 22.[8] These are just a few examples of how much material (whether quotations, titles or other references) can be found in his commentaries,[9] from sources ranging from the Presocratics (sixth-fifth centuries BC) up to his own time (early 6th century AD).

However, in the scholarly literature Simplicius' use of quotations, and in particular his generosity in quoting, is mostly taken for granted

[5] For Simplicius see I. Hadot (ed.), *Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie* (Berlin, 1987).

[6] See B.M. Perry, 'Simplicius as a Source for and Interpreter of Parmenides' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1983), 6.

[7] That is, from an estimated total of 3000 of his physical poem. Cf. D. O'Brien, *Empedocles' cosmic cycle: A reconstruction from the fragments and secondary sources* (Cambridge, 1969), 150 (but he assumes a physical poem of 2000 lines on the basis of the *Suda* testimony). See now the exciting new publication of the Strasburg papyrus by A. Martin and O. Primavesi, *L'Empédocle de Strasbourg* (*P. Strasb. Gr. Inv. 1665–1666*) (Berlin, 1999), in which further implications regarding the total length of Empedocles' poem are formulated.

[8] Perry, 'Simplicius as a Source', L. Tarán, 'The text of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*', in I. Hadot (ed.), *Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie* (Berlin, 1987), 246–66.

[9] A longer list of authors in Simplicius can be found in Tarán, 'Text of Simplicius', 247.

instead of explained. For a long time his works have been used as quarries and understandably the question of reliability has been dominant. Scholars agree that his longer quotations are reliable, but are less clear about the reasons for their presence in the commentaries. Was this Neoplatonist just an antiquarian delighting in writing long commentaries? Or, did he have specific reasons for his elaborate quotes, perhaps as the result of serious reflection upon his own method?

My aim in this chapter is to focus on Simplicius the scholar and his use of sources. For reasons of space I shall limit my analysis to the ways in which he *introduces* quotations. I have reason to believe that he had specific views about this point, which connects to the theme of orality. I shall present some evidence to show that he reflected on his method, and shall then argue that he provides clues as to why he thinks *direct* quotation is important; I shall conclude by speculating about the question as to why he thought *ipsissima verba* are important by suggesting an implicit motive which may connect his philological method to his philosophical outlook. This three-step-analysis will help to contextualise Simplicius' method and in a way it tells us as much about Simplicius' procedure as it does about our own presuppositions concerning the process of transmission and interpretation of texts.[10]

I. *Preliminary Remarks on Simplicius*

To have at least a general understanding of the aim of Simplicius' project of commenting on Aristotle two preliminary points must be made. First, it is not obvious that Simplicius and his colleagues, who regarded themselves as Platonists, devoted so much time to explaining Aristotle. Their Platonism (often referred to as Neoplatonism) however, which starts with the third century philosopher Plotinus, is of a new brand combining Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Pythagorean elements into a whole new system (see diagram below[11]). It is a

[10] On methods of scholarship see for example H. Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity: interpretations of the 'De Anima'* (London, 1996), chapter 3, and Sluiter, 'Commentaries', *passim*.

[11] The use of this tree model is of course not new. It is standard in manuscript studies, but also in other contexts: see especially J. Mansfeld, 'Doxographical Studies,

remarkable development in this school of thought that since Porphyry, the pupil of Plotinus and editor of the latter's works, the Neoplatonists are seen to harmonise the views of Aristotle and Plato; we know, for instance, that Porphyry wrote a work (now lost) entitled *On Plato and Aristotle being adherents of the same philosophy* (fr. 240T Smith = *Suda* 4.178.24–5), though he also wrote on the differences between them. Whatever *we* think about this, we should accept that Aristotle's works were taught as an introduction to Plato, and thus had a place in the Neoplatonic curriculum.



Quellenforschung, Tabular Presentation and Other Varieties of Comparativism', in W. Burkert, L.G. Marciano, E. Matelli, and L. Orelli (eds.), *Fragmentsammlungen philosophischer Texte der Antike* (Göttingen, 1998), 16–40. Its value for the analysis of the relationships between authors/works is limited and mainly meant to have a convenient graphic representation of chronology and the interrelations (in the first instance based on content resemblance).

One immediate result would be that more often than not doctrinal differences would either be explained from verbal misunderstandings or they would be explained away.[12] Second, I note that Simplicius' important and impressive commentaries stand out in several respects, of which I cite four: (i) whereas most of the Neoplatonic writings are notes taken during a lecture (or perhaps private tutorial),[13] the so-called *scholia apo phônês* or 'notes taken from the (teacher's) voice' (representing the words of the teacher, not the author), Simplicius' works are scholarly, written comments (*hypomnêmata*) on a text presumably meant for readership. Thus they may be considered as a more edited type of work representing his own views.[14] (ii) Unlike most Neoplatonists, he has the habit of using explicit named references to his sources.[15] (iii) Much of the material he provides is found nowhere else (especially on the Presocratics). (iv) In many cases we are able to distinguish fairly well between context and quotation, which creates the impression that these are direct quotations.[16] It is

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[12] See R. Sorabji, 'The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and their Influence* (London, 1990), 5: 'Syrianus had Proclus study Aristotle as the "Lesser Mysteries" serving to introduce the "Greater Mysteries" of Plato'. Cf. Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 7, 23–32, where he claims the task of a commentator is to show the general agreement between the two philosophers. There had been an earlier stage in the Academy some generations after Plato when a harmonizing tendency developed under Antiochus (c. 130 BC), see John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (Ithaca, 1977), 57–8.

[13] The latter holds, as Richard Sorabji kindly reminded me, of Proclus' having been taught by Syrianus (cf. previous note) at the latter's house, see Marinus, *Life of Proclus*, 12–13. The technical term for the reading of a text with a master was *sunanagnôsis* (Elias, *On Aristotle's Categories* 107, 24–6; cf. Sorabji, 'Ancient Commentators', 5 n. 28, and Mansfeld, *Prolegomena*, chap. 1).

[14] On acroamatic, hypomnematic writings see I. Hadot and Ph. Hoffmann, *Commentaire sur les catégories* (Leiden, 1990), 22, 65, 67–75. The two cannot be kept separate in every case, because the lecture notes could be reworked into a commentary; cf. E. Lamberz, 'Proklos und die Form des philosophischen Kommentars', in J. Pépin and H.D. Saffrey (eds.), *Proclus, Lecteur et Interprète des anciens* (Paris, 1987), 1–20, *OCD*[3] s.v. 'scholion'.

[15] See H.J. Blumenthal, 'Plotinus in later Platonism', in H.J. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus (eds.), *Neoplatonism and Early Christianity* (London, 1981), 213: 'The later Neoplatonists are, to varying extents, prone to reproduce material from their predecessors, without acknowledging its provenance'.

[16] Two qualifications are necessary here: (1) we should beware of the inference that 'direct' implies 'accurate'. In addition, Simplicius and Alexander report that they had access to different manuscripts with different versions of the text, and on many occasions they discuss the merits of the variant readings. We should not forget that Simplicius would not have at his disposal the modern editorial techniques to (easily) separate out quotation from the main narrative (either in his sources or in his own work), although Christian Wildberg has made an interesting case for

clear then that Simplicius' commentaries are more scholarly than other Neoplatonic works. But this feature easily leads to misunderstanding the nature of his writings. The main proviso therefore is to avoid a quasi-modern picture of the commentator and to strive for a well-informed judgement on his method and motives which is grounded in the text.

II. *Introducing quotations: 'theory' and practice*

When we now turn to the writings of this prolific commentator, there is one basic question which, as far as I am aware, has not been asked: *Why* does Simplicius use quotes the way he does? This leads to the even more specific: Why did he not suppress the words of earlier thinkers? Thus, there are several remarks from which it can be gleaned that he often gives us long quotes when he need not do so. I have found at least three clear remarks which indicate what he thought about the writing of commentaries: they show that he regarded writing as an important tool for interpretation, for instance when he states (*On Aristotle's Categories* 3, 4–6) 'my aim is . . . to acquire by way of writing . . . a more accurate understanding of what Iamblichus said'. An even stronger view is found in his *On Epictetus' Enchiridium* p. 194.57–60:[17] 'For he who writes will become both more sensitive to the words and also gradually convinced of their truth'. Even if both statements express his own involvement in the learning process by way of a 'leading of the soul' (*psukhagôgia*) towards a progressed level of understanding (the emphasis is on the content of the text studied), this process is clearly facilitated by the use of writing (*ek tou graphein akribesteran tôn eirêmenôn katanoêsin*).[18] It is essential that we take these authorial remarks seriously if we want to judge Simplicius by his own standards and intentions.

the early use of quotation marks (see below). (2) There are of course many problems in separating out quotation from context in the case of prose writers, see for example F. de Haas, 'Philoponus on Theophrastus on Composition in Nature', in J. Van Ophuijsen and M. Van Raalte (eds.), *Theophrastus. Reappraising the Sources* (New Brunswick, 1998), 171–89.

[17] I. Hadot (ed.), *Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Epictete* (Leiden, 1996).

[18] I am grateful to Frans de Haas for discussion of these passages, which helped to improve my wording, though he may not fully agree with my interpretation.

Further information on how Simplicius reflected on his method is forthcoming from an interesting remark in the commentary *On Aristotle's Physics* where there is some, though slight, evidence that Simplicius distinguished between the accuracy of prose and verse. After a discussion of Parmenides' obscure poem, Melissus' writing in prose is singled out as allowing a more accurate interpretation because of its clarity[19] (*On Aristotle's Physics* 111, 15–17): 'But since Melissus wrote in an archaic style but not unclearly, let us set down those archaic sentences themselves so that those who read them may more accurately judge among the more appropriate interpretations'.[20] These three remarks provide some general idea of his method concerning the writing of commentaries, but they already indicate that this is an author who reflects on his interpretive procedure, and wants his audience to know that he does (I leave open for the moment whether 'audience' means listeners or readers).

We should therefore move on to evidence for specific motives in quoting. How does Simplicius introduce his quotations and what can we learn from his remarks? We find a variety of *explicit* motives, as is only to be expected from a man with a complex scholarly and philosophical background using such a variety of sources. Yet the majority seem to have one or two features in common which are relevant for our purposes. I list a selection of cases connected to specific thinkers (mostly from his *Physics* commentary).

In an *ad hominem* objection against Philoponus with whom he was engaged in a fierce polemic about several issues (especially the beginning of the universe) to show the character of a person, he states: 'I have quoted so much of his words in order to show what kind of man he is' (*On Aristotle's Physics* 1333, 33, after a long quote from Philoponus). Here, the polemical context induces him to use an argument from character to make his point, namely that this person is rambling and not worth our attention.[21]

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[19] It is perhaps a moot point whether Simplicius intends to distinguish between genres rather than individual styles, which happen to be either in verse or prose, but the internal opposition with regards to Melissus between 'archaic, yet not unclear' implies that he does at least differentiate between clarity of style and thought.

[20] Translation: J. Barnes, *The Presocratics* (Harmondsworth, 1987), 147.

[21] For an excellent treatment of the polemical strategy of Simplicius against Philoponus, see Philippe Hoffmann, 'Simplicius' Polemics', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* (London, 1987), 57–83.

In a number of cases he tries to adduce evidence to be more persuasive in his argument. For instance, he may want to show abundance of evidence by indicating that there is more material than he is actually going to quote (*On Aristotle's Physics* 331, 10 after several quotations): 'and one could find more of that sort of views to quote from Empedocles' physics', or to substantiate a paraphrase in order to indicate that his reporting in paraphrase is adequate (*On Aristotle's On The Heaven* 140, 30–2): 'to make sure that I do not seem to be making empty claims (*kenas makarias*), I shall give a short quotation from Empedocles' poem'. One point in particular emerges, namely that he is emphasizing that direct quotation is a useful tool in proving one's point.

Two remarks which may have earned him the label of antiquarian are worth noting. One is on the Pythagorean Archytas (*On Aristotle's Categories* 352, 22–4): 'because of the rarity of Pythagorean writings I shall copy out the whole passage of him on this topic'; another (famous) remark is that on Parmenides' poem in which his intention to preserve material from oblivion is expressed (*On Aristotle's Physics* 144, 25–8): 'at the risk of seeming tedious, I would like to transcribe in this commentary Parmenides' verses on the one being (they are not many), both to justify what I have said about the matter and because of the rarity (*spanin*) of Parmenides' treatise'.[22]

From these examples, we can already see that his procedure is inspired by sound considerations of argument, clarity of interpretation, and historical awareness.[23] Here he no doubt was inspired by Aristotle himself, going against a recent trend to use testimonia *as a demonstration* (*On Aristotle's Physics* 1318, 10–15): 'it is Aristotle's habit after demonstrations to introduce the testimonies of his predecessors as agreeing with his demonstrations, in order on the one hand to teach and compel his readers through his demonstrations, and on the other to make the belief more certain in his hearers through the

[22] Translation: Barnes, *The Presocratics* (modified). In the case of Parmenides, there is a problem as to the transmitted version of some of his verse lines. We know of one passage for which Simplicius (532 AD) had a different version from that of Proclus (412–485 AD): see John Whittaker, 'Parmenides, Fr. 8, 5', in John Whittaker (ed.), *God Time Being. Two Studies in the Transcendental Tradition in Greek Philosophy* (Oslo, 1971), 16–32 (with earlier literature).

[23] On the relative decline of education and literacy in Late Antiquity see W.V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), chap. 8.

testimonies; he does not employ the testimony of predecessors as demonstrations, as is the habit of more recent writers'.[24]

In other words, testimonies serve to illustrate and reinforce rather than prove a point at issue. Note how this also implies that he regards quotation-plus-interpretation as the correct format for his exegetical strategy. Further study of passages such as these provides an interesting insight into how he marks out direct quotations with two particular verbs.

III. *Straight from the philosopher's mouth?*

Now that we have seen that Simplicius did reflect on his methodology, had specific criteria for selecting quotations, and was quite particular about the importance of *ipsissima verba*, we may look at some peculiar features of his method of signposting this narrow set of quotations, while also drawing together some work of other scholars. And it is at this point that I propose to adopt a particular stance on his method: I take his handling of quotations as somehow related to the Platonic view on the spoken and written word. Two kinds of considerations point us in this direction.

First, as we saw in some interesting examples (more or less implicitly expressed), Simplicius clearly regarded quotation as an essential part of his exegetical procedure.[25] It is also clear when he gives longer quotes than strictly necessary, and actually adds excuses for 'going on a bit', notably for a rather learned audience. Thus, at *On Aristotle's Physics* 29, 3–5 he says: 'Perhaps there is nothing wrong in my digressing (*mêkunai*) somewhat in order to demonstrate to those with a rather great desire for knowledge, how despite the apparent disagreement concerning their doctrines on the principles, the ancients are nevertheless in harmonious agreement' (trans. Perry). Thus, he

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[24] Translation: R. McKirahan, *Simplicus on Aristotle's Physics 8, 6–10* (London, 2001).

[25] Cf. Perry, 'Simplicius as a Source', 128, 264–5, 267. Recently Sedley has noted a similar approach in the Anonymus *Commentary on Plato's Theaetetus* (first century BC or AD)—in 'Plato's *Auctoritas* and the Rebirth of the Commentary Tradition', in J. Barnes and M. Griffin (eds.), *Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome* (Oxford, 1997), 129, he concludes: 'He wants to vindicate Plato's authority . . . It is done by devoting the closest possible attention, page by page, to the *ipsissima verba* of Plato's text'.

dismisses those who use certain lists of views as evidence that they disagreed.[26] At *On Aristotle's Physics* 80, 16–17 he criticizes a previous commentator, Alexander: 'I am forced to be more elaborate (*mêkunai*) because of the rather unimaginitive (*xêroteron*) and careless way (*aphereponôs*) in which the quite expert commentator on Aristotle, Alexander, understands the views'.

Second and more importantly, Simplicius in many cases clearly marks direct quotations: apart from paraphrasing and introducing quotes with verbs of speaking (*legei, phêsi*), he uses two specific and markedly different verbs for signposting his quotations. The first is παρατίθεσθαι (comparable is παράγραφειν) which may mean 'to mark as a quote', 'to quote'. In a very short but interesting article Christian Wildberg has pointed out that in the commentators this verb is almost always used to introduce fairly accurate quotation.[27] As far as I have been able to verify this also holds for Simplicius (for example, *On Aristotle's On The Heaven* 82, 10–14, *On Aristotle's Physics* 144, 25–8 quoted above).

But we can go one step further. A second verb of interest is ἀκούειν. Often the two basic meanings of the verb, (1) hearing and (2) understanding, are operating separately and sometimes they are bound up with each other. But in a number of cases ἀκούειν has a specific meaning: when combined with the participle in the genitive of a verb of speaking or writing it merely introduces a quotation.

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[26] He mentions *anagraphais historikais* (*On Aristotle's Physics* 28, 33–4). These 'lists' may belong to the doxographical tradition, which (in a sense) started with Theophrastus (see H. Baltussen, *Theophrastus Against the Presocratics and Plato. Peripatetic Dialectic in the De sensibus* [Leiden, 2000], 234–45), and then became stock and trade of the sceptical tradition (Sextus Empiricus), and were taken over by the Christian authors (for example, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius) to prove the permanent *diaphônia* among Greek (pagan) philosophers.

[27] A possible exception is Themistius, *In de anima* 107, 30 Heinze (*CAG* 5.3); cf. for example the famous Empedocles passages from his poem (31B, 17 [H. Diels and W. Kranz [eds.], *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* [Zurich, 1969]), which is introduced with the same verb (Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 161.14); see also C. Wildberg 'Simplicius und das Zitat. Zur Überlieferung des Anführungszeichens', in F. Berger (ed.), *Symbolae Berolinenses.* Für Dieter Harlfinger (Amsterdam, 1993), 187–199, especially 193–4 with notes, who translates 'ganz genau zitieren' (is not the same as verbatim), and points out the very interesting implication that Simplicius does not distinguish between the basic meaning of *paratithesthai/paragraphein*, 'marking a text with signs' (in the margin) and 'quoting', so that it is possible that Simplicius himself marked citations (adducing *On Aristotle's Categories* 64.20–25). For more examples see my 'Additional Fragments of Eudemus in Simplicius' commentary *On Aristotle's Physics*', in W.W. Fortenbaugh and I. Bodnár (eds.), *Eudemus of Rhodes* (New Brunswick and London, 2002), 127–156.

What should we make of this? Is this a literary fiction? Or, were these notes meant to be read and listened to in the classroom as has been suggested?[28] Such considerations would go against the common view that Simplicius' commentaries 'were composed for reading and not, like most of the school's output, for delivery as lectures'.[29]

I think there is another way of taking these occurrences. In a recent article Dirk Schenkeveld[30] has persuasively argued that the prose usage of the verb ἀκούειν in combination with a participle in the genitive (for example, λέγοντος) can mean 'to *read* what X has said/written'; as he did this on the basis of examples from the Hellenistic period until the fourth century AD, we should ask whether this also holds for our sixth century AD Neoplatonist Simplicius. It would seem that his use of the verb has the same function—I should perhaps add that it makes no significant difference whether we take it as 'to listen' or as 'to read'. What is important is that Simplicius is saying with even more emphasis that the *original words matter* in certain cases.[31] Two examples may suffice to substantiate this:

> *On Aristotle's On The Heaven* 566, 4–5: ὅτι γὰρ οὐ πάντῃ πάντως ταύτας ἀρχὰς ὑπελάμβανον τῶν σωμάτων, ἄκουε τοῦ Πλάτωνος λέγοντος

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[28] See for example J. Barnes, S. Bobzien, K. Flannery, and K. Ierodiakonou, *Alexander of Aphrodisias On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.1–7 (London, 1971), 6.

[29] J. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London, 1971), 138–9. Cf. A.C. Lloyd, 'Simplicius', in P. Edwards (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 7 (New York, 1967), 448–9, especially 448: 'His surviving commentaries . . . are both more learned and more polemic than would have been suitable for students'.

[30] 'Prose Usages of AKOUEIN "To Read"', *CQ*[2] 42 (1992), 129–141. His article is based on Greek prose texts up to the fourth century AD and gives a thorough overview of cases. For earlier but less extensive analyses on this aspect in philosophical texts see F. Schroeder and R. Todd (eds.), *Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect* (Toronto, 1990), 25–9, with reference to previous comments on the issue (I owe this reference to R. Sorabji). More recent contributions have tried to further narrow down the meaning of the verb in certain occurrences casting doubt on whether *akouein* can mean 'read', but as R.W. Sharples and J. Opsomer admit ('Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Intellectu* 110.4: "I heard this from Aristotle". A Modest Proposal', *CQ*[2] 50 [2000], 254 and note), cases of *akouein legontos* as a rule refer to views taken from *texts*.

[31] A proviso regarding the 'original words' must be stated: as noted earlier, accuracy is a moot point here. We should think of 'original words' as the words Simplicius thought to be the original words, or as he presented them as the original words. That he was capable of misrepresenting views has been shown in recent publications; for example, M. Rashed, 'A "new" text of Alexander on the soul's motion', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle and After* (London, 1997), 181–95, on the basis of new evidence (extensive marginal excerpts in a Paris manuscript).

> Because they did not assume these principles of the bodies fully in all respects; listen to/read what Plato says . . .
>
> *On Aristotle's Physics* 363, 16: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις ἡ ὕλη γράφει, καὶ τῆς τούτου ἐξηγήσεως ἀκουστέον.
>
> Because Alexander writes 'or the matter [is] in the things that come to be', we should also listen to/read his exegesis . . .

All cases (and there are many more)[32] mark a quotation with ἀκούειν. They emphasize the intentional use of quotation as a means of proving a point, and very often when he is polemically engaged.

Thus, not only do we find Simplicius using different ways of introducing quotations, and possibly suggesting different levels of accuracy, but he also gives particular pride of place to direct quotation. It would be rash however to explain Simplicius' approach from our point of view as one of aiming for historical accuracy or as a correct way of acknowledging the work of others—though it is fair to say that what we see here are the first signs of such a 'modern' approach. Nor would it be helpful to say that Simplicius was right in quoting as he did, but for the wrong reasons. Thus, I turn to my last point and speculate briefly on another possibility, which I present as a hypothesis for further investigation.

The important question *why* Simplicius thought direct quotation is important has not been answered, even if we have highlighted one little aspect of his quotation habits which I hope may counter to some extent his reputation as an antiquarian. I venture to suggest that the evidence may be used to connect this attitude and the view, held by Plato, Plotinus and other Neoplatonists as well, that speaking is extremely important in philosophy, and more appropriate to do philosophy and reach an understanding of reality. Some additional considerations can be adduced to clarify this idea.

Most of us are familiar with the paradoxical *Phaedrus* passage on the appropriate use of speaking and writing, and the strong qualifications formulated there on doing philosophy in written form.[33] The paradox was well formulated by M.M. MacKenzie: 'It has long been

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[32] I am still in the process of collecting and analysing relevant cases, but see for example *On Aristotle's Physics* 363, 15–6, *On Aristotle's On The Heaven* 454, 24 and 29–30, *On Aristotle's On The Heaven* 168, 15–18, 169, 2–3, *On Aristotle's Physics* (excursus on 'place') 644, 25–6.

[33] For an interesting interpretation of this aspect of Plato's position see T. Szlezák, *Reading Plato* (London, 1999), 39–65, whom I follow in the main points.

recognised that this passage is odd. Here is Plato writing a book which repudiates the writing of books . . . Socrates says it, but Plato writes it. If he writes to convince, he writes that writing should not convince us; if what he writes does convince us, it convinces us that it should not convince us.'[34] We should take note however of the fact that there is an embarrassed silence in the Platonic tradition on this passage (apart from a very short remark in a commentary from a lecture of Syrianus, Proclus' teacher, Hermias, *In Phaedrus* 275a–c).[35] It would be interesting to investigate whether we can witness a changing attitude towards the role of writing among Platonists up to Proclus in the fifth century AD, as Sedley has recently pointed out. For instance, Proclus' remark on *mimêsis* ('re-enactment') may represent the culmination of a line of thinking about the role of the proems in Plato's dialogues[36] as (implicit) guides for ethical conduct among the Middle Platonists (first century BC to third century AD): 'Plato uses the actual imitation (*mimêsis*) of the best men to sketch to us the main outline features of appropriate actions. And these have a much more powerful effect than things stored away in bare rules. For imitation has its own special way of shaping the lives of those who read it '(Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum* 1 16.6–12 Diehl; trans. Sedley).

The point here is that Plato teaches by example (which is an 'outline', *hypographê*, cf. *Republic* 548d2) rather than by prescriptive rules: we can read about them but they are not the full and finished product, since these actions have to be internalized in order to be functional. In other words, they are first of all meant to change one's attitude and state of mind, which can only be the result of going through a process rather than just reading them: in short, individuals have (to learn) to think for themselves.

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[34] M.M. MacKenzie (now McCabe), 'Paradox in Plato's Phaedrus', in *PCPS* 28 (1982), 65.

[35] See P. Couvreur, *Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum Scholia* (Paris, 1901). A similar omission in the discussion of this work in Simplicius who only refers to part of the passage in passing, see *On Aristotle's On The Heaven* 25, 34–6 with Hoffmann, 'Simplicius' Polemics', 66–7.

[36] The Neoplatonists had two basic positions regarding the proems: they were meant 'to draw moral lessons from the dramatic presentation of the characters (Porph.) or they would teach us about the subject studied in the dialogue (Iambl.)': R. Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 AD.* A Sourcebook, 3 vols. (London, forthcoming 2003), 'Logic', Section 2.B(ii).

Could then Simplicius' emphasis on the original words perhaps be inspired by the thought that teaching by the living voice (*viva voce*) was superior to writing,[37] as was suggested in a programmatic way by Plato (*Phaedrus* 276–8, cf. *Epistle* 7, 342a–244d)? Such a suggestion would perhaps make sense of the *de facto* approach found in the examples discussed above; we should in addition not forget that it was Ammonius Saccas,[38] the Alexandrian teacher of Plotinus, who wrote nothing (*Vita Plotini* 20) and thus presumably practised what Plato preached.

Though speculative, this possible motive behind the direct quotations would fit in with Simplicius' insistence on using these both as the appropriate first step to grasp the meaning of their words and as proof that (in his view) he uses these words responsibly. But it also leaves us with an interesting paradox: the long quotes in Simplicius may be a deliberate attempt to 'recreate' the living voice through *ipsissima verba*, but how then should we explain their occurrence in a *written* commentary? Should we conclude that the oral tradition, for better or for worse, had become enshrined in writing—in works, that is, referred to as *hypomnêmata*, 'reminders' or notes in the form of a running commentary? Possibly.[39] But it does raise further questions about the intended audience of Simplicius and his objectives in writing these commentaries.[40] There can be little doubt that the

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[37] Essential reading on this topic is M. Richard, '*Apo Phônês*', *Byzantion* 20 (1950), 191–222.

[38] Not to be confused with his namesake Ammonius, son of Hermeias, who wrote a number of *monobibloi* and some commentaries, and of whom we have *apo phônês* writings by Philoponus with some comments by the latter: see L. Westerink, 'The Alexandrian Commentators', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and their Influence* (London, 1990), 326–7.

[39] Cf. *Phaedrus* 275a, where writing is labelled *hypomnêseôs pharmakon*. Presumably here Plato is implying that writing might replace (the power of) memory and this was taken as a negative development. One wonders whether his works could have the additional function of self-advertisement, as Tarrant has suggested for the works of the earlier Greek thinkers: 'Orality and Plato's Narrative Dialogues', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece* (Leiden, 1996), 135. Tarrant's punchline on this page is particularly interesting: 'One's oral teaching was what one wanted the reader to hear, one's written teaching little more than a provocative preview.'

[40] In view of the marked features highlighted earlier one could ask whether his works arose in teaching. Sluiter's opening remark that 'the existence of a commentary on any given text is evidence that that text was used in teaching' ('Commentaries', 1) may not apply to Simplicius, although it is clear from many of his remarks that his motive is (also) didactic. It is rather unfortunate that we

cumulative effect of learning—itself stimulated by the use of writing—had outgrown the human capacity for memorising. Obviously the (re)presentation of the views of others will produce a type of orality or 'oral teaching' different from the Platonic philosophy as such, or from the different stages of the writings preserving oral teaching (where revisions could enter into the lecture notes); that is, it would have a subsidiary role in the overall framework. But it seems that this would be a difference of degree rather than of kind: if doing philosophy is essentially an activity of living souls (*Phaedrus* 277b–c),[41] then it remains true that whatever is written down cannot be sufficient for conveying ideas in all their richness of detail especially when this is combined with the interactive process of continuous feedback in philosophizing, which ideally leads to a mental state, a flexible attitude rather than a fixed belief.

IV. *Conclusion*

In this chapter I have studied a small detail of the methodology of Simplicius the scholar in order to (i) draw attention to his interest for the history of scholarship and commentaries, and (ii) contribute to our understanding of the reception of Classical philosophy in Late Antiquity.

We started by looking at some passages empirically in order to assess what his approach is, and extended existing research on exegetical issues of the use of earlier texts. Special attention was paid to the way in which quotations are introduced, in particular the use of special verbs which mark quotations in such a way that they become privileged as being somehow more 'direct' than others. As such these works represent a form of literacy which incorporates second order thoughts on and differentiates between exegetical paraphrase and

have no information about where he wrote his works. The availability of so many books almost implies he had a good library to consult. In discussion John Garcia pointed out that, if Simplicius had been travelling from Greece to Persia and then to the provincial town of Harran (Carrhae), it would be more likely that he had codices rather than book rolls (cf. Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 294–5). But Simplicius' whereabouts are a moot point; for the most recent account see R. Thiel, 'Simplikios und das Ende der neuplatonischen Schule in Athen', *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz* (Stuttgart, 1999).

[41] See Szlezák, *Reading Plato*, 40.

direct (or approximate) quotation. But the different motives we examined do not easily fit into one explanatory model and no doubt much more work needs to be done to survey the available material and shore up our provisional conclusions.

In addition, we speculated about possible motives for this approach. By making writing an important part of his method, as indicated twice (quoted above), Simplicius may have sought to circumvent the paradox involved in the critique of writing found in Plato, if not consciously than perhaps intuitively. Despite the lack of explicit evidence for this suggestion, it seems to me to be a helpful hypothesis to make sense of the question why the Neoplatonists show no awareness of the tension between philosophising in written and spoken form.[42] Moreover, Simplicius' polemical drive may be contributing to this attitude, as part of the attempt to save pagan philosophy from the growing presence of the Christian faith—and one might add that his strenuous efforts may be taken as an indication that he was fighting a lost battle.[43]

Plato had tried to solve the problem of how to convey and perpetuate his philosophical ideas by writing dialogues, a strategy which is now thought to make the point through content as well as form.[44] Simplicius seems to have extended this strategy even further by merging the (Aristotelian) use of testimonies with the exposition of philosophy in writing, but rather than quoting straight from the philosopher's mouth, he had to make do with 'voices from the past', taken straight from the philosopher's pen.

[42] They did think that the writing of *dialogue* was acceptable—despite Plato's rejection of plays—because in dialogues the characters are subjected to examination, according to Olympiodorus' commentary *On the Gorgias* 1,7–19 Westerink (see Sorabji, *Philosophy of the Commentators*). But they do not seem to object to *writing as such.*

[43] One could argue that this was also the case for Plato and his resistance to the growing influence of writing.

[44] On the relevance of the form of dialogues for Plato's philosophizing see C. Gill and M.M. McCabe (eds.), *Form and Argument in Late Plato* (Oxford, 1996).

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